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PREFACE

Decisions regarding terms and conditions of employment must be
made in every employer-employee situation;

these decisions can be

made unilaterally by either management, labor or government or by some
combination and compromise among these three groups.

Collective bar

gaining is the particular combination and compromise developed for
private employee decisions in the United States; government makes the
rules-of-the-game within which managements and unions hammer out the
terms and conditions of the work agreement.
Before collective bargaining could gain the protection and support
of the general community, however, two conditions were necessary.
First, collective bargaining had to possess a strategic constituency
which believed that it was superior to the other methods for resolving
industrial conflict.

And second, it had to be regarded as more of a

social asset than as a nuisance, i.e. it had to make a positive con
tribution to the public welfare.

Collective bargaining made a signifi

cant contribution to the public welfare in the following ways:

by

contributing to more peaceful labor-management relations; by providing
a measure of bargaining equality for workers in their attempt to secure
economic benefits; by enhancing the freedom and "dignity of workers
through protection against arbitrary procedures and exploitation on the
part of management; and by expanding democracy into the economic order
through giving workers a voice in the determination of those policies
and decisions which affect their work lives.

Collective bargaining has primarily been an instrument for
adjusting and compromising the private interests of labor and manage
ment.

The guideposts, however, are essentially an expression of pub

lic concern for the failure of some major agreements to produce
results compatible with the broader public interest.

Clearly, if

collective bargaining must now consider the public interest aspect of
wage decisions it will have to acquire a new dimension.

The central

question investigated in this dissertation is whether this new dimen
sion constitutes a broad scale limitation of collective bargaining.
Behind this question is the recognition that any broad scale limita
tion of collective bargaining will produce several changes.

First,

the decline of the social institutions for which collective bargain
ing is the core function— the trade unions.

Second, the decline of

collective bargaining and all of its positive contributions to the
public welfare.

And finally, an increase in the number of industrial

disputes that would be resolved either by default in favor of manage
ment or by government edict.

Collective bargaining cannot be preserved

as the principal technique for resolving labor-management conflicts
unless all new public demands on collective bargaining are fully
explored and understood.

This dissertation explores the nature of the

demands imposed on collective bargaining by the wage-price guideposts.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to the following:
to Professors William J. Stober, Robert F. Smith and Lee J. Melton for
their assistance, advice and guidance in the preparation of the manu
script; to the Graduate School Foundation of Louisiana State University
for travel funds for the collection of data; to Professor Kenneth
Boulding for valuable suggestions on legitimacy and social justice;

to my typist, Mrs. Harry Minkler, for her valuable assistance; to my
family for their financial assistance and moral support, and to my
wife whose help amdi encouragement made it worthwhile.

The author is

solely responsible for whatever deficiencies the manuscript may have.
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ABSTRACT

Decisions regarding terms and conditions of employment must be made
in every employer-employee relationship; and can be made in only four
ways:

unilaterally by either management, labor, or government or by some

combined decision making involving all three groups.

Collective bargain

ing is the particular combination used in the United States.

Government

functions as the rule maker and enforcer, and the parties negotiate
within this framework of rules.

Thus, collective bargaining is primarily

an instrument for adjusting and compromising the private interests of
labor and management.
The wage-guideposts express public concern and insistence that the
results of major collective bargaining agreements be compatible with
the public interest.

Clearly, if collective bargaining must now con

sider the public interest aspect of wage decisions directly it will have
to acquire a new dimension.

The central purpose of this dissertation is

to determine the changes in collective bargaining produced by the guidepost dimension and whether these changes constitute a broad scale limi
tation of collective bargaining.

It is recognized that any broad scale

limitation of collective bargaining will severely limit trade unions
thereby limiting collective bargaining and the freedom, dignity, and
participation of workers, and that it will increase the number of
employer-employee disputes that would be resolved either by management
or by government edict.

Guidepost statements must be distinguished from guidepost policy
in the attempt to determine the effect of the guideposts on collective
bargaining.

The statements represent nothing more than information as

to the long-run behavior of real wages and economy wide productivity in
a highly competitive economy and probably has only a minor educational
impact on the parties to collective bargaining.

Guidepost policy, how

ever, represents a commitment by the Chief Executive to use the guidepost information and the persuasive powers of his office to produce noninf lationary price and wage decisions.

Guidepost policy was intended

to produce the following four changes in collective bargaining:

(1)

broadened definition of the public interest in collective bargaining,
(2) narrowed range for decision making in collective bargaining in
which the public interest must be directly considered, (3) harder bar
gaining over the wage-benefit package, and (4) a better understanding
of the economics of wages, prices, costs, and productivity.

Changes 1,

2, and 4 were realized in some degree, but the guideposts failed to pro
duce harder bargaining primarily because of the failure to produce price
decreases in high productivity industries and because of the decentra
lized nature of collective bargaining in the United States.

The guide-

post policy also had two unintended effects 6n collective bargaining—
government review of the terms of selected agreements and a challenge to
the legitimacy of the union.

The former threatened the privacy of the

parties and the latter threatened the continued existence of the union.
The recent shift away from a rigid guidepost policy to guidepost state
ments will lessen the threat of these unintended changes.
The guidepost policy poses the most serious threat for collective
bargaining when it is imposed on the parties as a disguised form of

vii

wage control.

When the guideposts are imposed as general guides, as

they have been recently, then they do not pose a serious threat to
collective bargaining.

Studies of the impact of the guideposts on

collective bargaining should continue, however, since this institution
cannot be preserved unless all new public demands are explored and
understood.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The development and use of wage-price guideposts represents the
policy culmination of nearly twenty years of governmental concern with
the content of collective agreements.'*'

Prior to the Great Depression,

there was little need for such concern:

unions covered only a small

fraction of the labor force, the collective agreements in existence
were highly localized, and the beliefs and ideology of the country
opposed governmental control of the level of economic activity.

By the

end of World War II these conditions had changed— industry wide collec
tive bargaining had become commonplace and the monetary-fiscal philos
ophy of the country had changed enough to permit the government to com
mit itself to the active control of the level of economic activity.
Growing public concern with the content of collective bargaining
settlements is immediately deducible from the twin objectives of the
Employment Act— full employment and a stable price level.

2

While either

of these objectives alone can be achieved without great difficulty, what
is sought is a combination of the two— and it is here that collective
bargaining and the twin goals of the Employment Act may conflict.

The

^Melvin H. Reder, "The Public Interest in Wage Settlements" in
John T. Dunlop and Neil W. Chamberlain, editors, Frontiers of Collec
tive Bargaining (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), pp. 155177. Also see Appendix A: Chronology of Federal Wage-Price Policy
1945-1962.

2

W. H. Beveridge, Full Employment In A Free Society (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1944), pp. 198-203.

nature of this conflict is as follows.

Assume that effective demand is

set for the full employment level at a given price level.

This desired

price level is not inherently stable, however, for it depends on the
level of many wages, changes in money wages, and the relation of money
wages to product price in which different levels of bargained wages will
produce different product price levels.

If the average increase in

money wages exceeds some critical level, then product prices will
increase.

The monetary-fiscal authorities must then choose between

ratifying the higher price level or forcing prices down by reducing out3
put and employment.

Nature of the Study
The guideposts were suggested as a third policy alternative for the
monetary-fiscal authorities.

Their proponents argued that the guide-

posts would keep changes in money wages within non-inflationary limits,
thereby freeing the monetary-fiscal authorities from the conflict
between collective bargaining and the twin goals of the Employment Act.
To achieve this end, the government, through the guideposts, made cer
tain demands on the parties to collective bargaining and on the collec
tive bargaining process.
In the guideposts the government established three things:

first,

a definition of the public interest in the content of collective bar
gaining agreements (a non-inflationary money-wage settlement); second,
the critical range within which money wages could change without produc
ing inflationary pressures (the average annual increase in nation-wide
productivity); and third, a means of providing the public with the
3

Reder, o£. cit.. pp. 157-158.

information they needed to judge whether a particular wage decision was
in the public interest.

The guideposts were expected to generate a cli

mate of informed public opinion that would insure the responsible use of
wage-setting power.

4

The guideposts marked a shift in government policy toward collec
tive bargaining and in the role played by government in the bargaining
process.

Previously, collective bargaining policy had been aimed toward

securing labor peace by getting the parties to the bargaining table
peacefully and then requiring good faith negotiations.

Agreement was

not required, but any agreement reached was presumed to be in the public
interest.

The guideposts, in effect, served notice that the terms of

some labor agreements were contrary to the public interest, and that
public policy dealing with the content of labor agreements was neces
sary.

Thus, the guideposts thrust a new role upon government:

encing the outcome of wage decisions.

influ

Before wage decisions were

reached, the government could use moral suasion to influence the par
ties.

After wage decisions were made, governmental investigatory and

fact finding powers could be combined with moral suasion to produce wage
results compatible with the public interest.

Either way, the guideposts

required the government to become a more active participant in collec
tive bargaining negotiations.
The guideposts also made certain demands on labor and management and
on the collective bargaining process.

Parties that had previously been

free to pursue their self interests restricted only by competition and

4

Economic Report of the President, together with the Annual Report
of the Council of Economic Advisers, (Washington, D. C. U. S. Govern
ment Printing Office, 1962), pp. 185-190.

the discipline of the market were now asked to put the public interest
ahead of their private interests.
The first reaction of labor and management was immediate and pre5
dictable.

Each blamed the other for the cost-inflation pressures

before rallying to the defense of collective bargaining.

Both labor and

management agreed that collective bargaining was "an essential element
of economic democracy,"^ that is contributed to the achievement of our
national economic goals, and that it should be preserved.

They recog

nized that to survive collective bargaining had to become more respon
sive to the public interest, but rejected the guideposts as a means of
achieving that end.

They also rejected governmental imposition of terms,

formula solutions, and public review of the terms of agreements as
unnecessary, undesirable, and contrary to the purpose of collective bar
gaining.

Government, admittedly, had a useful and vital role to play in

improving the climate for bargaining and should restrict its activities
to that role— developing facts, staging conferences, improving mediation
services, and revising the national emergency dispute provisions.

Deter

mination of the terms of the agreement was not, in their opinion, a pro
per function of government and was best left entirely to the parties.7
The guideposts present several unanswered questions for students of
collective bargaining and industrial relations.

Will the demands

imposed on collective bargaining and the parties by the guideposts change

^See official statements by representatives of labor and management
in the Joint Economic Committee Hearings on the Economic Report of the
President.^CWashington, D. C.;U. S. Government Printing Office,
1962-1968).
^Collective Bargaining, A Report by the President's Advisory Com
mittee on Labor-Management Policy, (Washington, D. C.- 1962), pp. 1-6.
7Ibid.

the nature, structure, and function of collective bargaining?
why not?

If not,

If so, in what ways and what will these changes do to collec

tive bargaining?

Do the guideposts merely represent a tightening of the

rule framework for bargaining or do they signal the first stage in an
entirely new form of industrial relations?

The major purpose of this

study is to investigate these and similar questions as a means of deter
mining the probable impact of the guideposts on collective bargaining.
The major justification for such an inquiry is the belief that our
economic institutions can be preserved and improved only if the effects
of economic changes on these institutions are fully understood.

Rap

idly changing economic conditions continuously alter the nature of the
economic problems encountered, which in turn alter the importance and
hierarchical ranking of economic goals and their supporting economic
policies.

If these goals and policies are to be properly evaluated so

that the basic fabric of our economic system may be preserved, they must
be understood in relation to the economic changes which brought them
about.

Recognition of this fact is not new; it is evident in the

research into the effects of economic change.

Numerous studies have

been made concerning the effects of other specific economic changes on
g

collective bargaining,

but none to date have dealt with the effects of

the wage guidelines on collective bargaining.
g

For example, see Harold W. Davey, Howard S. Kaltenborn, and Stanley
H. Ruttenburg, New Dimensions in Collective Bargaining. (New York:
Harper <5L Bros., 1959) for a discussion of the impact on collective bar
gaining of the AFL-CIO merger, employee security, technological change,
long term contracts, etc. On the other hand, in Arnold R. Weber, The
Structure of Collective Bargaining: Problems and Perspectives. (New
Y o r k : F r e e Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961) the focus is entirely on the
organization, structure and size of the bargaining units, and the locus
of decision making power and their effects on collective bargaining.

Limitation of the Problem
The scope of the inquiry will be limited in several ways.

First,

the study is concerned with wage guidelines and their impact on collec
tive bargaining; it will consider price guidelines only where they are
directly relevant to the effect of wage guidelines on collective bar
gaining.

Second, it will consider primarily contract negotiations,

which are the aspect of collective bargaining directly affected by wage
guidelines, and will consider only briefly contract administration and
enforcement.

Third, it will deal with the period from 1962 to 1967

because this period covers the time from the first official announcement
of the guideposts to a major shift in administrative philosophy.
Finally, this inquiry will concentrate on collective bargaining and
guidepost policy in the United States.

Comparisons with the industrial

relations systems or income policies of other industrial nations will be
made only if it becomes necessary to indicate the international aspects
of the cost-inflation problems.

Organization and Sources
Excluding the introductory and concluding chapters, this study will
be divided into two major sections, each dealing with a different aspect
of the central problem.

The following discussion will outline the sub

jects to be treated in each of these sections, show how each contributes
to an understanding of the central question and indicate the major source
materials to be used.
The first section is intended to provide a clear understanding of
the process of collective bargaining and the role of government in col
lective bargaining which existed before the wage guideposts.

In so doing,

this section will provide the basis for determining the effects of the

wage guideposts on collective bargaining.

The first of the two chapters

in this section will deal with the development of the process of collec
tive bargaining as a means for solving labor relations problems.

It

will contain a survey of the historical development of collective
bargaining and the la\f of collective bargaining.

Chapter three will be

J

devoted to an investigation of the nature of the contemporary or preguidepost collective bargaining.

It will contain a discussion of the

forms of collective bargaining and the multiplicity of bargaining rela
tionships in the United States, the policy goals of collective bargain
ing.

Materials for these two chapters will be drawn from standard works

in Labor Economics and Collective Bargaining and from the appropriate
statutes, and administrative court decisions.
The second part of this study will deal with the development and
meaning of the wage guideline concept and the differences in meaning it
may have assumed through application.
three chapters:

This section will be divided into

The first dealing with the dialogue among policy makers

which led to the guideline concept, the second dealing with the formula
tion, modifications, extension and other changes in the guideline con
cepts; and the third investigating the ways in which the guideposts have
been applied in collective bargaining.
The first of these guidepost chapters, chapter four, will discuss
the economic conditions immediately prior to the development of wage
guidelines, the assumptions regarding the structure of the American
economy underlying the guidelines, the adequacy of existing policy tools
in combating the new inflation, and official pronouncements on the guide
line concept and philosophy.
Chapter five will be devoted exclusively to the development and
refinement of the guidepost concept by the Council of Economic Advisers.

The purpose of this chapter will be to determine if the guideline
philosophy is contrary to the philosophy of collective bargaining and to
provide a more detailed analysis of the policy making process.

Informa

tion for this chapter was drawn from the annual Reports of the Council
of Economic Advisers, testimony of Council members before the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress, and public pronouncements by Council
members.
The sixth chapter shifts the emphasis to the application of the
guidelines.

Its purpose is to determine whether the guidelines have

been applied in a way consistent with their original concept and
whether they were applied in such a way as to constitute a threat to the
continued existence of free collective bargaining.

In order to answer

these general questions, the chapter will identify "key bargains'1 and
potentially inflationary collective bargaining situations.

Also it will

investigate the various means used to apply wage guidepost pressure in
specific cases.

Finally, it will compare the median wage and benefit

packages of major collective bargaining agreements to provide some
insights into the results of the guideposts during the 1962-1967 period.
An important by-product of this chapter will be a summary of the most
frequently encountered policy administration problems.

This material

on major agreements will be drawn from materials on collective bargain
ing gathered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, whiId material on appli
cation of the guideposts to specific bargaining will be gleaned from
news media.

CHAPTER 2
SOLVING LABOR RELATIONS PROBLEMS:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Since this dissertation is intended primarily to investigate the
probable effects of wage guidelines on collective bargaining and to ana
lyze the guidelines as policy tools, it must provide a certain amount of
historical information in order that the problems will be seen in true
perspective.

This chapter will provide this background information, by

concentrating on the historical development of collective bargaining and
the main pieces of legislation which affected this development.

Many of

labor's attempts at collective action were opposed and defeated and did
not lead to true bargaining activity.

The way in tdnich the early war

fare resulting from collective action was gradually changed into a
highly structured bargaining situation will be the main subject of the
following pages.

The Development of the Process of Collective Bargaining
The evolutionary process of collective bargaining discussed in this
section will be approached by the following divisions, which mark off
distinct directions in its development:

unilateral demands and action;

^Throughout the following discussion a formal one-sentence defini
tion of the term "collective bargaining" will be avoided, but the fol
lowing working definition will be used as a guide. Collective bargain
ing is the name given to the process of bilateral determination of the
rules governing the employer-employee relationship. This bilateral rulemaking process includes negotiations between representatives of employ
ees and employer for the purpose of establishing wages, hours, working

10
the tempering of unilateral action; the acceptance ©ff c®Ilective action;
and competition for control of the collective agency.
In tracing the history of collective bargaining, H a s section will
include only those parts of the large history ©ff trade unionism which
concern union bargaining relationships with employers.

Neither a reci

tation of the major names, dates, and events in the development of trade
unions, nor an explanation of the motivation for this development will
be attempted.

Unilateral Demands and Action (prior to 1825])
Before 1800 there was little opportunity for ©©Elective bargaining
to develop.

The economy was agriculturally based amid included only a

few industries, most of which were still in the harodicraft stage.

Much

of the unskilled labor was performed by convicts,, slaves, and indentured
servants.

Only after industrialization was there a class of urban wage

earners -dependent entirely on wages for their livelihood.

2

Once a wage earning class becomes firmly aimd permanently estab
lished, it develops its own sets of values and imstittntions— one of
3
which is an industrial relations system.

However, mmtii these new

conditions and rules governing other conditions ©ff ©nployment for some
determinant period. Such negotiations must conform It© the legal re
quirements of meeting at reasonable times, conferring in good faith and,
if negotiations are successful, producing a written agreement. Addi
tionally, collective bargaining includes the interim period between con
tract negotiations, when the agreement must he administte red, applied,
interpreted, and enforced.
2

Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and labor Bteiations, 3rd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959]), pp. 4-5.
3
John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems ((New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1958), contains a discussion off the framework of an
industrial relations system.

11
values are established, there is conflict with the previous value
system.

The values of an agricultural economy, in which the ability to

work and save determines an individual's success,

are much in conflict

with the concept of collective action which workers find to be necessary
in industrial societies.
Although several instances of early attempts at collective action
can be found,

5

most were, confined to the skilled trades in the larger

coastal cities and were sporadic "...short-lived and uncoordinated
attempts that resulted in journeymen societies of such craftsmen as
printers, shoemakers, coopers, carpenters, and masons."^
These early unions, known as "societies,"" ""associations," "bodies,"
or "combinations" seldom had any permanence or continuity as organiza
tions, but rather "....were raised to life on particular occasions"^ to
deal with a current, or pressing problem.

Lacking any permanent organi

zation and meeting place, they would meet at a member's home, elect
temporary officers and decide, on a plan of action— generally a way to
pressure for a wage change.

John T. Dunlop and James J. Healy, Collective Bargaining; Princi
ples and Cases, rev. ed. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955),
p. 9. Individual savings, for example is directly related to next year's
earnings in an agricultural economy but may he totally unrelated to
earning ability in an industrial economy.
^Fisherman at Richman Island, Maine, struck in 1636 over withhold
ing of wages, and in 1676, the licensed cartmem struck over wage rates.
See Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (®flew York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Co., 1949), p. 21.
Sileil W. Chamberlain and James W. Kuhn, Collective Bargaining,
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1965) p. 4.
''ibid., p. 5,

12
The method of seeking wage change seems to
have been rather simple and direct. The members
of the trade society would gather, agree among
themselves on the "price list" or piece rates
that were to be sought, and take an oath that
none would work for less or work alongside any
journeyman who worked for less. At times, they
would observe the solemn formality of inserting
the revised wage list between the pages of a
Bible, the assembled workers placing their
hands upon it and swearing not to work for less.
Committees from among their number would then
be appointed to visit the shops of the masters
to inform them that their employees would not g
report for work until the demand had been met.
The strategy of the unions was the "turn out" or "stand out"— i.e. to
refuse to work for those employers who refused to meet their demands in
full immediately.

And the employers, not wishing to be first to grant

the wage increase, delayed.
...a strike almost inevitably accompanied union wage
action.
In fact, when the body was considering
making a wage demand upon its employers, the ques
tion before them was often whether the members
should stand out against the employers, the under
lying assumption being that the strike was a nec
essary and integral part of the process of increas
ing wages.^
Asking for more than they wished to receive, giving counter-offers,
and then bargaining was not part of the process.
promise were not intended:
struck.

They were merely trials of strength in which the

of the economically stronger group prevailed until the next con

frontation.

8Ibid.
9

unions demanded, employers delayed, unions

Therefore these confrontations could hardly be called collec

tive bargaining.
wishes

Negotiations and com

Ibid.. p. 6.

After participating in a number of these contests of strength,
employers began to realize that their lack of a solid front weakened
their economic power position.

Consequently, they began to consult with

each other before making any individual commitments.

The employer line

generally came to be one of wearing down the strikers, and blacklisting
those employers who "broke the line."

Counter-offers to union demands

"were virtually unheaidof; the employer merely agreed to demands or
denied thern."^

Win or lose, no compromise, was the battle cry on both

sides, and "...the fight, once started, continued with each side holding
to its original position, until one or the other was worn out and sur
rendered or its organization began to fall apart, with members giving in
on a piecemeal basis.
Although each side would attempt to maintain its tactical advantage
after the battle, neither had any assurance that any terms agreed upon
would be honored.

The agreement was usually only oral and specified no

definite duration. Employers would honor an agreement only until they
believed themselves strong enough to change it, either all at once or a
little at a time.

And since there was no grievance procedure, there was

no alternative for the union but to resort again to economic pressure.
Conversely, unions did not hesitate to try to alter terms of an agree
ment if they felt that they held an economic advantage.

Permanence,

stability, and continuity were simply not part of the process.

As the

economic fortunes of the parties changed with the business cycle, so did

^C . Wilson Randle, Collective Bargaining, Principles and Practices.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 11,
^Chamberlain and Kuhn, op. cit., p. 7, mention several of the rare
instances of negotiation and compromise: The Philadelphia shoemakers in
1799, New York master printers in 1809, and the Philadelphia journeymen
tailors in 1.825,

their behaviors

the unions attempted to impose their will in periods of

rising prices, and the employers theirs when prices were falling.

The Tempering of Unilateral. Action (1825-1850)
The depression of 1819 severely weakened the bargaining power of
unions.

Employment was difficult to obtain and strikers could be

replaced easily.

Unions could not maintain their memberships.

But

attempts at collective action revived with returning prosperity in 1822.
Workers again organized and began to use the old methods of issuing
demands backed by the threat of strikes.
These strikes, did apparently serve one important purpose— .they led
to the beginning of the "city central."

This organization, made up of

workers of more than one occupation or trade, made concerted action on a
city-wide basis possible,

The Philadelphia Mechanics' Union of Trade

Associations (1.827) was the first of these new organizational forms.
Workers in other cities soon saw the advantage of pooling their strength
concerted action by several trades and combined strike funds greatly
increased the unions' ability to unilaterally impose their demands.

The

success of these organizations led to employers' forming associations of
their own, in order to regain lost power.
During the era of rising prices in the early 1830’s, joint collec
tive bargaining conferences between city centrals and employer associa
tions became more frequent.

When the National Trades Union was estab

lished, in an attempt to spread the influence of unions beyond the local
area, the area for collective bargaining was correspondingly widened.
However, the financial panic of 1837 cut short the possibility of a

12Ibid.
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broadened base for collective bargaining.
depression brought unemployment,

The subsequent ten year

lower wages, longer hours, more work

duties, labor-saving devices, and the competition of immigrant labor as
the employer sought to maximize his economic advantage.
movement was virtually destroyed

13

influence again until about 1850.

The trade union

and did not begin to regain its lost
As unions rebuilt their organization,

they again attempted to impose their demands unilaterally.
employers adopted their former methods of resistances

Once more

delay and refuse

to accept the demands; or accept with the intention of repudiating them
later.

The pattern at the end ot this period was much like it was at

the beginnings

employer resistance to unionism and unilateral action by

unions.
Nevertheless, during this period the number of
both union officials and employers who had gained
actual experience in the art of negotiation
increased. Among their number,
a few had become
advocates of collective-bargaining as a policy of
union-employer relations. The idea of collective
bargaining was gaining ground,,^

The Spread of Collective Bargaining (1850-1900)
With the return of prosperity in the

early 1850's, labor turned

from the idealistic and reform tendencies

of the forties andsettled

down to "pure and simple" business unionism.

Their first, tasks were the

organizing of workers into effective, organizations, and the securing of
improvements in conditions of employment.

Early in the period, labor

13

This lengthy depression not only destroyed the labor organiza
tions but also apparently temporarily destroyed the workers' faith in
their ability to solve the problems faced by labor. The period of the
1840!s was characterized by utopian dreams, cooperative movements, ^nd
socialistic, schemes.
14
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was successful in its organizational endeavor:

locals were founded in

skilled trades in nearly all of the principal cities in the country and
more than a dozen national unions were formed.

But labor was lesssuc

cessfulin the early fifties in winning and holding

gains for their mem

bers, for no sooner had the labor movement begun to gain momentum than
it was stalled by the panic of 1857.

Unions could not provide the per

manent organization needed to insure continuous development in the col
lective bargaining process, primarily because they were not yet strong
enough in most cases to withstand major depressions.
With the period of rising prices accompanying the Civil War, unions
again began operating in the familiar pattern:
work to gain concessions.

organize first, then

The increasing ^eman<i f°r goods, rising

prices, and the acute manpower shortage combined to encourage organiza
tional efforts and to place labor in a favorable economic position.
Again labor was virtually starting all over.
...most of the previous tendencies toward col
lective bargaining had disappeared in the sixyear hiatus. As workers drew together to seek
wage increases to offset the rising cost of
living, they did not try to continue joint nego
tiations but returned to the old tried and true
system of unilateral imposition of terms suppor
ted by strike action. They reverted to "first
beginnings.
This time, however, the system of unilateral demands met with
opposition from three sources.

First, individuals who were convinced

that collective bargaining offered the best hope for dealing with labor
problems attempted to alert the public to an awareness of the fact.
Second, employers who opposed unionism attempted to destroy the effec
tiveness of union demands.

Third, the national trade unions preferred

to develop stability even if it meant compromise.

15Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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Among the individuals

who recognized the possibilities

bargaining was Horace Greeley,

in collective

"who looked upon the unions'coercive

efforts as unsuited to a cooperative society and who sought to replace
them with a system of collective b a r g a i n i n g . H e felt that collective
bargaining would result in

the establishment and maintenance of fair

rates of wages:

the workers' standpoint, in that they had a

fair from

voice in their determination, and fair from the employers' standpoint,
in that they too had a voice in their determination, and because it
would remove the competitive pressure of substandard producers by obliga
ting all employers of an industry to abide by the same wage scale.
Although he believed that strikes were caused primarily by the employers'
refusal to bargain over wages, he did not feel that strikes were worth
while to the union because their cost was seldom offset by ensuing wage
increases.^

The effectiveness of Greeley's efforts on behalf of collec

tive bargaining is difficult to assess, but at least the presentation of
his view was m...perhaps the first such concisely ordered statement in
this country

and it

stands as a landmark in the history of collective

bargaining in the United States."

18

The second source of opposition to unilateral action by trade unions
came from employers who opposed unionism.

Their approach was to form

employers" associations, provide mutual help to resist strikes, blacklist
union members, and use other methods to reduce the effectiveness of
unions.

They hoped that weakening or eliminating unions would solve

labor problems.

16Ibid.. p. 31.
17
18

Ibid.. pp. 24-31.
Ibid.. p. 23.
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The third area in which unilateral action met resistance was from
the unions themselves— the national labor unions.

During the prosperous

periods of the 1860's and 1880's, the entire trade union movement
expanded greatly:

membership reached about 300,000 in 61 different

trades in the 1860's, declined to approximately 50,000 during the 18731878 depression,

19

and climbed to about 700,000 during the heyday of the

Knights of Labor in the mid-eighties.

Not only were new local unions

and city centrals formed during each period of expanding membership, but
even more significant from the standpoint of the development of collec
tive bargaining, national unions began to develop.

These national unions

held out the hope of solving the problems which local unions could not
solve, such as financing prolonged strikes, and competition among local
unions.

Before national unions could be successful at solving these

problems, however, they had to acquire a permanent status, with expand
ing memberships, centralized operations, and financial stability— things
which were threatened by unilateral local union demands.
Officers of these new national organizations
soon found unilateral action by their constituent
local unions an embarrassment. For one thing, it
created adverse public reaction at a time when
they were seeking to expand their influence in the
national arena. For another, the local unions
came to expect strike support from the national
treasury, and irresponsible action in the field
threatened the financial stability of the strug
gling national organization.20
Consequently, the national trade unions began an attack on the
practice of unilateral demands:

they placed limitations onthe

strike

actions of locals by requiring them to follow specified bargaining
19
Reynolds, op. cit.. p. 35.

20

Chamberlain and Kuhn, op. cit.. p. 33*
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procedures to qualify for strike benefits.

In this way National Unions

began to encourage the substitution of a reasoned approach for the war
fare inherent in unilateral action.
Collective bargaining was able to take another step toward maturity
after the formation of the American Federation of Labor in 1886.

The
21

Federation was perhaps "more of a philosophy than an organization,"

but as a philosophy it dominated labor's actions for half a century.
The cardinal points of this philosophy of Samuel Gomper's organization
may be summarized as follows.

First, labor must recognize that the

"interests of workers are distinct from those of other groups."

22

Thus,

workers must refuse to be drawn into middle-class reform movements;
instead, they must work for their own interest.

Second, the trade union

movement could achieve solidarity only if it organized by trades and
developed strong national unions with large treasuries and benefit sys
tems.

The federation was to serve only as a confederation of sovereign

national unions, its chief function being to define and enforce jurisdic
tional divisions.

Third, "...labor's objectives should be pursued

mainly on the economic front through collective bargaining."

23

Matters

^dhiich could not be dealt with through collective bargaining should be
handled by bringing pressure on existing political parties:
labor parties were to be avoided.

independent

24

The Federation soon assumed a leading role in the labor movement:
by 1897, membership in affiliated unions reached 265,000 and continued
21
Reynolds, op. cit., p. 45.
22

Ibid.

23Ibid., p. 48.
2^Ibid., pp. 44-48,
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to climb, reaching 548,000 in 1900 and 1,676,000 in 1904.
helped to usher in a new era of collective bargaining:

25

The AFL

the "trade-agree-

ment" era.
The device of the union contract or collective
agreement, which had been used by a few unions in
the 'eighties, became during the 'nineties the
accepted method of dealing with employers. The AFL
hammered out and wrote into union contracts a new
conception of the union as a continuously operating
organization, rather than a sporadic protest and
strike movement. The union was to be a partner,
though perhaps only a Junior partner, in the con
duct of industry. It was to be active every day
in the year, representing the interests of its
members on all fronts, winning small gains which ^
would eventually mount up to an impressive total.
By the end of the century, joint negotiations on a national scale
were being conducted in some form in the following industries:

stove

foundry, general foundry, iron and steel, tin plate, bituminous coal,
stove molding, longshoring, pottery, the various glass trades, machining,
and printing.

27

The national agreement reached by the Molders' Union

and the Stove Founders' National Defense Association in 1891 has been
singled out as inaugurating the era of trade agreements.

28

This agree

ment, following about thirty years of friction between these two groups,
provided for regular termination, a re-negotiation procedure, and a
grievance procedure, and successfully treated several other troublesome
topics.

It proved to be highly successful in settling disputes without

25

Clyde E. Dankert, Contemporary Unionism in the United States.
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), p. 36.
26
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resort to strikes or outside intervention.

29

By the end of this period, some of the country's leading citizens
were beginning to favor the principle of collective bargaining.

In 1896,

the National Civic Federation was founded in Chicago with a program
designed to convince the parties to avoid strikes and lockouts, to
encourage the use of collective bargaining, and to maintain arbitration
and mediation machinery.

Mark Hanna, Samuel Gompers, Grover Cleveland,

John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Charles Schwab, August Belmont, and John
Mitchell were among the members representing labor, management, and the
public.

The promise in the undertaking was never fulfilled however; it

was counteracted by the effects of the Industrial Workers of the World

30

which convinced many employers that opposition to unionism in any form
was the only right course of action.
years of competing tendencies:

The early 1900's, therefore, were

all out employer resistance to unions

and collective bargaining gradually gave way to attempts by employers to
provide substitutes for both.

Competition for Control of the Bargaining Process (1900-1925)
This period was one of hardening resistance to unions and union
activities.

It took many forms— from all out warfare to the more

29

Chamberlain and Kuhn, o£. cit., p. 35. This relationship is still
in existence, being ''...one of the oldest continuous bargaining systems
still operative."
30
The IWW, the first nation-wide attempt to form an industrial
union of workers of all trades, was dedicated to the overthrow of capi
talism and the abolition of the wage system. Plans far the system to
replace capitalism were never clearly formulated beyond the general idea
of a communist society, however. For additional information see Joyce L.
Karnblugh, ed., Rebel Voices: An IWW Anthology, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Uni
versity of Michigan Press, 1964) and Robert Franklin Hoxie, Trade Union
ism in the United States, (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1917, 1923)
and Mark Perlman, Labor Union Theories in America: Background and Devel
opment, (Evanston, 111., Row, Peterson & Co., 1958).
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subtle techniques of undermining union influence by providing substitutes
for union activities.
The tendency away from unilateral action in the years before the
turn of the century did not satisfy those employers who were totally
opposed to unionism.

Instead, the growth in union membership and the

development of collective bargaining only served to solidify their oppo
sition.

Many companies refused to recognize and deal with unions; others

negotiated but then repudiated the agreements when they felt strong
enough; and still other companies resorted to organized combat with the
unions, employing such means as strikebreakers, labor spies, and black
lists.

Well financed employer associations began to emerge to combat the

growth of trade unions.
The National Metal Trades Association adopted
a policy frankly opposed to collective bargaining
through unions. In 1903 the National Association
of Manufacturers followed suit in its "Declaration
of Labor Principles." Also in 1903, more than one
hundred employers' associations joined to estab
lish the Citizens' Industrial association as a
spearhead for the "open-shop" drive, as the anti
union movement came generally to be known.^
Employers who wished to get rid of unions without direct conflict
used other methods.

They assumed that workers joined unions primarily

to achieve higher wages.

By offering workers other means of achieving

this goal, they hoped to undermine the unions' appeal.

These counter

measures to union activities further weakened efforts to improve collec
tive bargaining.
The scientific management movement offered an alternative to col
lective bargaining's method of establishing the amount of wages which
would constitute a "fair day's pay for a fair day's work."
31

Chamberlain and Kuhn, op. cit., p. 36.

The tools
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and techniques of scientific management could be applied by efficiency
engineers to solve the problem by "scientific" principles.

Job tasks and

duties would be determined and arranged to improve efficiency, with the
workers on these jobs paid an incentive rate.

Thus, the questions of

fairness could be resolved scientifically, making collective bargaining
unnecessary.
Unions saw scientific management as an implicit anti-union device
and fought it accordingly.

32

However, as scientific management became

better understood, both sides cane to realize that it was neither as good
nor as bad as it had been painted.

Although its conclusions were syste

matic, they were still based on techniques which involved value judgments
and interpretation.

33

The employee-representation movement presented a more serious threat,
for it was not a frontal attack on collective bargaining or trade unions,
' but an attack on the proper organization for bargaining.

Employers who

installed representation plans were implicitly admitting that collective
rather than individual action was the necessary and desirable condition
for action by industrial workers, but they did not feel that it was
necessary for 'their" workers to be represented by an "outside" organiza
tion.

The company would sponsor an employee representation plan through

which the workers could take collective action.
The various employee-representation plans, though differing greatly
in detail, followed the same basic structure:
32

a constitutional system

See Robert Franklin, Scientific Management and Labor, (New York:
D. Appleton and Co., 1920^ for discussion of influence of scientific
management on labor in theory and in practice. See also Frederich W.
Taylor, Scientific Management, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947).
33
Chamberlain and Kuhn, o£. cit.. p. 38.
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of employee-representation combined with large doses of
couched

in democratic governmental terns,

paternalismand

The citizens of theindus

trial community elected members to a unicameral legislature, so that
representatives had the opportunity to debate each question fully and
prepare recommendations.

Management, however, retained the final deci

sion as to the disposition of these resolutions and there was no final
appeal from their decisions.
The whole plan thus resembled a large grievance
committee through which management could learn the
complaints of the workers and, in turn convey to
them what was being done on their behalf. It was
more a communication system than a means of joint
decision-making. The latter aspect was, however,
stressed by leaders in the movement and employee
representation was made to appear preferable to
collective bargaining, with which strikes, lockouts,
violence, picketing, and such unsavory activities
were associated.
Workers participating in the program soon learned that these plans
often were not all their proponents claimed.

Employee-representation

plans were usually initiated by management, carried out by representa
tives who were in the employ of the company, and ended in decisions by
management from which there was no right of appeal.

Management had con

ceded the right of workers to organize and take collective action but
only as long as it could dictate the terms of the work agreement.
As a result of this stiffened employer opposition to trade unionism
and collective bargaining, and the recessions of 1907, 1910-11, and
1914-15, the growth of the American Federation of Labor was slowed.

By

1914, it had 2 million members, compared to the 1.5 million a decade
before.

However, the heightened business activity created by World War

I again stimulated union growth:

34Ibid., p. 39.

by 1920, the labor movement numbered

4 million, with the AFL accounting for 70 to 80 per cent of this
total.

35

At the outset of the conflict, a War Labor Board was created

to promote peaceful labor relations and uninterrupted production.
Although the Board enunciated a policy defending the right of workers to
organize and bargain collectively, and required management to negotiate
with its employees, it did not require management to deal with other
than its own employees, except in cases where companies had established
relations with "outside" unions previously.

The net effect of these com-

bined policies was to encourage the employee-representation movement.

36

Unions and management operated under a truce during the war period, but
this truce did not outlast the removal of wartime controls.

During 1919,

4,160,348 workers participated in 3,630 strikes, including the Boston
Police Strike, the Seattle Strike, the Great Steel Strike, and the Soft
Coal Strike.

37

In October, 1919, President Wilson assembled a National Industrial
Conference composed of representatives of management, organized labor,
and the public, for the purpose of developing cooperation in industrial
relations.

Fundamental differences developed over collective bargaining

and employee representation.

Randle has said of this effort:

Labor insisted on the right "to organize without
discrimination," whereas the employers stated that
"the arbitrary use of collective bargaining was a
menace to the institutions of free peoples." No area
of agreement was possible. The conference terminated
and the employer group started a movement to destroy
unionism.38
35
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Management continued their development of employee representation
plans.

During the ’twenties, the number of plans increased from 196 to

869, and the number of workers covered increased from 403,765 to
1,547,766.

39

Employers also developed other means of combating trade

unions during this decade:

company unions to compete with independent

trade unions; programs of Welfare Capitalism, which were extensive wel
fare and benefit programs; and a vigorous open shop drive under "...the
appealing and misleading title 'The American Plan.'".

40

The trade unions lacked a vigorous counteroffensive.

They continued

to concentrate on organizing the skilled workers, who were enjoying tol
erable economic conditions during this decade, while neglecting industrial workers, whose wages were low.

41

Union membership declined during the 1920's while collective bar
gaining made advances.

Previously, union membership had expanded during

prosperous periods and declined during recessions, and collective bar
gaining had followed suit.
the twenties.

But this pattern did not hold true during

For the first time, management made no significant attack

on the principle of collective bargaining; rather it concentrated its
efforts on controlling the method of representation of the worker.
Having thus espoused a process of collective
representation, even though not the process sought
by the unions, many employers found it difficult
39

Edwin Fj^Beal and Edward D. Wickersham, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining, (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959), p. 21.
40
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to retrace their steps oii individual bargaining.
Some found it undesirable. From this point on,
labor relations would remain largely a collective
matter. The only issue was the nature of the col
lective agency.
Unions and management had fought for control of the collective
agency until the mid-twenties.

After this period, the nature of the

agency came to be determined by public policy.

The Development of Collective Bargaining Policy
American trade unions have traditionally worked to achieve three
basic rights:

the right of workers to organize trade unions; the right

of these unions to bargain collectively for their members; and the right
to

use economic weapons to support their organizational and collective

efforts.

Labor's efforts to achieve these rights has been greatly

affected by public policy toward unions and collective bargaining.

The

purpose of this section is to trace the development of labor relations
policy, with special attention to those aspects affecting collective bar
gaining.
Although this section will emphasize labor relations policy since
1926, it will also summarize briefly two previous periods— the coamonlaw era, 1790-1890, and the anti-trust period, 1890-1926

43

— in order to

show why many of our current labor relations laws are as they are.

An

understanding of the public policy reflected in these laws requires an
awareness of the public -dissatisfaction with the philosophy and efforts
of labor policies of previous periods.
42
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The Common-law Era (1790-1890)
Throughout this period there were no statutory labor laws, but only
court decisions made in accordance with the principles or doctrines of
common law.

Two common-law doctrines were applied in labor cases during

this period:

the criminal conspiracy doctrine and the doctrine of civil

conspiracy, or illegal purpose.

44

The former was directed toward labor's

right to organize, and the latter toward labor's right to use economic
weapons.

-Either, applied vigorously, would severely weaken collective

bargaining by weakening the unions.
The criminal conspiracy doctrine was actually not one doctrine but
two:

one dealing with the relationship between an organized group and

society, the other dealing with the relationship of the group to the
individual.

45

When applied in the first sense, the doctrine held that

while certain acts would be considered lawful when performed by ar indi •
vidual, these same acts would become unlawful when committed by a group
of individuals acting in concert.

In addition, the group, because of its

ability to take undue advantage of the public by exerting monopoly power,
would be considered as constituting a criminal conspiracy against the
best interests of society.

Thus while an individual might legally

attempt to improve his wages and working conditions, any sort of union
activity to seek the same goal would be illegal and punishable by fine
or imprisonment.
The courts also concerned themselves with the relationship of the
group to the individual, holding that union attempts to impose a closed
44Charles 0. Gregory, Labor and the Law, 2nd rev. ed. (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1958), pp. 13-82.
45
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shop constituted a deprivation of personal liberty by the union.

The

court reasoned that citizens would protest any legislative enactment
permitting only members of a particular organization to work in a certain
trade as

a discriminatory exercise of legislative power.

court doubted that the citizenry would allow this
with trade unions.

Therefore the

same power toreside

The court thus held that trade unions were conspir

ing to injure workers who wished to pursue an individual course of action.
In applying the civil conspiracy doctrine the courts were concerned
with the means used by labor organizations in the pursuit of their goals,
but determination of the legality of means must include an examination
of the purpose of their actions.
The application of the civil-conspiracy doctrine
was by state courts, and their judgments differed.
If generalizations can be made, unions were permitted
to carry on their activities as long as injury to
others (an employer, other workers) was purely inci
dental to the achievement of legitimate objectives
of their own,^®
Peaceful strikes to secure higher wages were generally tolerated.
Picketing was often regarded as an implied threat of violence.

And a

closed shop was often held to be illegal because it was a means to the
union's objective of securing monopoly control of the trade, and as such
it harmed those individuals excluded from the closed shop.

47

Although the courts had little to say directly about the collective
bargaining process, they affected its development with their decisions
regarding union activities.

By questioning the unions' right to organize

and their right to use economic weapons, court decisions hindered the
development of trade unions and therefore of collective bargaining.
46
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The Anti-trust Period (1890-1926)
This period marks the beginning of statutory labor laws and of the
entry of the federal government into the area of labor relations.

The

two most important labor relations laws of this period were the Sherman
Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act.

The Sherman Act, passed in 1890, was

directed against contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that restrained
trade or created monopolies.

48

Whether or not Congress intended,the act

to apply to labor organizations is a debatable matter.
applied by the courts.

In the Danbury Hatters case

49

But it was so
the Supreme Court

held that the act applied to labor organizations, that secondary boycotts
constituted an illegal interference with interstate commerce, and that
suits for damages could be brought against the union and against the
members of the union.

Congress apparently intended to clarify the

Sherman Act with respect to unions in passing the Clayton Act of 1914.
Section 6 attempted to remove labor from the commerce clause coverage
and affirm the rights of unions to organize and carry out legitimate
functions without being classified as monopolies.

Section 20 limited the

issuance of injunctions in cases "between an employer and employees"
growing out of labor disputes.

Labor hailed this act as its "Magna

Charta," its guarantee of the rights to organize, to bargain collectively,
and to use economic weapons such as strikes, boycotts, and picketing to
support its attempts to better its position.

However, the Supreme Court

interpreted the Clayton Act as a mere restatement of the position of the
48
49
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courts on labor.

Therefore, although the Act had been Intended to help

the unions, It was rendered Ineffective by Its judicial application.^0
Although the legislation of this period is of special importance, it
cannot be understood without reference to the often contrasting body of
common law to which the courts added by their decisions.

In general

these decisions represented an interpretation of the Constitution which
was injurious to the development of unions.

The position of the courts

was of crucial concern to unions particularly in regard to injunctions
and yellow-dog contracts.
An injunction
doing certain acts

is a court order requiring a party to refrain from
that would cause irreparable damage to another party

or an order requiring a
sion.

party to do certain acts required by court deci

Used in thelatter sense, an

injunction is the weapon used by the

courts to uphold their own authority.

The labor injunction was usually

secured from the courts by employers to prohibit strikes.
The yellow-dog contract was a work agreement between an employer
and each employee individually, which provided that, as a condition of
employment, an employee would not become or remain a union member.

The

courts held that such agreements constituted legal, enforceable contracts,
that legislation making such requirements invalid were i l l e g a l , a n d
furthermore, that injunctions could be issued against the union's
attempts to breach this lawful contract.

52

In effect, this decision made

individual work contracts more important than collective work contracts.
50
Gregory, op. cit.. pp. 159-174.
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Erdman Act of 1898.

■^Hitchman Coal and Coke v. Mitchell, 245 W. S. 229 (1917).

World War I, the National War Labor Board and the employeerepresentation movement occupied labor's efforts until the mid-twenties,
but labor did not abandon its attempts to cbamge public policy.

Its

greatest successes in influencing labor relations policy came after 1925.

Legal Encouragement of Collective Bargaining (1926 to the Present)
After 1925, labor's drive to achieve the rights of self-organiza
tion, collective bargaining, and the use of economic weapons received a
boost from legislative action.

The Railway Labor Act of 1926 marked the

passage of the first legislative statute encouraging the use of collec
tive bargaining.

It was soon followed by other legislative acts:

the

Norris LaGuardia Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Wagner
Act, the Taft-Harley Act, and the Landrum Griffin Act.

These new laws

lifted restriction on many of the union's economic weapons, made collec
tive bargaining public policy in industries engaged in interstate com
merce, and replaced much of the economic warfare surrounding union orga
nizing drives by orderly representational elections.

Union membership

expanded rapidly as collective bargaining was introduced into the massproduction industries.
expanded in scope.

The process of collective bargaining matured and

The purpose of this section is to survey the provi

sions of the acts affecting collective bargaining.
Railway Laho.r.Act of 1926.

Prior to the passage of this act, the

railroad Brotherhoods, like other unions, had the right to exist, but
had no guarantee of being recognized by management.

Companies might

either refuse to recognize the unions or start company unions in direct
competition with them.
strike.

In such cases, the union's only recourse was to

However, a railway strike could severely hamper the nation's

economy because of the critical position the railroads held in the

transportatation industry at that time.

Therefore, Congress guaranteed

the Brotherhoods the right to organize and be recognized, thus helping
to prevent the need for strikes.

This act also required railway manage

ment and labor to make and maintain collective bargaining agreements.
In short, it made independent unionism and collective bargaining (both
negotiation and contract administration) public policy in the railroad
industry, thus opening the doors to broader coverage of this policy in
later acts.
The Federal Anti-Injunction or Morris LaGuardia Act of 1932.

This

act reaffirmed labor's right to organize and bargain collectively, but
its major purposes were to make yellow-dog contracts unenforceable in
court, thus giving collective work contracts precedence over individual
contracts, and to provide limitations on the use of injunctions in labor
disputes so that they could hot be used to hamstring the unions' strike
weapon.
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In evaluating this act, Gregory calls it

...an exceedingly important pieceof labor legis
lation. Its chief significance lies in the fact
that it simply cancels out a small host of what
might accurately be called judicial perversions.
What it accomplishes is a laissez-faire setup for
organized labor's self-help activities, on both
' collective bargaining and organizational angles,

Section 4 of the act lists labor practices which may not be
enjoined, such as striking, becoming a union member, paying strike bene
fits, peaceful assembly, lawfully aiding someone involved in a labor dis
pute or advising of the intent to do any of the above.
Section 7 of the Norris LaGuardia Act restricts but does not com
pletely prohibit the use of injunctions in labor disputes. It limited
injunctions to the following cases! when unlawful acts were contemplated
when substantial and irreparable injury to property might occur; when
failure to grant an injunction would result in greater injury to the
plaintiff than that to the defendant if the injunction were granted; or
when there was no legal remedy. Moreover, no injunction could be issued
without an advertised public hearing. Even if all these conditions were
met, they were not enough to guarantee an injunction even then if they
found that the parties had "failed to make every reasonable effort to set
tie such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available
government machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration."
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by requiring the courts, in their injunctionissuing capacity, to keep their hands off such
activities under prescribed circumstances. The
point of this act is not what it does for orga
nized labor but is what it permits organized
labor to do for itself without judicial inter
ference.^^
Congress, apparently not wishing to run afoul of the courts again,
expressed the provisions of the Morris LaGuardia Act very clearly.
Terms used in the act were defined so as to leave little for the Court
to interpret.
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,

This act, passed as

part of the New Deal legislation in the depths of the depression, was
designed primarily to stimulate economic recovery by increasing produc
tion, employment, and through Section 7(a) to guarantee the right of
workers to organize unions and bargain collectively thereby keeping wages
and purchasing power at high levels.

Furthermore, employers were not

permitted to force a worker to join company unions or require him to
refrain from "joining, organizing or assisting a labor organization of
his own choosing" as a condition of employment.

However, the act did not
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contain any administrative or enforcement machinery for this provision.
President Roosevelt established a UJational Labor Board to investigate
and resolve differences arising under Section 7(a) and to conduct rep
resentation elections, but the board lacked the legal authority to
enforce its own orders.

56

Furthermore, employer circumvention of the

purpose of the act was relatively easy for the act did not require
54

Gregory, op. cit., pp. 185-136.
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Section 7(a).

"^Morgan, op. cit., pp. 565-566.
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employers to recognize or bargain with unions, although the National
Labor Board tried to read such provisions into the act.
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The Supreme Court declared the National Industrial Recovery Act
unconstitutional on May 27, 1935, because of provisions other than those
covering collective bargaining.
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Immediately, Senator Wagner intro

duced a bill reaffirming and amplifying, the substance of Section 7(a).
This bill

was enacted by Congress as the National Labor Relations Act

one month after the NIRA was declared unconstitutional.
The National Labor Relations Act. 1935.

This act, commonly known

as the Wagner Act, was enacted for a single purpose:
practice and procedure of collective bargaining.

to encourage the

Experience had made it

clear that bare statements of policy concerning collective bargaining
would be meaningless, so the Act creates an administrative procedure to
be used in carrying out this purpose.
Section 7(a) succinctly states this central purpose.
Employees shall have the right to self-organlzations, to form, join or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining,
or other mutual aid or protection.^
Clearly, the right to bargain collectively is the core of the law.
However, to make the law effective, each side had to have complete,
independent, and unilateral control over the selection of its repre-__
sentatives in a labor dispute.

Section 7(a) contains such a guarantee

for trade unions, but not for management, probably because management's

^Chamberlain and Kuhn, op. cit.. p. 43.
CQ

Schechter Poultry Co. v. U. S. (1935), U. S. 495; 55 S. Ct. 837.
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National Labor Relations Act, 1935.
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freedom to choose its own representatives had never been seriously
challenged by unions.^
The justification for this direct federal intervention into labormanagement relations is contained in Section 1, Findings and Policies.
In essence, Congress justified this intervention on the grounds that
employers had superior bargaining power because of the corporate form of
ownership and because employees did not possess "full freedom of associ
ation or actual liberty of contract."

Furthermore, employers used their

superior bargaining strength to refuse to negotiate with unions.

These

refusals to bargain collectively usually resulted in organizational
strikes which often interrupted interstate commerce.

Thus, Congress

felt it could "mitigate and eliminate these obstructions" to interstate
commerce by "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bar
gaining" and by protecting the worker's right to organize into trade
unions without employer interference.
The major purpose of the act was to be achieved in two ways:
first, by providing a method to be followed in selecting bargaining
representatives and second, by setting out unfair labor practices for
employers.

The mechanism for determining the employee's bargaining

representative was a secret ballot election conducted by the government.
If a majority of employees in a given bargaining unit voted for a par
ticular union, that union was given bargaining rights as their represent
ative and the employer was required to bargain with that certified bar
gaining agent.

Peaceful persuasion was substituted for the organizing

strike.^

^Alfred Kuhn, Labor: Institutions and Economics (New York:
Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1956), p. 273.
61Ibid., p. 274.

Employers were forbidden to engage in certain acts listed as unfair
labor practices.

First, employers could not interfere with the workers'

efforts to form a union and bargain collectively.

Second, the formation

of company unions was deemed an unfair labor practice on the grounds
that they were not independent of management's domination.
Third, employers could not discriminate against an employee because
of his union membership.

These first three unfair labor practices were

provided for in order to protect the employee's right of choice.

The

fourth unfair labor practice, discrimination against workers filing
charges of testifying under the act, was prohibited in order to make
enforcement off the law possible.

Finally, refusal to bargain collec

tively with a union constituted an unfair labor practice.
The national Labor Relations Board was established as the indepen
dent administrative agency responsible for enforcing the act.

The two

major functions off the Board were the certification of bargaining repre
sentatives and the processing of unfair labor charges,

In carrying out

the latter function, the Board could hold hearings and issue orders.
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The orders were mot self-enforcing, nor were there any penalties for
non-observance, but the Board could petition the courts for enforcement
of its orders.

Should the court grant an enforcement order, failure to

comply would constitute contempt of court.

Similarly, either of the

parties to a labor dispute under the Board's jurisdiction (interstate
commerce) could petition for a court review of the Board's orders.
There were several things the Wagner Act did not do.

First, while

62The national Labor Relations Board is made up of three members
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Much of their work is delegated to regional boards, from which the
parties may appeal to the National Board.
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the act made it clear that there was to be collective bargaining and
that the NLRB was to see that collective bargaining took place, the act
did not say how bargaining was to be conducted or what were bargainable
issues.
Whatever may have been the effect of some of
the interpretations of the Wagner Act, neither the
text of that act nor the apparent intentions of
its sponsors seemed to call for specific regula
tion of either the process of bargaining or the
content of bargained agreements. In the oftquoted words of Senator Walsh, after the repre
sentatives of the employees, had been escorted to
the employer's door, "What happens behind those
doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not
seek to inquire into it."°^
Thus the Wagner Act
...abandoned strict non-intervention, but in
preserving both the freedom and the privacy of
negotiations, it left intact the principle of
laissez-faire for the determination of the
terms and conditions of employment.^
Another thing the Wagner Act did not do was to make strikes
illegal or directly involve the NLRB in the settling of strikes.

No

provision was made to protect the employer and the public in a fight
between two unions, or to protect against the intrusion of a second
union after a bargaining representative had been chosen.

No provision

— r- was made for dealing with the refusal of unions to bargain in good
faith.
Employers considered the Wagner Act one-sided because it restricted
employers without placing any comparable restrictions on unions; they
63
Brown and Myers, op. cit., p. 12.
64
George H. Hildebrand, "Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust
Laws," Public Policy and Collective Bargaining, ed., Shister, et al.,
op. cit., pp. 164-165.
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demtotted the constitutionality of the act, and in many cases resisted its
enforcement.

Most employers affected by the act were surprised and dis

mayed when the Supreme Court upheld the law in 1937.^
toother court decision favorable to labor was the Supreme Court's
rewersal of its previous position of the applicability of the Sherman
tot.

lam the second Coronado case, before 1937, the Court held that

strikes which inhibited the flow of interstate commerce were illegal
nmmder the Sherman Act.

However, in the 1940 Apex case,^^ the Court

©rennmledi the previous decision, holding instead that if the restric
tion on commerce were incidental to the union's chief purpose of orgaunizlamg ®r securing better terms and conditions of employment, there was
mam design to exercise monopolistic power, so that strikes supporting
the anamioimrs action were permissible.

The practice of granting labor

iimnnuitTiitty from anti-trust laws was extended during the forties in a

series of decisions.^

However, if unions conspired with management to

parowide the employer with a local monopoly, they were held to be illegaily restraining trade and thus subject to anti-trust provisions.
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As

a resmdLt of the new labor legislation of this period and the courts'
liberal reinterpretations of statutory and common law, legal restraints
/r e r

HERB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1; NLRB v.
Fanmehaamf Trailer, 301 U. S. 49; NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
€©.„ 3®1 U. S. 58; Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103; and Wash
ington, Virginia &. Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 142.
®^Agtex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
^ S e e U.
Federation of
ffinxfl (Carriers'

310 U. S. 469 (1940).

S. v. Hutchison, 312 U. S. 219(1941); U. S. v. American
Musicians, 318 U. S. 741 (1943); U. S.v.International
Union, 313 U. S. 539 (1941).

®®Allen Bradley v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U. S. 797 (1945).
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on the exercise of union power, with respect to the interests of society
at large and of individuals who might be injured by union policies or
practices, were severely weakened.
Government encouragement of collective bargaining and protection of
union organizing activities combined with rising levels of employment
and the organizing rivalry between the AFL and the newly formed CIO led
to a rapid increase in union membership and a consequent growth in col
lective bargaining.

However sit-down strikes, violence, and the

alleged radicalism of the new CIO unions created an unfavorable public
opinion toward labor union activities during the late thirties.
Employers continued their attack on the inequities of the Wagner Act.
The wave of strike activity following the lifting of war-time control of
wages only served to coagulate public opinion into a legislative move
ment to impose additional restrictions on trade union activities.
Partly in response to this body of opinion, Congress, in 1947, passed
the Labor-Management Relations Act over President Truman's veto.
Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act. 1947.
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The Taft-

Hartley Act incorporated most of the provisions and philosophy of the
Wagner Act, but went beyond it in scope.

It reaffirmed the right of

workers to self-organization, the need to protect employees against
interference and other unfair labor practices on the part of employers,
and the policy of encouraging the use of collective bargaining.

It

maintained the enforcement agency of the Wagner Act, the National Labor
Relations Board, but broadened its powers of supervision and enforce
ment to include injunctive relief in unfair labor practice cases.

The

most significant difference from the Wagner Act was that the Taft-Hartley

^Reynolds, op. cit.. p. 129-131.
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Act recognized that some union activities which affected employers,
union members, and the public were detrimental to the rights and inter
ests of these groups and should be regulated, and furthermore, that it
was proper that the federal government should provide the necessary con
trols.
In providing for these controls, the Taft-Hartiey Act limited the
use of some important union weapons.

Secondary boycotts, jurisdictional

strikes and strikes against the government were made illegal.

As a pro

tection for the right of the Individual not to be organized, the closed
shop, the preferential shop, and the union hiring hall were also made
unlawful.

The act made it possible for organized workers to get rid of

their union if they so desired, by the process of decertification elec
tions.

Significantly, it also established unfair labor practices for

unions, Including the refusal to bargain.

The law also permitted

government intervention into internal union affairs by requiring finan
cial statements and non-Communist affidavits to be filed by unions which
desired the protection of the act.
The Taft-Hartley Act also moved further into the regulation of the
collective bargaining process by excluding certain topics from the bar
gaining, by imposing cooling-off periods before contract expiration, and
by providing for special governmental regulation of disputes affecting
the public interest.

New enforcement measures such as injunctions and

court enforcement of labor agreements were established or introduced.
Four collective bargaining problems are affected by the act:

refusal

to bargain, proper subjects for bargaining, contract expiration, and
contract enforcement.
The Taft-Hartley Act was- ^primarily of the "rules of the game"
variety of legislation.

Unstructured bargaining situations in which the
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parties had unequal bargaining strength had been classified as detri
mental to the public interest.

Thus, the public interest could best be

served by equalizing bargaining power and structuring the bargaining
situation.

The parties were granted the right to independent organiza

tions but were obliged to bargain in good faith.

The role of the govern

ment was to structure the situation, define the rules of the game
(unfair labor practices) and enforce these rules.
It was generally presumed that collective bargaining agreements
resulting from this approach would be in the public interest.

Provi

sions were made for the possible exceptions such as national emergency
strikes and illegal contracts.
proved fallacious.

Unfortunately, however, this presumption

The senatorial McClellan Committee in Improper Activ

ities in the Labor or Management Field found numerous instances in which
the result of this laissez faire approach was "collusive bargaining"
rather than collective bargaining.

Some of the parties found that they

could circumvent the rigors of competing self-interest; management offi
cials sometimes paid union officials for "sweetheart" contracts^ or
signed under-the-table agreements with an "approved" union to exclude
other unions.

Cases of conspiracy to form industrial monopolies were

found^ as were cases of selling protection from labor disturbances.
As a result of the Committee findings, Congress passed the LandrumGriffin Act.
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LandrumGriffin Act).

Unlike the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, the Landrum-

^ T h e union official sells his membership out by selling a substan
dard contract to the employer.
^Morgan, o£. cit.. pp. 410-411.
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Griffin Act "...does not purport to be a law covering the broad aspects
of collective bargaining."

72

Rather, this act is primarily designed to

reform the internal aspects of union government.
Unions tend to have two governmentsi

73

one dealing with the internal

affairs of the organization, and the other with the collective bargaining
relationship.

74

The Landrum-Griffin Act was designed primarily to deal

with the first of these two governments so that it only indirectly
affects the collective bargaining process.

It removes the "no-man's

land" between federal and state agencies in unfair labor cases by defining jurisdiction,
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circumscribes organizational picketing,
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allows

economic strikers to vote in representation elections, makes "hot-cargo"
clauses in collective agreements illegal, strengthens secondary boycott
prohibition, and modifies closed shop prohibition to allow more restric
tive union security provisions in the construction industry.
Thus, it is apparent that the Landrum-Griffin
Act goes deeply into the internal affairs of all
parties to collective bargaining. It is much more
than "rules of the game" legislation; it goes into
72
Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup, The Economics of Labor
Relations. 5th ed. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965)
pp. 810-811,
73
Chamberlain, 0 £. cit..pp. 174-181. The body of the law relating
to union government is divided into four main sections. First is a
"bill of rights" for union members, guaranteeing every member equal
right to participate in union meetings and elections. Second is the
requirement that national officers be elected by secret ballot at least
every five years and local union officers every three years. The Act
also details the election procedures that must be followed. Third, the
act reduces the power of national unions by restricting their use of
trusteeships over local unions. Finally, the Act spells out the fiduc
iary responsibilities of union officers.
74Ibid.. p. 180.
^Section 14(c).
^Section 8(b) (7) of NLRB amended.
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the dressing rooms of the participants, so to speak,
and in effect, tells them how they shall choose
their captains, and how they shall govern them
selves between "games."7?

Summary
The historical survey of the development of collective bargaining
presented in the first part of this chapter illustrates the necessity of
strong national unions for effective collective bargains.

Before col

lective bargaining became public policy, trade unions faced opposition
from three sources!

employers, the courts, and the business cycle.

Prior to 1900, trade unions were virtually destroyed each time the
country was hit by a recession or depression; after each depression
trade unions had to begin over again.
similar pattern.

Collective bargaining followed a

Each new attempt to provide workers with a voice in

industrial decision making exhibited similar characteristics!

unilateral

demands, no concept of bargaining, lack of permanent organization, and
no provision for administering agreements.
From these first beginnings collective bargaining evolved to a point
at the turn of the century where national trade unions were assisting
their locals in the negotiation of agreements, where contract negotiation
meant give and take bargaining, and where agreements were reached for a
specified period of time.

Labor learned many lessons during this early

period, of which one was the necessity of securing legislation favorable
to the cause of trade unions and collective bargaining.
The second part of this chapter explored the impact of public policy
toward trade unions and collective bargaining in more detail.
early, or common law period, the courts assumed an attitude of

^Morgan, o£. cit.. pp. 582-583.

In the
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intolerance, perhaps even hostility, to the growth of trade unions and
collective bargaining.

The courts applied the criminal and civil con

spiracies to labor unions, enjoined the use of strikes and boycotts, and
ruled that individual work contracts took precedence over collective
work agreements.

Later the court interpretation of the Sherman Act

brought trade unions and their activities under the anti-trust laws mak
ing it extremely difficult for unions to bargain effectively.
In the period between the two world wars, the formation of labor
policy shifted from the courts to the legislature and the intent of
labor policy changed from intolerance to the promotion of collective bar
gaining.

Congress passed laws providing those rights and requirements

necessary for effective collective bargaining;

the union's rights to

organize, to bargain collectively for its members, to have exclusive
representation, and to conduct its affairs without employer interference.
These acts required the parties to collective bargaining to respect the
rights of the other party and to bargain in good faith.

In order to

allow for orderly functioning, the government attempted to structure the
collective bargaining process by such means as representation elections,
notice of contract termination, methods for ending national emergency
disputes, and providing means for contract settlement.
Collective bargaining was desirable because it contributed to labor
peace and because it restored the balance of power in the labor market
thereby making possible more realistic bargaining between employers and
their employees.

Congressional legislation promoting collective bargain

ing was designed to provide the rights and requirements necessary for
collective bargaining and to create a climate favorable to bargaining,
but bargaining was to be left entirely to the parties.

The government

tried to interfere as little as possible with the conduct of negotiations.
There was, for example, no requirement that the parties reach an agree
ment, only that they bargain in good faith.

Public policy was designed

to force the parties to the bargaining table peacefully, to allow unions
to represent workers, to force management to bargain with certified bar
gaining agents, and to insure that the parties followed the "rules of
the game."

If negotiations between the parties produced an agreement,

it was presumed to be in the public interest because the parties to the
agreement had opposing interests.
The investigations of labor-management relations by the McClellan
Committee in the late 1950's produced numerous cases of "collusive"
rather than collective bargaining:

sweetheart contracts, extortion,

conspiracy to form monopolies, "sellout" deals, etc.

These findings

became the basis for establishing new labor legislation— the LandrumGriffin Act.

This act goes beyond rules-of-the-game legislation to deal

with the conduct of the parties toward each other and toward their mem
bers during and between contract negotiations.

This act commited the

government to a more active role in collective bargaining and opened the
door to the public review of the terms of an agreement as a way of
insuring that the public interest was being served.

CHAPTER 3
THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The central question under investigation is whether the current
wage-price guideline policy has basically altered the nature of the col
lective bargaining process.

Before that question can be answered, the

nature of contemporary collective bargaining must be clearly and accur
ately ascertained.

The basic forms of collective bargaining, the func

tions it performs in a mixed capitalistic system, and the conditions
necessary for it to be effective are the main points considered in this
chapter.

Forms of Collective Bargaining
With over 100,000 collective bargaining agreements currently in
existence in the United States, covering an estimated 16 million
workers,^ diversity in the forms of collective bargaining relationships
is the general rule.

2

An agreement-by-agreement study of the impact of

This figure does not include pension and welfare plans negotiated
separately. See: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "The Collection and
Analysis of Collective Bargaining Agreements," Techniques of Preparing
Major BLS Statistical Series (BLS Bulletin No. 1168). The Bureau currently maintains a file of approximately 5,000 current agreements cover
ing about 8.5 million workers from all industries except the railroad
and airline industries which are covered by Railway Labor Act.
2

See the following U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publications:
"Characteristics of 12,000 Labor Management Contracts," Monthly Labor
Review (July, 1951), p. 31; Collective Bargaining ProvisTon Series (BLS
Bulletins 908-1 to 908-191, various titles). Or see: Basic Patterns
in Union Contracts. 3rd ed. (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc., 1954).
.
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the guideposts would clearly be unmanageable.

Yet it is possible that

the guideposts could have different effects on each collective bargain
ing relationship.

For analytical simplicity two basic bargaining models

will be used in this studyi craft union bargaining and Industrial union
3
bargaining. The central purpose of this section is to clarify these
bargaining models.
Craft union bargaining.

This bargaining type is found in industries

in which the product or service is turned out by skilled craftsmen.
Training for a skill is both time consuming and expensive, and the costs
are borne largely by the trainee during his apprenticeship period.
After a predetermined training period workers are classified as master
craftsmen.

Since this classification is based on the ability to accom

plish successfully a certain level of tasks within a craft, it indicatethat an employer should not need to be concerned as to which particular
craftsman is chosen for a job.

An employer may even depend on union

hiring halls for the provision of the necessary labor force.

And, on

the Job, supervisors need tell workers only what must be done, and not
how, since a master craftsman can be presumed familiar with work pro
cedure.

Management, in effect hires skill, but only when needed and

only for the length of time needed.

Therefore, both the employment and

supervisory functions are simplified for the employer.
The craft union, in effect, acts as the skilled craftsman's agent
for the sale of his labor.

Craft unions attempt to secure higher wages

for their members by decreasing the supply of craftsmen or by increasing
the demand for craftsmen.

On the supply side the craft union attempts

3

Edwin F. Beal and Edward D. Wickersham, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining, rev. ed. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc, 1963)
p. 32-50.
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to control the entrance into the trade in several ways:

by limiting the

number of apprentices; by manipulating the length of the training period,
apprenticeship pay and work rules; by imposing closed shop conditions;
by refusing to work with non-union men; and by operating union hiring
halls.

On the demand side the craft union resists the introduction of

skill-saving machinery and jealously guards craft jurisdictions.

Organi

zing by crafts may also help the craft unions secure higher wages for
their members in that each craft can take advantage of the importance of
4

being unimportant.
In collective bargaining negotiations involving a craft union, bar
gaining is generally limited to wages.
work" aptly sums up the wage goal.

The slogan "Equal pay for equal

The union defines "equal work" and

then bargains for "equal pay," bidding a relatively fixed supply of
labor against a given demand.
demands, a strike may ensue.
withdrawing labor and waiting.
a disadvantage:

If the craft union is unable to secure its
Craft union strike strategy consists of
The craft union strike puts employers at

new craftsmen cannot be trained quickly, other crafts

men may honor the picket lines or refuse to work with non-union workers,
and the striking workers may minimize the loss-of-income threat gene
rated by the strike by working for a non-struck employer.
the employer

Consequently,

cannot secure trained craftsmen without coming to terms

with the union.
Collective bargaining agreements between craft unions and an
employer are quite simple documents— usually they are a standard onepage document with blank spaces for the names of the parties, the wage
4

For example, if bricklayers' wages accounted for 17. of the total
cost of a residence, an increase of 507. in their wages would increase
the final cost of the house only by one half of one percent.
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rate, and signatures.

Administration of the agreement rests entirely in

the union's hands and grievances between union members and employers are
almost non-existent.
Industrial union bargaining.

Industrial union bargaining is

generally found in enterprises using mass production instead of division
of labor by craft as in handicraft technology; mass production technology
requires division of labor by function.

Each task is broken down into

numerous simple operations which become jobs that require onLy a short
training period.

Often training is specific to a particular work place,

thus limiting the worker's job opportunity.

"Skill" is measured by the

ability to continuously perform a highly repetitive operation at the
pace of the assembly line without an excessive number of errors.
Semiskilled jobs differ from craft, jobs in the following ways:
worker qualifications generally consist of a few simple aptitudes; no
apprenticeship period is required; training takes place on the job; the
job is easily learned since it represents only a small part of the total
process; all employees work for a given enterprise; the work is usually
not highly seasonal so that periodic unemployment is usually not a con
stant threat; and workers follow the same general work patterns from day
to day.

These differences affect the way in which industrial unions

organize the semiskilled.

These workers may be attached to a given work

place for their working lives

and have little maneuverability.

To

bargain effectively, these workers must be organized into one labor
union representing all workers of the plant regardless of differences in
skill.
The industrial unions differ from craft unions with regard to degree
of skill, division of labor, and type of organization.

Consequently,
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— their bargaining goals, techniques, and strategy are also different.
Industrial unions are concerned with more than wages.

Effort, working

conditions, job security, grievance procedures, personnel policies, due
process, and contract administration are important issues in industrial
union bargaining.

Furthermore, a single uniform wage scale is inappro

priate because industrial union labor is not homogeneous.

The slogan

best expressing the industrial union's wage goal is "Unequal pay for
unequal work— in proportion to the inequality,""* i.e., pay should be
based on the difficulty, responsibility, working conditions, and effort
required by the' job.

The bargaining task is to determine the wage level

for each job as well as the. structure of rates for the entire enterprise.
Job security, the individual's relative claim to available work
£
and due process, the individual's absolute claim to fair treatment on
the job, are other items of major importance in industrial union bar
gaining.

Generally, the industrial union does not attempt to control

job openings for new employees, as craft unions do.

Rather, it seeks to

give the present work force a claim to the available work in accordance
with the seniority principle.
Discharge is another major issue in industrial bargaining.

Unlike

the craft union, the industrial union does not control initial hiring.
Moreover, the threat of job loss is more serious for the semiskilled
worker as it means loss not only of pay, but of seniority rights and
accrued fringe benefits as well.

Since management controls the disci-

-> plinary process in mass production, the industrial union strives to
5

Beal and Wickersham, op. clt., (rev. ed.), p. 45.

g
Ibid., p. 42.
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secure the right to appeal personnel decisions.

The grievance procedure

provides a form of due process in industrial union bargaining.
administration is a joint effort:

Contract

management makes the decisions and

the union retains the right to grieve and appeal.
Industrial union strikes cannot be conducted in the same manner as
craft union strikes, for the mass-production worker has no scarce skill
to sell and can be replaced easily.

While on strike his great concern

is to see that he is not replaced.The industrial union

strike is

basically the gross display of power^ designed to deny non-union workers
access to the plant by closing the gate and keeping it closed.

The

industrial strike must be a simultaneous mass movement affecting the
entire plant and must include picketing to prevent physical access to
the plant.
While the conceptual models of craft and industrial union bargain
ing situations provide valuable insights into collective bargaining
relationships, they represent only the first step in a more detailed
classification scheme (see Figure 3-1).

Each basic model may be sub

divided to show the various ways the parties may organize for collec
tive bargaining.

The chart should be viewed as a visual depiction of

the nature and maturity of the particular bargaining relationships.
Awareness of this sub-classification of bargaining structures is
particularly important for the major question under consideration
because it provides a standard against which the effects of wage-price
guideline policy may be judged.

Assuming that cost-push pressures could

be generated in any of the bargaining structures, which structure would
be the most likely candidate for the most dangerous cost generator in

^Ibid., p. 47.

FIGURE 3-1

FORMS OF BARGAINING ORGANIZATION
Single Employer
Single Craft Union
bargaining independently
Employer's Association
(Multi-employer bargaining)
CRAFT UNION
BARGAINING MODEL'

Single Employer
Several Craft Unions
bargaining j oi ■■f’y
(Multi-union bargaining)
J- pioyer's Association
(Multi-employer bargaining)

COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING

Single Employe!

/

INDUSTRIAL UNION
BARGAINING MODEL-

SINGLE

/

<

-NATIONAL
UNION
Employer's Association
(Multi-employer bargaining)

Plant wide
Company wide
(or multi-plant)
Area or Region
or City wide
Industry wide

Source: Compiled from Edwin F. Beal and Edward D, Wickersham, The Practice of Collective Bargaining,
rev. ed. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963); E. Robert Livernash, "Recent Developments in Bar
gaining Structure," The Structure of Collective Bargaining: Problems and Perspectives, ed. Arnold R.
Weber (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), pp. 33-55; Neil W. Chamberlain, "The Structure of
Bargaining Units in the United States," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (Oct., 1956) U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics; Collective Bargaining Structures: The Em ployer Bargaining Unit, Report No. 1 (Feb., 1953).
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the public eye?

The obvious answer is that it would be those bargaining

structures which encompass the largest number of employees, the widest
market area, and which receive the greatest amount of national publicity.
In short, the most likely choice would be industrial union bargaining
where decision making is highly centralised.

Policy Goals of Collective Bargaining
Insight into the nature of collective bargaining can be gained by
examining its public policy go&ls.

Proponents of collective bargaining

claim that it was designed to accomplish four things:

first, to provide

an orderly means for the resolution of industrial conflicts; second, to
provide for the establishment of a system of industrial jurisprudence;
third, to provide substantial support fv,r our mixed capitalistic sys
tem; and finally, to extend democratic ideas into the industrial environ
ment.

Each of these goals will now be examined in depth.
Providing an orderly means for resolving industrial conflict.

Congress, in passing the National Labor Relations Act, recognized the
disruptive nature of previous methods of industrial dispute settlement
and visualized collective bargaining as an alternative to the unilateral
imposition of terms by unions, management, or government.

A summary of

their position is found in the statement of Findings and Policy, of this
act, which states:
The denial by employers of the right of employees
to organize and the refusal by employers to accept
the procedure of collective bargaining led to strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which
have the Intent or the necessary effect of burdening
or obstructing commerce.... Experience has proved
that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce
from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes
the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest.... It is

—

.
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hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States to eliminate the causes of certain sub
stantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the pracg
tice and procedure of collective bargaining....
Collective bargaining reduced the number and severity of industrial
disputes by providing an orderly, rational alternative to brute force.
Before collective bargaining became public policy, the major causes of
industrial disputes were the unions' attempts to organize plants, to
force employers to recognize and bargain with then^ to secure the employ
ers’ agreement to their demands, and to enforce the administration of
any agreements reached.
cases was the strike:

The unit -'s major weapon in each of these
organizational strikes, recogniti.a strikes, bar

gaining strikes, and grievance stiikes.

Employers often attempted to

"break" these strikes with force; consequently, violence often erupted
in labor disputes.

The Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts contributed to

industrial peace by instituting a formal election procedure thus making
organizational and recognition strikes unnecessary.

9

Collective bargaining reduced disruptive industrial disputes in at
least two other ways.

First, in most industria1-union bargaining

Section 1, National Labor Relations Act.
9

The present union procedure for winning recognition follows a pre
scribed pattern.
First, a question of representation must be raised, so
that the National Labor Relations Board will be satisfied that a union
is trying to organize the workers involved. Management, a union, or an
individual may raise this question simply by filing the appropriate form
with the NLRB.
Second, if the Board finds that a question of represen
tation does exist, the next issue is to determine the appropriate bar
gaining unit. The Board generally allows the parties to resolve this
question without interference, but if they cannot agree the Board makes
the decision.
Third, the NLRB conducts a representation election in a
mutually convenient place and under a rigidly prescribed set of rules.
If a labor organization receives the majority of votes cast in a repre
sentation election, the NLRB certifies that union as the exclusive bar
gaining agent for the bargaining unit. The employer must then recognize
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situations where contract administration and due process are extremely
important, grievance procedures have been adopted, thereby reducing the
need for grievance strikes.

Employers entering into an agreement with

the certified bargaining agent generally prefer an agreement to run for
an extended period of time— one year or longer— and to have no disrup
tive strikes during that period.

Consequently, employers generally

insist on a no-strike clause for the duration of the agreement.

A for

mal grievance procedure is a practical way of handling day-to-day dis
putes arising out of theadministration of the labor agreement.
As a result of the widespread use of collective bargaining, only
the bargaining strike remains widespread.

According to Bureau of Labor

Statistics estimates,^ the United States has averaged about 3,000
strikes each year since 1946.

But during that same period, the man-days

of idleness as a percent of estimated working time has been less than
one percent for every year except 1947 (1.437.), and the yearly average
has been less than one-half of one percent fov most of the years.
The substitution of a reasoned, orderly, logical approach for
organizational and grievance problems had decreased not only the rela
tive number of strikes, but also the violence associated with labor dis
putes.

The violence that does occur occasionally during bargaining

strikes makes the news because it is the exception rather than the rule.

and bargain with that union in good faith. No other union can claim
Jurisdiction over that bargaining unit for a period of one year, or until
the collective agreement expires, whichever is later. If no labor orga
nization or individual receives the majority of votes cast in a repre
sentation election, the law prohibits a question of representation from
being raised again for a period of one year.
^ S e e Monthv Labor Review. (August, 1966) or BLS Reports 175, 176,
178, concerning work stoppages in the aircraft and parts, water trans
portation, motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment industries.
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Providing for the establishment of a system of industrial
jurisprudence.

Professor Sumner Slichter of Harvard coined the term

"industrial jurisprudence" and described the process as follows:
Through the institution of the state, men devise
schemes of positive law, construct administrative
procedures for carrying them out, and compliment both
statute law and administrative rule with a system of
judicial review.
Similarly, laboring men, through
unions, formulate policies to which they give expres
sion in the form of shop rules and practices which
are embodied in agreements with employers or are
accorded less formal recognition and assent by man
agement; shop committees, grievance procedures and
other means are evolved for applying these ruler and
policies; and the rights and duties are claimed and
recognized. When labo' and management deal with
labor relations analyt 'ally and systematically after
such a fashion, it is proper to refer to the syst^T!
as "industrial jurisprudence.
Considered in this way, the collective bargaining p rocess is a form
of democratic industrial government in which the basic constitution and
supportive statutes are drafted by the legislature, administered by the
executive, and interpreted and enforced by the judiciary.
ture in this case is the bargaining representative
the representative

The legisla

of the workers and

of management who frame the "constitution" (the col

lective bargaining agreement) and supporting statutory laws (work rules).
Management functions as the executive branch, initiating orders and mak
ing operating decisions within the boundaries of the agreement.
Judicial machinery is needed to settle disputes arising from the
failure to comply with the constitutional or statutory arrangements.
The grievance procedure, with arbitration as a terminal step, serves as
the judiciary.

Hearings, testimony, evidence, interpretation of law and

^Sumner Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management,
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1941), p. 1.

facts, appeal procedures, and intent are all part of the judicial pro
cess.

Redress is authorized for injured parties.

A substantial body

of "the common law of the plant" is accumulated through decisions on
griavancea.
This jointly determined body of industrial statutory and common
law serves several important functions.

It defines, protects, and

extends the rights of individuals and groups, provides a convenient
machinery for grievance handling, gives the workers a voice in deter
mining their conditions of employment, and brings consistency to the
employer-employee relationship by clarifying the rights and duties of
the workers.^
Providing support for the mixed capitalistic system.

Three ways
10

in which this support is provided are especially Important.

First,

collective bargaining helps to "...humanize the operation of an essen
tially impersonal price system by making it more generally palatable to
workers as a group."

14

Harbison argues that economists have contributed,

perhaps unwittingly, to the worker's view of the impersonality of our
economic system.

Workers have found phrases such as "the mechanistic

operation of the economy by blind and impersonal forces," and references
to labor as a "commodity" or as "another factor of production" particu
larly repugnant.^

12
13

Harbison states that American workers

John T. Dunlop and James J. Healy, o£. cit.. p. 29.

Frederick H. Harbison and John B. Coleman, Goals and Strategy
in Collective Bargaining. (New York! Harper and Bros., 1951).
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...are convinced that labor has values distinguish
ing it from, and placing it above other factors of
production. An American is conditioned by his par
ents, by his teachers, and by all the media of mass
communication to believe that he is born free and
equal, is endowed with the right to seek redress of
grievances wherever they arise, and is heir to an
economic system guaranteeing him the right to work
and to earn a good living. The emphasis which col
lective bargaining places on human values, there
fore, provides him with a rationale for believing
in the existing enterprise system. The very pro
cess of establishing wages through bargaining, even
if income levels of workers may not be substantially
influenced thereby, gives workers a feeling that
blind economic forces are being properly tempered
by human forces.^
Collective bargaining also protects the mixed capitalistic system
by absorbing the energies and interests of many leaders of labor and
workers who might otherwise be inclined to direct their energies toward
the overthrow of that system.

Harbison feels that as American labor

leaders have gained experience with contract negotiation and administra
tion, they have become less radical^more conservative, less likely to
advocate the overthrow of capitalism than to advocate ways of strength
ening the system.^
Thirdly, collective bargaining gives workers a "stake" in the eco
nomic system.

The property rights versus human rights dispute is not

new with the present civil rights movement; it is one of the central
themes in the history and development of collective bargaining.

As

workers gained the right to organize and bargain collectively, they also
acquired a vehicle (the collective agreement) through which human rights
16 T,
Ibid.
American trade union history provides several instances in which
workers developed other channels of protest after being denied access to
orderly channels. Two such examples are the Western Federation of
Miners and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).

on the job could be extended and defended.

At the same time the growth

of collective bargaining has strengthened the workers' respect for prop
erty rights, not only by such tangible means as welfare and pension
funds, but also by securing widespread support for the concept of job
rights as a form of property rights.

A strengthening of this trend

should lessen worker objection to a system incorporating strong property
rights controls.

Further, since labor usually contributes to welfare

and pension funds which are invested in corporate and government securi
ties, organized labor has a substantial financial interest in the contin
ued success of the capitalistic system.
Extending democratic ideas to industry.

Some observers ate the

introduction of collective bargaining into the field of industrial rela
tions as
...one of the most outstanding social changes of
the modern era— a change that has been truly revo
lutionary in nature, not because it has been
achieved by violent means, but because it has
involved the decline of one type of industrial
government and the emergence of another.
They are, of course, referring to the decline of theautocratic
system of government through collective bargaining.
tem of government is open to two major objections.
uncertainty.

Any autocratic sys
First, it creates

Even in a benevolent or paternalistic autocracy, privi

leges or favors can be changed without consultation, and discipline can
be meted out irregularly and unfairly.

And second, because it is the

very antithesis of democracy, it is out of place in the over-all value
system of a society which strives to be democratic.

Collective bargain

ing provides labor with the opportunity to help determine the rules under

18
Dankert,

0£.

cit., p. 269.

which they must operate, i.e. it provides the opportunity for participation in the decision making process.

19

Collective bargaining also helps to extend democratic ideas into
industry by providing a means of protest against autocratic personnel
decisions.

The collective agreement establishes the personnel rules of

the plant within which management is free to make decisions.

But these

decisions are subject to questions and appeals by the employees through
the grievance procedure.

Although collective bargaining complicates

management's task it makes the employer-employee relation more democratic

Conditions Precedent To and Postulates About Collective Bargaining
For collective bargaining to achieve the basic goals discussed in
the previous section, certain conditions must be present.

The purpose

of this section is to discuss these necessary conditions.

They are, the

right to organize and bargain collectively; union recognition and exclu
sive representation; the legal requirement of "good faith" bargaining;
legal protection and guarantee of mutual independence; relative equality
of bargaining strength and alternative courses of action for each party.
The right to organize and bargain collectively.

In the absence of

unions employers have considerable power in the employer-employee rela
tionship.

Since employers often interpret the growth of unionism and

collective bargaining as a serious threat to their decision making power,
they have often used their power to prevent and/or destroy unionism
19
Edwin E. Witte, "Collective Bargaining and the Democratic Process,
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (March,
1954), pp. 85-93. Also found in E. Wright Bakke, Cl,‘ark Kerr, and
Charles W. Anrod, Unions. Management and the Public. 2nd ed. (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 271-275.
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and effective collective bargaining.

Unions have been particularly

vulnerable to such attacks in their early or formative stages and in
periods of business decline.

Therefore, it is argued that an effective

union organization is a necessary condition for effective collective bar
gaining but this requires a legal guarantee of the union's right to
organize and bargain collectively without employer interference.
Union recognition and exclusive representation.

20

The legal protection

of the right to bargain collectively would become hollow and meaningless
if employers were free to reject the bargaining representative chosen by
their employees.

This danger can be prevented by requiring employers to

recognize and bargain with the bargaining representative chosen by their
employees.
On the other hand, the right to bargain collectively could also be
threatened by continuous inter-union battles over the right to be the
bargaining representative for a given group of employees.

Thus provi

sions must be made to grant to the certified bargaining agent the exclu
sive right to represent a given bargaining unit.
"Good faith" bargaining.

The third requirement for effective col-

lective bargaining is that each party must bargain in good faith.
Although labor law
20

22

See Sections
specific guarantees

21

makes good-faith bargaining legally necessary, it

7 and 8(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
and restrictions.

for

21

See Robert W. Fleming, "The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith,"
Public Policy and Collective Bargaining, ed. Joseph Shister, Benjamin
Aaron, and Clyde W. Summers (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 60-87
for an excellent detailed discussion of this subject.
22

See Section 8(d), LMRA, 1947 for the definition of good faith bar
gaining.
Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for manage
ment to refuse to bargain collectively with a certified bargaining agent,
while Section 8(b)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
refuse to bargain collectively with an employer.
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is silent on its definition, preferring to leave interpretation to the
NLRB and the courts.

In dealing with this question under the Wagner

Act, the NLRB and courts repeatedly held that the duty to bargain
required an employer to approach negotiations with an open mind and to
make a sincere attempt to reach an agreement.

23

agreement was not necessary to prove good faith.

However, reaching an
This interpretation

of good faith bargaining was incorporated into statutory law by the
Taft-Hartley amendments,

24

but the statute offered no definition of

what constituted good faith bargaining, again leaving the actual deter
mination to the NLRB and the courts.
Determining whether a party is negotiating in good faith is perhaps
the most difficult legal issue in collective bargaining for it require?
a subjective evaluation of that party's attitude as reflected in his
course of conduct during negotiations.

Therefore it is largely a matter

of determining intent of one or the other of the parties.

For the most

part this means that the NLRB and the courts must treat each case indi
vidually.
There are, however, some broad exceptions to this case-by-case
approach.

The NLRB and the courts through their decisions have estab

lished a pattern of rules that govern certain good faith cases.

For

example, they have ruled that certain actions are such a flagrant viola
tion of the good faith provision that they will treat them as "per se"
violations of the duty to bargain.

The following actions have been

held to be such prima facie violations of the good faith requirement:

^ N L R B v. Montgomery Ward &. Co., CA 9, L943, 12LRRM 508.
^ S e e Section 8(d).
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refusal to discuss a mandatory bargaining subject, the insistence that
illegal subjects be discussed, refusal to provide data necessary for
reasonable discussion, and insistence upon inclusion of voluntary sub
jects in discussion.
In a 1958 decision,

25

the United States Supreme Court recognized

three categories of bargaining proposals (illegal, mandatory, and volun
tary) and established rules for the handling of each category.
Bargaining on illegal subjects is not allowed by law and illegal
subjects may not be included in the collective bargaining agreement even
if both parties agree to their inclusion.

The closed shop is an example

of an illegal or prohibited subject.
Mandatory subjects on the other hand are those on which bargaining
is legally required if requested by one of the parties.

Such subjects

as wages, hours, and working conditions are considered mandatory.

26

Either party is within its legal rights to insist on the inclusion of
any mandatory subjects in the contract.

Refusal to bargain over manda

tory subjects or refusal to include the agreement on these subjects in
a contract constitutes a "per se" violation of the duty to bargain in
25

NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner, U. S. Supreme Court,
1958, 42 LRRM 2034.
26
A long line of Court and Board decisions have given specific
meaning to these terms, holding that employee discounts (Central 111,
Public Service Co., NLRB, 1962, 51 LRRM 1508, affirmed CA 7, 1963, 54
LRRM 2586), fringe benefits, discharge, and discipline, plant practices,
no-strike clauses (Shell Oil v. American National Insurance Co., 1952,
30 LRRM 2147) would fall into the mandatory subjects classification.
In the Borg-Warner case cited previously the court offered one yardstick
for determining whether a particular proposal comes within the scope of
mandatory subjects for bargaining: the proposal must deal with the rela
tions between employer and employees. Proposals dealing with relations
between employees and their union, such as the composition of shop com
mittees (Iron Castings, Inc. v. NLRB, 1955, 37 LRRM 1030) or require
ments governing the selection of shop stewards (NLRB v. Superior Fire
proof Door and Sash Co., CA 2, 1961, 47 LRRM 2816) would not be classi
fied as mandatory subjects.

65
good faith.

Moreover, if one party refuses to meet a reasonable request

for data necessary to an intelligent discussion of a mandatory subject,
such action is also considered a violation of good faith bargaining,
because this refusal removes the subject from the bargaining table Just
as effectively as an outright refusal to discuss the matter.

27

This

is simply a recognition that effective collective bargaining should be
constructed upon an intelligent and informed discussion of the issues.
To do this, the union must have sufficient data to bargain understand
ing^, to police the administration of the current contract, and to pre
pare for coming negotiations.
Voluntary subjects are those that fall outside the mandatory and
illegal categories.

They may be placed on the bargaining agenda at the

request of either of the parties, but neither party is required to
agree to their inclusion on the bargaining agenda, to bargain on them,
or to agree to their inclusion in the contract.

Insistence on agree

ment on a voluntary subject as a condition to execution of a contract is
a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith.
Other than these prlma facie violations, the inquiry into good
faith bargaining centers upon whether the Board or the Courts can infer
bad faith bargaining from a party's conduct throughout contract negoti
ations.

In viewing a party's conduct, the NLRB and the courts do not

focus their investigations on isolated incidents but consider the total

27See; Aluminum Ore Co., NLRB, 1942, 10 LRRM 49; enf. CA 7,
1942, 10 LRRM 693. NLRB v. Item Co., CA 5, 1955, 35 LRRM 2709.
General Controls Co., NLRB, 1950, 25 LRRM 2709. Whitin Machine Works,
NLRB, 1954, 34 LRRM 1251, enf. CA 4, 1954, 35 LRRM 2215; cert. den.
U. S. Supreme Court, 1955, 35 LRRM 2730.
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"course of conduct" during negotiations.

28

In short, the question of

good faith bargaining hinges on the NLRB's and the courts' interpreta
tions of a party's intent as evidenced by his total conduct in the
course of contract negotiations.
The question of good faith bargaining is further complicated by the
court's interpretation of the duties and function of the National Labor
Relations Board.

Questions of good faith bargaining would become moot

questions if the courts would allow the NLRB to apply the "contract test™
to such cases.

That is, good faith bargaining would be considered a

relevant question only in those cases in which the parties have failed
to reach an agreement; in all other cases, the existence of an agreement
would be evidence of good faith.

However, the court will not accept

this measure of good faith, because it feels that this approach would
destroy the intent of the law and would be an undue expansion of the
Board's role and powers.

The court has held that the Taft-Hartly Act's

bargaining provisions restrict the Board's role to that of encouraging
the parties to reach an agreement.

As long as the parties bargain

fairly and with a sincere desire to reach an agreement, they must be
left to their own devices.

For example, the Supreme Court has held that

the Board may not "compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon
the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements"

29

nor "...

regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used as part of
28

General Electric Co., NLRB, 1964, 57 LRRM 1491. Board held that
company's "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude violated bargaining duty even
though company goes through motions of bargaining and wishes to sign an
agreement; furthermore, the employer is obligated to deal with the
employees through the union, not the union through the employees.
29

NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., U. S. Supreme Court,
1952, 30 LRRM 2147.

<6 1
collective bargaining."

30

In short, the role of the Board is to get flue

parties to the bargaining table and see that they bargain in good faltlfa
on mandatory subjects.

The duty to bargain does not compel either party

to agree to a proposal, nor does it require the making of a concession.
Legal protection of the right of mutual independence.

Collective

bargaining is based upon the assumption that the groups involved have
the power to select their bargaining representatives and formulate
their demands, strategy, and tactics independently of each other.

31

If

either party were allowed to dominate the other's decisions this would
substitute a unilateral imposition of terms for collective bargaining.
In discussing the importance of mutual independence in the selection of
bargaining representatives, one authority puts it this way:
Collective bargaining requires the independent
selection of bargaining representatives on each
side. This, in turn, means that it is none of the
employer's business whether his employees unionize
or not, and if they do, which union they select.
This does not mean that the employer has no inter
est in the matter.
He obviously has, for the same
reason that a party to a lawsuit has an interest in
the quality of his opponent's lawyer. But the
determination of who shall represent employees must
remain exclusively in the hands of employees.
Therefore a law which accepts collective bargaining
must scrupulously prevent the employer from partic
ipating in or influencing that decision in any sig
nificant way.32
The history of labor-management relations provides sufficient
evidence to support the claim that mutual independence will not come
30

NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, U. S. Supreme Court, 1960, 45
LRRM 2704.
31

Vernon H. Jensen, "The Process of Collective Bargaining and -the
Question of its Obsolescence," Industrial and Labor Relations Review.
Vol. 16, No. 1, October^
1962, p. 549.
32

Kuhn,

jd£.

cit.. p. 282.

into existence naturally in the labor-management relationship.
Acceptance and encouragement of collective bargaining make it necessary
legally to protect the right of mutual independence.
Relatively equal bargaining strength.

Collective bargaining is

presumed to take place between two organizations with opposing self
interests who are forced by the market to be dependent on each other
for their continued survival.

33

Each party soon recognizes that it

could not endure without the other.

34

Only if these two parties possess

relatively equal bargaining strength can it be assumed that they will
reach agreements that are in their own best interests and in the public
interest as well.

Equality of bargaining strength prevents dominance

of the collective bargaining process by one party, that is, "...unless
there is some equality of power between the parties, bargaining cannot
take place."

35

The concept of "equality of bargaining power" is difficult to
define.

Chamberlain and Kuhn recognize this and state that:
The concept of bargaining power is at the
same time useful and tricky. The term is widely
used and appears to be self-explanatory, having
no need of further definition.
Supplying con
tent to the many definitions of bargaining power
is not always easy, however, and...what seems
simple may be deceiving in its appearance.

Chamberlain and Kuhn feel that earlier attempts to define bargain
ing power as the ability to control the setting of wage rates within the
33
34

Jensen, jO£. cit., p. 550.
Kuhn, _o£. cit. , p. 144.

35

James J. Healy, ed., Creative Collective Bargaining, (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 12-13.
36

Chamberlain and Kuhn,

0£.

cit., p. 162.
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boundaries imposed by the supply and demand for labor, ^ or as the

ability of one psrty to impose losses or damages on the other party
or simply as monopoly power

39

must all be rejected,

38

They proceed

solely from the standpoint of price and wage determination whereas bar
gaining power is important in fixing ell of the terms end conditions of
employment.

40

Equating bargaining power with monopoly power is based

on the false assumption that the labor market would be perfectly competitive if unions and collective bargaining were not present.

41

The

definition of bargaining power as the ability to impose costs on the
other party overlooks several aspects of the union-management conflict.
The ultimate cost that one party could impose on the other would be
destruction; yet if the union succeeds in destroying management, it
would succeed in destroying itself as well.

Furthermore, it is mislead

ing to suggest that the sole objective of the parties in collective bargaining is to impose a loss on each other

42

or to suggest that a loss to

37

A. C. Pigou, Economics of Welfare. 4th ed. (London:
&. Co., Ltd., 1938).

MacMillan

38

Joseph Shusterm, "The Theory of Union Bargaining Power,"
Southern Economic Journal. Vol. 10 (1943-44), pp. 151-159.
39

Henry C. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society. (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 129-154.
40

Chamberlain and Kuhn, op. cit.. pp. 169-70.

41Ibid., pp. 165-66.
42

Frederick H. Harbison and John R. Coleman, d£. cit.. suggest that
the willingness to resort to raw economic power may depend on the type
of working relationship developed between the union and management.
They identify four possible relationships: open conflict, armed truce,
working harmony, and union-management cooperation. The propensity to
resort to raw power to settle disputes declines as the parties move
through the scale. Other classifications follow similar patterns: aggre
ssion and resistance, repressed hostility, quiescence, and cooperation.
See Milton Derber, W. E. Chalmess, and Milton T. Edelman, "Types and Var
iants in Local Union-Management Relationships," Human Organization. Vol.
21, No. 4, (Winter, 1962-63), pp. 264-270.
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one party will result in a gain to the other party.
Bargaining power is defined by Chamberlain and Kuhn as
...the ability to secure another's agreement on
one's own terms. A union's bargaining power at
any point in time _is^, for example, management's
willingness to agree to the union's terms.
Management's willingness in turn depends upon
the cost of disagreeing with the union terms,
relative to the cost of agreeing to them.
This definition not only avoids the pitfalls of previous attempts
to define bargaining power, but also brings out the following points.
Bargaining power "...is not an inherent attribute of the parties or
some absolute 'amount' of power available for any and all bargaining
situations."
climate.

Bargaining power .>ay vary according to the economic

The union will have more bargaining power during periods of

relatively full employment when labor markets are tight, profits high,
and the employer's will to resist is weakened by fear of loss of sales
and profits.

Conversely, periods of substantial unemployment generally

tend to reverse the positions, giving the employer the stronger power
position.

45

Bargaining power may also be changed by the tactics used by the
parties, since each party attempts to increase the effectiveness of its
tactics and to render itself immune to the tactics of the other.

Each

party attempts to conduct itself so that its costs are minimized while
43

Chamberlain and Kuhn, p. 170. For a mathematical statement of
bargaining power, see J. Pen, "A General Theory of Bargaining,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 42 (1952), pp. 24-42.
44
45

Chamberlain and Kuhn, p. 171.

Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation.
(New York; McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 31-32. Note: as
long as bargaining power follows this general cyclical pattern, collec
tive bargaining has a built-in procyclical bias.

7L

the other party's costs are maximized.

Unions, for example, pay strike

benefits; attempt to prohibit non-strikers from returning to work; time
the strike to gain the greatest advantage;
cotts, and sometimes violence.

46

engage in picketing, boy

Management, on the other hand, may

develop strike insurance to mitigate financial losses due to strikes;

47

require the union to pay strike benefits to a larger number of members
than they wish, as when all non-struck. firms in an industry lock out
their employees when one firm of the industry is struck; or continue to
operate during a strike or replace the striking workers.

48

Both parties

attempt to acquire public support.
Bargaining power may also sr. .ft with the nature of the demands
made.

In general, the greater the demand, the great the resistance to

it, and therefore the less the bargaining power.

The parties must weigh

the "costs" or disadvantages of agreeing, including the direct, secon
dary, and non-market or tactical costs of concessions.

Any considera

tion of the direct or money costs of agreement must consider the amount
directly added to the year's operating budget as well as future periods
that the addition will remain in existence.

Thus, discounted future

costs must be added in as part of the cost of the present agreement.
Not all direct costs resulting from a concession can be computed
46

This ability is also related to the importance of being unimpor
tant.
See Paul A. Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 5th
ed., (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), p. 593.
47

Chamberlain and Kuhn, oja. cit. , p. 179, report that strike
insurance has been used in the air transport, railroad, newspaper pub
lishing, and the Hawaiian sugar growing industries.
^Striking differs from quitting in two important ways:
(1) quit
ting is normally the act of an individual, whereas the strike is the
concerted act of a group; (2) a striker expects to return to his job
with better conditions, whereas a person who quits, leaves his job
permanently.
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easily, e.g. fringe benefits, seniority, severance-pay, and call-inpay.

49

Secondary costs resulting from one bargaining settlement may

establish precedents that others outside the bargaining unit will insist,
on following.

For example, if production workers gain a favorable set

tlement other workers in the organization generally insist on similar
improvements, entailing further costs.
The non-market costs of agreeing to the other party's proposals
generally involve "matters of principles," i.e., those principles which
managements and unions "...adhere to so firmly that they constitute
creeds with deep ethical or moral roots, the compromise of which will
scarcely be considered."^*-

In some cases one party may view the cost

of agreement on some matter of principle as infinite, as when some man
agements have gone out of business rarh_r than bargain with the union.
Specific proposals such as union recognition, union security provisions,
and management's rights are often viewed in this fashion.
The tactical costs of agreement are associated with the principle
of the opening wedge.

That is, a party is likely to take a very firm

position on a particular subject introduced into bargaining if he feels
that agreement on that subject would be used as a springboard for some
future demands which he would be unwilling to consider.

For example,

management might hesitate to agree to union participation in job descrip
tion and classification for fear that this might lead to union involvement in job evaluation, job training, placement, and so forth.
49

Chamberlain and Kuhn, ££. cit., pp. 182-85.

5°Ibid.. pp. 184-85.
51Ibid.. p. 187c
52Ibid.. pp. 186-87.
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This view of bargaining power takes into account the total situa
tion; it is dynamic; it allows for the shifting of bargaining power
over time; it is not exclusively tied to two-party negotiation.

In

this view, bargaining power is relative to particular proposals and can
be changed by altering the costs of either agreeing or disagreeing.
Each party must engage in a subjective cost-benefit analysis of possible
action.

Estimates of the costs and benefits cannot be precise 'because

they are contingent upon the moves and
This necessity for

countermoves of the other parry.

second-guessing the other party is the reason collec

tive bargaining has been called a mixture of psychology, politics, and
,
53
poker.
The impossibility of equalizing bargaining power by legislation is
brought out by this analysis.

Bargaining power is not an absolute that

can be established

once and for all by legislation; it is relative to

what each party is

seeking and to each party's ability to convince the

other that coercion will be used.

Specific coercive tactics, such as

blacklists, injunctions, "hot cargo" boycotts, and secondary boycotts
may be eliminated or restricted, but the terms sought by the parties are
largely beyond the control of the legislation.
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The parties to collec

tive bargaining have shown great ingenuity in devising tactics, proce
dures, and organizational structures to equate bargaining power.
Alternative courses of action.

If either party had no alternative

but to accept the first offer of the other party, the bargaining aspect
of collective bargaining would be lost.

Collective bargaining

53

John M. Clark, Guideposts in Time of Change, (New York:
and Bros., 1949), p. 151.
54

Chamberlain and Kuhn, _o£. cit., p. 188.

Harper
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necessarily implies the right of tine parties to disagree, to reject
unsatisfactory proposals, and to bring economic pressure tobear
force changes in the other party’s last offer.

to

In collective bargaining

the ultimate weapons of economic pressnre are strikes and lockouts.

55

But, contrary to popular belief,
...most collective bargaining proceeds without
strikes. Reliable estimates Indicate that the
number of bargaining negotiations far new agree
ments or changes in old agreements, each year,
is approximately 125,000; talons and management
negotiate peacefully and r e a d agreements with
out any strike in at least 96 to 97 per cent of
these situations.
. 'me nnlons and managements
have conducted collec ive bargaining for years
and even decades with t strikes.^
Nevertheless, even if not used frequentlyT the right to strike or
lockout "...is always present in tne mi f* off the parties at the bargaining

57
table,"

parties

guarantee "...that :>e two parties who- must compromisetheir

Strikes

tv1 lockouts and the resultant losses

differences will in fact do so— ox go ©nt ©f business."

to thi
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Proponents of the use of strikes ©r lockouts in collective bargain
ing maintain that strikes are necessary for the following reasons.
First, strikes can act as a catharsis for the parties— a way to clear
the emotion-laden air.

Second, the constant threat of strikes make bar

gaining more deliberate, because It makes each party more likely to

"^However, the use of the lockout as an employer alternative is not
necessary if the employer can force a strike.
In most states, workers
out of work because of a lockout are eligible for unemployment compensa
tion; but usually they are not eligible while on strike. Furthermore,
a lockout can change the employer’s experience rating and his unemploy
ment compensation rate.
56

Chamberlain and Kuhn, op. cit., p.

57_,
Davey, ££. cit., p. 75.

58

Kuhn, ££. cit., p. 145.
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abandon unreasonable demands in clue face of the possible serious losses
of a strike.

Third, strikes place the issues and the disputes betore

the public, thus forcing the parties to defend their stands publicly.
Finally, the proponents of economic force in collective bargaining
assert that private methods of industrial relations dispute settlements
are superior to governmentally imposed ones.

The freedom to strike or

lockout is generally regarded by the parties as synonomous with freedom
from dictation by outsiders,

59

When regarded in this way, strikes are

the price paid for decentralized decision ma k i n g . ^

aUBnwiry

Collective bargaining is a process of continuous negotiation and
compromise between labor and management over the determination, admini
stration, and enforcement of the terms and conditions of employment.
Several aspects of the American solution to the problems of determining
terms and conditions of employment were examined in this chapter on con
temporary collective bargaining:

the multiplicity and diversity of the

forms of bargaining relationships, the goals and accomplishments of col
lective bargaining, and the requirements for genuine collective bargain
ing.
The multiplicity and diversity of the forms of bargaining relation
ships in the United States is perhaps due to the high priority assigned
to decentralized decision making and the right of self determination.
Public policy does not prescribe any single form of organization for
bargaining.

Within the limits of the rules of the game, the parties

~^Ibid., p. 158.
^Chamberlain and Kuhn, op. cit., p. 394.

have the right of self determination in the form of organization for
bargaining.

Furthermore, the rules encourage decentralization:

each

bargaining relationship can be adapted to the needs of the bargaining
environment.

So in one sense each collective bargaining relationship

is uniquely different, a fact which makes it difficult to talk of col
lective bargaining as a single homogeneous process.

On the other hand,

it is possible to group relationships according to skill and commonality
of interests such as in craft and industrial union bargaining models.
In the craft union bargaining, the single most important bargaining sub
ject is wages.

Union orgami^at-on is on the basis of skill, and the

union functions as an agent for .te members in the sale of skili.
Craft unions attain bargaining power by restricting the supply of
skilled labor (e.g. through apprenticesnip rules and pay) and by inert.* ing the demand for skilled
codes).

abor (e.g. craft jurisdiction and building

Typically, craft nr ion agreements are simply designed and local,

in scope.
Industrial unions, on tne other hand, bargain for the unskilled and
semiskilled worker in the mass production industries.
acts as an agent for its members.

This union also

This agency relationship is not limi

ted to the sale of services, however, but includes attempts to secure
the protection of the rights of its members on the job— both human rights
and job rights.

Consequently, industrial union agreements are generally

more complicated than craft agreements since they deal not only with
wages, but with hours, working conditions, fringe benefits, job rights,
grievance procedures and other subjects.

Generally, industrial agree

ments cover more workers per agreement since they include all workers in
a given bargaining unit which may be a single plant, or a multi-plant
company, or an entire industry.
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Decentralization, diversity, self-determination, and multiplicity
of bargaining relationships serve two important functions:

they pro

vide some insurance against the adverse social effects that might grow
out of bargaining (e.g. strikes), and they minimize the consequences of
individual errors.

These same factors also make it difficult to apply

a policy which calls for uniform wage settlements.

Furthermore, if

such a policy were applied it could easily affect craft and industrial
bargaining in quite different ways.
In this century, laws designed to encourage the development of
collective bargaining were adopted in an attempt to promote labor peace
and restore the quality of bargaining power between the individual
worker and the large business enterprise.
achieved:

Both goals have largely been

the former by providing a substitute for organization and

recognition strikes, and the latter by allowing the growth of unions
and diversity and self determination in the formation of bargaining
relationships.
plishments.

Collective bargaining has also recorded other accom

First, it has established a system of industrial jurispru

dence through a jointly administered grievance procedure.

Second, it

has provided support for the economic system by humanizing the labor
market, absorbing the creative energies of potential discontents, and
by providing workers with a stake in the system through the acquisition
of job rights.

Third, it substituted participative for autocratic

decision making in industry, thereby making the work environment less
uncertain and more consistent with the democratic ideals of the larger
value system of society.
In the final section of this chapter the requirements for genuine
collective bargaining were identified and analyzed.

Before collective

bargaining can become fully operative as a means for determining the

terms and conditions of employment, certain preconditions have to exist.
Collective bargaining cannot exist without a strong, effective worker
representation organization.

Therefore, the first precondition is that

unions have to gain the right to organize and bargain collectively as
the exclusive representative of a group of employers.

Employers have

to be refrained from using their power to thwart or to dominate these
labor organizations and have to be required to recognize and bargain
with the certified bargaining agent representing his employees.

Each

party should have relatively equal bargaining strength and should be
required to bargain in good faith.

This implies that the parties pos

sess a desire to negotiate and have some items over which they can bar
gain.

Finally each party must have a realistic course of action as an

alternative to accepting the final offer of the other party.

Not all of

these conditions would occur if the parties were left to their own
devices; they could be provided only by instituting a framework of rules
that would assure those rights and responsibilities necessary for effec
tive collective bargaining.
Eliminating one or more of these requirements may hamper or even
destroy the effectiveness of collective bargaining as a vehicle for the
settlements of industrial disputes and as an instrument for producing
industrial jurisprudence and support for the economic system and for
extending democratic ideas into industry.

The wage guideposts must be

analyzed in terms of their impact on the preconditions for genuine col
lective bargaining and their possible differential impact on craft and
industrial union bargaining.

The next section is devoted to the develop

ment and application of the guideposts.

CHAPTER 4

THE NEW INFLATION AND THE POLICY GAP

Since World War II the American economy has experienced three
distinct periods of rapidly rising pricest

the post-World War II boom

(1946-49); the Korean War inflation (mid 1950 to 1953); and the "new
inflation" (1955-59).

Economic policy makers have expressed concern for

the behavior of wages, especially bargained wages in each of these
inflations.*

This concern grew out of the awareness that wage increases

may either accelerate the pace of an inflation that is already underway,
or generate sufficient pressure to produce an inflation.
The Employment Act commits the government to the goals of maintain
ing a full employment level of aggregate demand at a non-inflationary
price level.

The price level is not an independent variable, however.

It may increase if the level of aggregate demand exceeds the full employ
ment level (traditional ,or

demand-pull inflation) or it may increase if

wage increases exceed some critical level (cost or seller's inflation).
Agreement is widespread that the first two postwar inflations which
accounted for more than 75 per cent of the total postwar price rise,
resulted from excessive aggregate demand, and substantially conformed to
the traditional demand-pull inflation format.

These inflations presented

no real policy dilemma— knowhow and policy tools were available.

*See Appendix A:
1962.

Chronology of Federal Wage-Price Policy, 1945-
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The third postwar inflation, however, appeared to present an
entirely new inflation format.

The existence of inflation during a

period of relatively high unemployment and excess capacity caused econo
mists to reappraise inflation theory and existing anti-inflation policies.

2

The theoretical and policy vacuum created by the new inflation

was soon filled with an extensive dialogue.

Economists, special interest

groups, government officials, and policy makers wrote, discussed, and
debated the nature, causes and probable remedies for treating this new
economic malady.
This chapter will survey one aspect of this dialogue— the dialogue
among the policy making groups.

This part of the dialogue was directed
3

by the need to find an acceptable policy to combat the new inflation.
The scope of the investigation was limited in several ways.

Only those

items which could be regarded as policy shaping were included.

Theoret

ical Issues regarding the possibility of "cost-push" inflation were
avoided since policymakers generally accepted the thesis of a new
inflation.
2

For an example of the re-examination of existing inflation theory,
see Martin Bronfenbrenner and Franklyn D. Holzman, "Survey of Inflation
Theory." American Economic Review. Vol. LIII, No. 4 (Sept., 1963) pp.
593-661. This exhaustive study also contains a comprehensive biblio
graphy on inflation which contains nearly two hundred entries.
3
This is not to imply that other groups were not interested in the
policy gap posed by the new inflation. For evidence of the widespread
interest in the problem, see: John M. Clark, The Wage-Price Problem
(The American Bankers Association, I960)} Inflation. Growth and Employ
ment. a series of Research Studies prepared for the Commission on Money
and Credit (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964);
The Public Interest in National Labor Policy (New York: Committee for
Economic Development, 1961); Inflation, proceedings of a conference
held by the International Economic Association, ed. by D. C. Hauge (New
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1962); The American Assembly, Wages.
Prices. Profits and Productivity, final edition, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959).
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This investigation will generally be restricted to the executive
and part of the legislative branches of the government.

While there are

large numbers of committees and subcommittees in Congress concerned with
economic affairs, the Joint Economic Committee occupies a unique place
for the purposes of this dissertation for several reasons.

First, it is

a Joint Committee, which means that it contains members from both houses
— thus presenting the possibility of a wider spread of opinion.

Second,

this Committee conducted one of the most extensive investigations of the
nature, causes and possible cures of the new inflation long before an
official policy was selected.

Finally, this Committee acts as Congress'

official advisory committee on economic affairs and it conducts hearings
on the Economic Report of the President each year.

Thus, a survey of the

Committee's pre-gmidelime position provides a basis for comparison with
their post-guideline statements.

Statements by the Chief Executive and

by his chief policy-recommending body, the Council of Economic Advisers,
will demonstrate the growing concern with the policy gap posed by the
new inflation.

The Legislative Brairbh— Joint Economic Committee
The 1957-58 recession left two legacies that set the stage for a
prolonged debate over the appropriate economic policy:

the largest

peacetime deficit in history and the highest rate of unemployment in the
postwar period.

The large deficit caused the Administration to fear a

renewal of inflationary pressures, whereas the Democratic majority of
the 86th Congress viewed the high unemployment rate as prima facie evi
dence of a low level of economic performance traceable to inappropriate
policies.

This policy debate resulted in two separate studies, one by

the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth and the
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other the Joint Economic Committee's Study on Employment, Growth and
Price Levels.
The Cabinet Committee, appointed by President Eisenhower from among
his Cabinet members on January 31, 1959, was chaired by Vice President
Nixon.

The purpose of the committee was to focus public attention on the

current dangers of inflation; whereas in reality the committee's "infor
mational" reports defended the economic policies of the Eisenhower Ad
ministration and called for their continuance.

Price-wage controls were

categorically rejected as inflationary retarding policies on the ground
that the cure was more serious than the disease.

4

Somewhat as a countermove to the Administration's "education
efforts," and somewhat as a means of increasing their prestige, the
Joint Economic Committee launched its now famous "Study on Employment,
Growth and Price Levels."

5

Study Papers
In preparation for a committee investigation of employment, growth,
and price levels, the Joint Economic Committee commissioned a number of
individual scholars to prepare reports on various aspects of the broader
study.

Each study paper was to provide factual and analytical materials

for consideration by the committee in the preparation of staff and com
mittee reports.

Since several of these study papers dealt with the

Federal Economic Policy, 1945-1967. 2nd ed. (Washington, D. C.s
Congressional Quarterly Service, July, 1967), pp. 49, 52.
"*The JEC's study was actually a compilation of numerous studies and
was clearly more objective and more exhaustive than the Administration's
effort. The JEC commissioned 23 study papers, collected 3,486 pages of
testimony from government agencies, professional economists, and interest
groups; required a staff report; and then issued a final committee report.
This study lasted from March 20, 1959, to January, 1960, and resulted in
over 5,700 pages of testimony, at a cost of approximately $200,000.

"
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wage-price problem and the 1957-58 inflation, they provide a factual
backdrop for the discussion to follow.
Charles L. Schultze,^ in the first study paper, concluded that the
1955-57 inflation resulted from the downward rigidity of wages and
prices combined with a shift in the composition of demand.

These two

factors, in a period when aggregate demand was dramatically stable, led
to rapidly rising prices in those sectors of the economy where demands
were growing rapidly and rigid prices in those sectors where demand was
falling.
Wages followed the same general pattern, rising rapidly in expand
ing industries which served as a pattern for wage settlements in other
industries.

For instance, excess demand in the capital goods industry

resulted in price and wage increases not only in that industry, but else
where in the economy as well.

Thus, it was argued, the general price

level was forced up in industries vdiere demand was stable or falling.
Policy weapons designed to combat inflations caused by excess
aggregate demand would be of limited value in combating inflations in
which excess aggregate demand is not the problem.

In fact, reducing

aggregate demand during such an inflation, Schultze argued, would more
likely reduce productivity and raise costs, thus generating pressures
for higher prices as profits get squeezed.

Apparently he did not

believe that flexible wages and prices could be secured in the existing
policy framework:

what were needed were selective rather than

^Charles L. Schultze, Recent Inflation in the United States. Study
Paper No. 1., prepared in connection with the Study of Employment,
Growth, and Price Levels for consideration by the Joint Economic Commit
tee, Congress of the United States (Washington, D. C.: Government Print
ing Office, 1959). Hereinafter all study papers will be footnoted by
author, title, and study number only, as all other publishing information
remains the same.
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comprehensive policy instruments— policies directed at the excess-demand
industries.
The second and third study papers^ dealt with price increases in
two key industries— steel and machinery.

Eckstein and Fromm were con

cerned with the causes of the $29.01 per ton increase in steel prices
during the 1953-58 period.

They concluded that the increase in steel

prices and wages could not be explained by demand factors alone, but
were caused by a substantial degree of market power in both the product
and labor market.

The steel price increase was due to the extraordinary

rise in costs, (employment, materials, capital and taxes) combined with
a conscious management effort to maintain and perhaps increase profit
margins in the industry.

Table 1, on the following page, gives the

change in revenues, costs, and profits between 1953 and 1958.
Each of the major elements of total cost increased during the
period.

Capital costs increased primarily because of the increase in

costs of replacing facilities and building additional capacity together
with management's desire to raise the required funds through internal
financing.

Material costs reflect the increase in prices elsewhere in

the economy.
Eckstein and Fromm attribute the comparatively large increase in
employment costs to "... bargaining between a strong union and a management
with strong market power in the product market, persuaded of their abil
ity to pass higher employment costs on in higher prices and being presg

sured by Government to settle their differences on favorable terms."

^Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm, Steel and the Postwar Inflation.
JEC Study Paper No. 2 and Thomas A. Wilson, An Analysis of the Inflation
in Machinery Prices, JEC Study Paper No. 3.

8

Ibid..pp. 20-21. A very comfortable assertion, but one which could
hardly be proven using employment costs. The major union in the steel

Table 4 - 1
Changes in Revenue, Costs, and Profits
in the Steel Industry, 1953 and 1958

1953

7c of
revenue

$

Revenue per ton

117.87

Profits per ton

6.59

Costs per ton

1958

1953-58

7. of
revenue

$

increase in
7. of revenue

146.88

5.5%

111.28

(94.37c)

9.21

6.27.

137.67

+0.7

(93.67.)

(-0.7)

employment

40.11

34.07.

56.10

38.17.

+4.1

materials, supplies
and freight costs

54.55

46.37c

61.26

41.77.

-4.6

5.99

5.07.

8.87

6.07.

+1.0

10.63

9.07c

11.40

7.77.

-!. 3

capital and interest
taxes

Source:

Adapted from Eckstein and Fromm, ££. cit., pp. 23-24.

The authors find that the sluggish performance of productivity in the
steel industry complicated the wage increase, for
...had productivity risen rapidly enough, it would
have served as an offset to the higher wages,
keeping unit wage costs from rising, or at least
from rising more than the average for the economy
.... The rise in output per man-hour in steel was
27 per cent from 1947 to 1957 compared to 32 per
cent in all manufacturing.^
A final factor that Eckstein and Fromm found contributing to the
increase in total costs was "...a conscious effort to maintain and
perhaps increase profit margins in the industry, giving steel companies
at least a proportionate share of the income gains scored at the expense
of the rest of the economy.
Eckstein and Fromm were apparently satisfied that they completed
their task, of demonstrating that the rise in steel prices was a critical
part of the new inflation.

They did not go any further, to discuss

industry does not bargain for all employees in the steel industry, only
for the production and maintenance employees. Furthermore, the average
hourly earnings for production workers in the steel industry showed only
a 24 per cent increase for 4 per cent fewer workers during 1953-57.
9

Ibid.. p. 21. Some interesting questions can be raised about
the data presented to illustrate productivity. Why use a 1947-57 time
period when previous discussions have centered on the 1953-57 period!
How can the "strong-union-monopoly power" part of the previous asser
tion be supported in view of the fact that productivity for wage employ
ees in basic steel kept pace with the all-manufacturing average?
Alfred H. Conrad, in Study Paper No. 9, (The Share of Wages and Salaries
in Manufacturing Incomes. 1947-56, p. 142), found that after the 1953-54
recession the shift to a greater proportion of administrative workers
increased unit labor costs, and widened the gap between unit labor costs
and productivity, and increased the downward rigidity of earnings lev
els, thus increasing cost-push pressures. Conrad's findings are sup
ported by Schultze and Tryon in Study Paper No. 17, (Prices and Costs in
Manufacturing Industries, p. 53), in which they stated that labor costs
per unit behave more like a fixed cost than a variable cost over the
complete business cycle because of the increasing proportion of compen
sation per unit going to salaried employees instead of wage employees.
^Eckstein and Fromm, ££. cit.. p. 34.

concrete policies for preventing further inflations of this type, but
merely referred vaguely to "...continual economic analysis and a wide
range of flexible policies."'*''*'
Thomas A. Wilson, in his study paper, attempted to determine
whether sectoral demand pressures have been present in key industries,
particularly the machinery industry.

He found negligible pattern set

ting wage behavior in this sector and small impact of machinery costs
upon the current costs of other sectors.

He found that "...the major

cause of the inflation in machinery is demand pressure in boom periods
coupled with downward rigidity during contractions...."
a combination of policies:

12

He suggests

reducing demand pressures, lowering entry

barriers, and reducing price rigidity, and the checking of steel price
increases.

Since steel is an important input into the machinery indus

try, any increase in steel prices leads to higher costs, causing ma
chinery prices to be rigid during recessions and setting the stage for
price increases when demand expands.

Thus, while Wilson did not find

significant cost-push elements originating in the machinery industry,
his analysis supported Eckstein and Fromm's position that the steel
industry was a major cost-push generator.
Not all views expressed in these study papers agreed as to nature,
cause, or cure of the 1957-58 inflation.

H. S. Houthakker

13

argued that

the inflation was of a transitory nature and was due to the public's
adjustment to a policy of full employment.

He admitted that further

inflation was possible, but believed the existing inflation would come

12

Thomas A. Wilson, o£. cit.. pp. 41-81.

13

H. S. Houthakker, Protection Against Inflation. JEC Study Paper
N d . 8., pp. 117-35.
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to an end of its own accord in

three to five years when the forecasted

increases in the general price

level were discounted in the returns

obtained from various kinds of

assets.

In other words, a high enough

interest rate on bonds would offset the consequences of any steady rate
of inflation.^
Houthakker explained that the public's adjustment to full-employment
policy would be a once-and-for-all kind of adjustment.

Such a policy

would lessen the likelihood of risk and in turn cause three shifts in the
economy:

less need for liquidity of assets, a greater exercise of mono-

poly power, and an increase in the amount of consumer debt.

15

Another adjustment to a policy of full employment could be the
tendency toward long-term collective bargaining contracts with automatic
annual improvement factors and cost-of-living adjustments.

A lessening

of uncertainty in the product market could lead to a lessening of uncerttainty in the labor market and could build in an upward wage bias.

Ibid., p. 123. Nor does Mr. Houthakker believe that creeping
inflation will turn into hyperinflation.
See p. 124.
15

First, cash and other highly liquid assets become less attractive
while business investments become more attractive as the need for liquid
ity is diminished.
In general, liquidity is desired as a protection
against disaster. When the likelihood of disaster is diminished by a
full employment policy commitment, the need for liquidity is also dimi
nished.
Furthermore, as the bond rate increases, the opportunity cost
of holding cash increases, making cash even less attractive.
Second, a full employment policy makes the severe discipline of
recessions unlikely, which favors the traditional victims of depressions
(the capital goods industries) and the exercise of monopoly power be
comes more likely. Business and labor unions have always tended to be
highly concentrated possessors of monopoly power in heavy industry, but
were prevented from exercising this power fully by the perennial risk
of depression. Removal of this disciplinary aspect of the market has
made the exercise of monopoly power a more serious danger to the economy.
Finally, by diminishing risk, the full employment policy has tended
to change the consumer's attitude toward debt.
Consumer debt is the most
rapidly expanding form of debt, and may continue to increase at an ever
increasing pace as bank sponsored charge accounts and overdraft plans
increase the velocity of money.

89
Another economist, Harold M. Levenson, notes that:

*

One of the factors underlying the upward
movement of hourly earnings during the 1956-58
period was the long-term contracts originating
in the automobile and steel settlements of
1955 and 1956 which provided for automatic
annual productivity increases and cost-of-living adjustments through 1957, 1958, and 1959.
These contracts established a pattern for several
other major industries in the economy.^
Two other basic questions were investigated by the study papers.
First, what light could be thrown on the general problem of wage-price
stability by a survey of the experiences of West European countries?
And second, how feasible were the possible policy alternatives for deal
ing with cost-push inflation?
Mark W. Leiserson^ concluded that Western European attempts to
maintain wage-price stability were not likely to be useful or success
ful in the United States because the conditions necessary for an effec
tive wage policy were lacking.
trality of outlook.

These conditions all required a cen

First, wage policy must be part of a coordinated

effort to achieve a national objective such as defense and reconstruc
tion measurably significant to organized interest groups.

Second,

national wage policy decisions must be centrally coordinated within the
government, an unlikely condition in the United States, where separation
of powers prevails.

This condition means that all economic interest

groups must be committed to a given national policy for wages; they must

Harold M. Levenson, Postwar Movement of Prices and Wages in Manu
facturing Industries. JEC Study Paper No. 21, pp. 21-22. The 1955 auto
mobile contract contained an automatic annual improvement factor of 9c
per hour, and the 3 year automobile industry contract of 1958 called for
an annual improvement factor of 2^7. per year.
^ M a r k W. Leiserson, A Brief Interpretive Survey of Wage-Price
Problems in Western Europe, JEC Study Paper No. 11.
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be able to achieve internal coordination among themselves.

This means

that trade unions must be centrally organized for collective bargaining
primarily over wage matters, and the unions must possess a tradition of
worker solidarity.

Management must be organized into employer associa

tions powerful and centralized enough to exercise discipline over mem
ber firms in the matter of wage changes.

Thus Leiserson holds that the

West European experience is not relevant for United States policy
. . .
18
decisions.
The suggested policy alternatives for combating market power infla
tion alluded to in previously discussed study papers can hardly be
deemed sufficient in light of the uniqueness of the problem.
scale analysis of all policy proposals is called for.
is undertaken in Emmett Redford's study paper.

A full-

Such an analysis

Redford"s basic premise

is that, discussions of whether the new inflation was initiated by the
monopoly power of corporations or labor organizations is irrelevant for
policy considerations.

What is important is the latent inflation that

exists in the concentration of power in organizations and how this infla
tion can be prevented from becoming overt.

As he puts it, "Americans

have always been concerned over concentrations of power..."
devised ways of limiting its use.

19

and have

One way is to check power with power,

18

Ibid.. p. 58. He explains that the "...lesson of European eco
nomic experience is the extremely simple one that government action and
economic policy here will have to depend primarily on analysis of the
structure and operation of private and public organizations in this
country. The study of European wage-price systems may be of some help
in enlarging our perspectives and obtaining greater understanding of
our economic institutions.
But, in general, systems of industrial rela
tions and wage determination tend to be so adapted to the social and eco
nomic environment in which they developed that they do not take well to
transplanting— in whole or in part— without substantial mutation."
19

Emmett S. Redford, Potential Public Policies to Deal with Infla
tion Caused by Market Power, JEC Study Paper No. 10, p. 3.

as for example, through the separation of governmental powers, checks
and balances, and federalism.

In the economic sphere, a perfectly com

petitive market would check power with power as competitors of the same
relative size were pitted against each other.

Another way to limit

power is to place direct limitations on it through judicial review and
the bill of rights.

The Landrum Griffin Act and recent civil rights

legislation serve as modern examples of this approach.

A third way is

to check the growth and exercise of economic power by antitrust laws.
And finally, the prices and rates of natural monopolies may be directly
limited by regulatory agencies.

The present problem of concentrated

private power does not present itself in a way that can be dealt with
through these traditional approaches,

Therefore, a new public policy

approach must be devised for this problem of power concentration.
Mr. Redford recommends:

(1) that a study be established to locate

inflationary power centers, to analyze effects of proposed price and
wage changes and to recommend policy; (2) that potential inflation
generators be required to serve notice of intent to change wages or
prices; (3) that the President be authorized to appoint a fact-finding
board with the power to issue advisory statements and recommendations;
and (4) that public utility control be extended to a few industries
such as the steel industry.

Hearings
In connection with its ten-month study on employment, growth and
price level, the Joint Economic Committee collected over 3,500 pages of
testimony from some 100 different witnesses.

About three-fourths of the

witnesses were professional economists; the remaining were either spokes
men for special private interest groups or for various government agencies
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The purpose of this section is to determine first the extent to
which professional economists recognized a new variety of inflationary
pressure, second, their diagnosis as to the causes for this new malady,
and finally their prescription or remedy for curing the new disease
before it reached epidemic proportions.
About one-third of the 75 professional economists appearing before
the Committee discussed the wage-price problem.

Appendix B summarizes

their views as to the nature, cause, and cure for the new inflation.
There seems to be general agreement among these economists that the
benefits of our present labor policy surely outweigh the costs involved.
Consequently, the policy of encouraging collective bargaining should be
retained and any governmental intervention in the process should proceed
cautiously.

The proper role for government in wage-price matters should

be limited to gathering facts, developing general guidelines, and
informing the public.

Most witnesses displayed an aversion to wage-

price controls, or the application of anti-trust laws to trade union s , ^
or to the abandonment of the ful1-employment commitment.

In a previous hearing, Abba P. Lerner recommended rules for con
trolling administered wages and prices by a governmental body.
Capacity
would be the critical factor for prices:
capacity production (and
above) warrants a price increase; below-capacity production warrants a
price decrease. Full employment would be the critical factor for wages:
general wage increases equal to the average trend increase in national
productivity would be permitted at full employment.
Deviations from
productivity ceiling would be permitted in tight labor markets (say 27.
or less unemployment) and in slack labor markets (say 87. or more unem
ployment).
Lerner's proposal fails to provide specific guides for the
range of permissible price increases or decreases. Administration would
be further hampered because of a lack of a generally accepted criterion
of capacity, tightness, or productivity, and due to the difficulty of
measurement. See: Abba P. Lerner, "Inflationary Depression and the
Regulation of Administered Prices," The Relationship of Prices to Economic
Stability and Growth, Compendium of Papers Submitted by Panelists
Appearing before the Joint Economic Committee, 85th Congress, 2nd Ses
sion (Washington, D. C . : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958), pp.
257-268.

93
Inn spice of the apparent disagreement among the witnesses there
seem tt© Bsc trwn general areas of policy agreement.

First, the government

must nTCaimtfaTTn M g h levels of economic growth and full employment through
appr®priatte! monetary and fiscal measures, and second, the go vernment
sBmotiM ff©ll©w policies designed to keep compensation per employee (wages

pious fringes) from increasing faster than average output per man hour.
Specifically, the government should do the following things:
a]) Increase competition in the product market,

thus making it

necessary for employers to resist union demands for inflationary wage
increases.

Competition could be increased through such devices as more

vig©r©us anti-trust enforcement; removal of agricultural p ica supports;
~ T

-

ellmmnattiom of governmental stockpiles; liberalization of trade poli
cies; aftxmlisEmient of unnecessary subsidies to private interest groups;
revision off ch.e tax system; or improvement of labor mobility.
Id';; ffitewelop an informed public opinion to serve as "court of last

res®rtm mm wage-price matters.

Presumably this would require, first,

mass pmtolic education campaigns as to the proper relationships between
wages* prices, profits, and productivity; second, a fact-finding proce
dure tt® clarify the issues and position of the parties in each case.
c)) Stage an annual conference of labor-management and governmental
leaders t® discuss the state of the economy and the wage and price
cihanngg.s that would be consistent with the basic economic goals of
gr®wttBn* Bnighi employment and stable prices.

Staff ffieport
IBue Staff Report‘d

presumably represents the opinion of the

Staff Report on Employment, Growth, and Price Levels, Joint
EccmrmriLc Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, D. C.:
iGwerunnemtt Printing Office, 1959).
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economic staff of the Joint Economic Committee resulting from the data
presented during the course of the study.

For our purposes, only those

conclusions relating to the following questions are relevant.
the causes of the 1955-59 inflationary recession?

What were

What are the most

appropriate policies for dealing with this new variety of inflation?
The Staff agreed that the 1957-58 recession was unlike any of the
previous postwar recessions, because wage rates continued to move upward
in the face of a high rate of unemployment, unused capacity, and a very
slow rate of increase in capacity and productivity.

Furthermore,

the

Staff found that the 1955-59 inflation pressures concentrated in three
important sectors of the economy;
services.

manufacturing, construction, and

Manufacturing was the greatest offender and posed the most

serious policy problems for the fcLlowing reasons:

two industries

(steel and machinery.) accounted for most of the inflationary pressures;
price increases in these two industries were transmitted to other indus
tries because of the interdependence of the industrial process; the
shift in employment from variable-cost production workers to fixed-cost
non-production workers increased the proportion of fixed to variable
costs and accentuated wage rigidities; and finally, downward wage and
cost rigidities were further increased by the long-term collective bar
gaining agreements negotiated in the automobile (1955) and steel (1956)
industries „^

^ E a c h of these agreements was negotiated by strong unions with
companies which were enjoying very high levels of output and profits;
each contained liberal wage and fringe benefits provisions for the dur
ation of the agreement.; and each was a long-term 3 year agreement..
Con
sequently, wages and fringe benefits continued to rise even after the
postwar boom had leveled off and the economy had entered a recession,
See: Ibid., p. 60.
For a more detailed discussion of multi-year collective bargaining
agreements and their impact on labor costs, see: Joseph W. Garbarino,
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Inflationary pressures in the other two sectors, construction and
services, were due to an entirely different set of causes.

In construc

tion, inflation resulted from strong market demand probably combined
with the exercise of market power by strong construction unions.

In the

service sector, the supply of medical personnel failed to keep pace with
the great increase in demand and productivity grew very slowly in the
unskilled service area.

23

The Staff Report found no significant relationship between "...
changes in earnings and changes in employment, in output, or in man-hour
productivity in the manufacturing, mining, or railr

d industries."

24

Within manufacturing the most important
factors which were related to wage changes were
(1) the level of profits, and (2) the degree of

Wage Policy and Long Term Contracts (Washington, D. C.; The Brookings
Institution, 1962). Garbarino also discusses the "formula wage poli
cies" of these agreements.
These policies were based on the thesis
that increases in real wages made possible by increases in productivity
should be distributed to the workers by regular increases in money
wages sufficient to cover productivity improvements and changes in the
cost of living.
In effect, this formula wage policy was a privately
devised version of the CEA's wage guideline policy that was to follow
in 1962. Garbarino regards the wage formula approach as workable in
prosperous companies with above average productivity increases and
expanding employment but unsuitable as a general wage policy for the
entire economy for the following reasons.
First, mechanical formulas
deprive the union of an opportunity to demonstrate its value to its
members.
Consequently management has had to pay a higher settlement
price to gain a lengthy contract.
Second, the privately determined
formula plaoes restrictions on wages but no restrictions on prices.
Third, the power to negotiate sector agreements in addition to the
basic formula causes the formula to break down. Finally, a national
formula wage-adjustment system which includes only changes in consumer
prices and changes in the average rate of national productivity in the
calculation of the formula will be unworkable in a free enterprise,
free collective bargaining economy.
23

Staff Report, o£. cit.. pp. 159-60.

24Ibld.
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competition in the. product market, as measured
by concentration ratios, This relationship
was not evident in mining or railroads . ^
The Staff thus rejected the simple cost-push explanation of the
1957-59 inflation, concluded that the causes are numerous and varied,
and noted the inadequacy of present policies.

New policies were neces

sary to (1) decrease the effects of excessive sectoral demand, (2) com
bat excessive market power, (3) increase the supply of medical personnel,
and (4) increase productivity, especially in the nonskilled service'
trades.
Although the Staff had collected and analyzed data for causes, and
suggested general remedies,

it felt that devising specific remedies and

overseeing their administration was beyond its scope as an advisory
group.

___

Committee Report
After completion of its monumental Study of Employment, Growth and
Price Levels, The Joint Economic Committee compiled a Committee Report—
complete with minority views— for presentation to the 86th Congress.
This Committee Report recognized that attempts to combat the 1957-59
inflation by restraining aggregate demand had not stopped the upward
movement of prices over the period but had brought unemployment and a low
growth rate.

The Committee concluded,

therefore, that the new inflation

was not caused by excess aggregate demand but. by shifts in demand, con
centration of market power, and low productivity combined with inadequate
supply of services.

Consequently, new inflation could be prevented only

by eradicating these causes.

To this point, the Committee Report, did not
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vary greatly from the Staff Report discussed earlier.

The difference

between them was in the policies recommended to curb cost-push inflation.
The Committee's general policy recommendations can be summarized
under three headings:

increase of productivity, reduction of concentra

tions of economic power, and reduction of the adverse effects of shifts
in demand.
The JEC felt that a comprehensive program for promoting the pro
ductivity of the labor force should:
(a) Provide Federal aid to education, without Federal control,
particularly for those States with a large school-age
population and poor financial resources.
(b) Provide a national scholarship program.
(c) Strengthen Federal programs of medical research and
vocational rehabilitation.
(d; Strengthen the private and public apprenticeship programs.
(e) Continue and increase support of scientific research,
especially basic research, even in the event that strictly
military needs for advancement in science diminish.
(f) Set up national productivity centers for raising produc
tivity in the low-wage, low-productivity industries and
services in the economy.
(g) Encourage those institutions of collective bargaining
that allow for the introduction of new technology
and which promote an equitable sharing of the inevi
table social costs of technological change.
(h) Provide unemployment benefits and retraining for workers
laid off because of technological change, with benefits
related to seniority.
(i) Establish special programs for the rehabilitation of
depressed areas.26
In addition, productivity could be promoted by reordering
...the priorities in Federal Government expenditures
to place greater emphasis on those activities which

^kjoint Economic Committee Report on Employment Growth and Price
Levels (Washington,D.C.t U,S. Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 4-5.
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contribute to growth, such as education, research
and health programs, and reduce subsidies for
agriculture and business, and prune wasteful
Government activities .^
Another major set of specific policy proposals are designed to
improve the structure of the economy in ways which reduce the adverse
effects of shifts in demand.

Among the most important specific pro

posals in this classification are the following:
(a) Aid to chronically depressed areas— through technical
assistance, worker retraining and long-term financial
aid to help these areas develop.
(b) Improve the operation of the labor market— through a
coordinated national job-worker information system
and a more liberal system of unemployment insurance.
(c) Reduce the social costs of technological unemployment
through a special unemployment compensation system
for technologically unemployed workers.
(d) Continue and improve special programs to promote
small business by making capital available and by
protecting small business from predatory practices.
(e) Gradual curtailment of uneconomic production activi
ties which are being maintained only through federal
s u bsidies.
These policies are designed to improve the operation of the market or to
mitigate adverse effects of the market.
The Joint Economic Committee had four specific recommendations to
reduce the concentration of market power, viz., tariff reductions,
strengthening of patent laws, government participation in key pricewage decisions, and more effective anti-trust approaches.

Gradual tariff

reduction would mean freer trade and hence more competition in now-pro
tected markets.

The Committee regarded this measure as a most effective

^ I b i d ., p. 5.
^ I b i d ., p. 54.
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restraint on the exercise of market power.

Patent laws should be

strengthened to assure that the patent system becomes a more effective
incentive for technological progress, rather than a means for restric
tive practices.
Another specific recommendation for the reduction of market power
was that of governmental participation in key price-vage decisions.

The

JEC began their discussion of this recommendation by emphasizing that
"...as a general rule, there should be a strong presumption against any
type of Government interference or control unless the circumstances are
such as to make it essential."
worse than the disease.

29

Otherwise, they feared the cure may be

Nevertheless, the JEC did recognize that society

has the right to impose limitations on the exercise of market power which
is being used in a manner detrimental to the public interest as it pre
sumably was in the 1957-59 period.

The JEC thus faced the choice of pre

scribing a dangerous medicine— governmental interference.

But the Com

mittee clearly recognized that this medicine comes in various strengths
and combinations.
The weakest kind of governmental intervention would he that designed
to encourage voluntary restraint in the exercise of market power.

This

approach implicitly recognizes that excessive market power exists and
attempts to deal with this excess of power by inducing business and labor
leaders to adopt a policy of self-restraint in the use of this power.
Usually this appeal to self-restraint comes through publie-admonitions
and appeals by the President and other national leaders.

The JEC’s posi

tion is that these appeals "can do no harm" but they are pessimistic as
to their effectiveness because the parties are asked to put national

29Ibid.. p. 437.
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interests before private interests and because the very high degree of
decentralization of power in American unions makes a broad acceptance
of a policy of wage restraint highly unlikely.^*
The JEC believes that an annual conference of business, labor, and
government leaders would be a more fruitful w e M . d e for achieving volun
tary self-restraint.

Such a conference could (discuss the President's

Economic Report, the annual Joint Economic (Gmmmittee hearing on this
Report, and the overall economic outlook.

The conference could also be

used to inform private decision-makers of tifae effects of their decisions
on the national economic welfare.

Perhaps them key wage and price deci

sions would be reached with a greater understanding of their impact on
the economy.
The second weakest form of governmental interference in the market
to reduce the effects of market power is a fact-finding procedure.

When

the stability-threatening wage and price decisions occur, the President
should have the power, the JEC felt, to invoke a standby, fact-finding
procedure.

The fact-finding group would study the stability-threatening

wage and price increase and issue a report vhich would include recom
mendations regarding the justification and desirability of the increases.
Presumably after the study, report and recommendations were made public,
public opinion would be counted on to insure non-inflationary settlements.
The third alternative is notification off the intent to raise prices
and wages followed by public hearings in which the parties justify their
positions.

The result of the hearings would be made public and the

public again would serve as a court of last resort.
30

Ibid., pp. 436-37. A policy of voluntary self-restraint is not
only the weakest form of governmental interference in the market, it is
also the only form of governmental interference that does not require ana
lysis of how the excess of market power came about or how it could be
eliminated.

* *■
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The fourth alternative is to allow wages and price decisions to
continue to be made privately but give the President the power to sus
pend such increases in pattern setting instances which he feels threaten
price stability.

During the period of suspension, hearings would be

held and again public opinion would be marshalled— this time to ratify
the decision or the conclusions of the hearings.

The final alternative

is compulsory arbitration combined with wage and price controls in public
utility fashion, i.e., governmental wage and price setting.
The Committee rejected the three most severe forms of governmental
interference and recommended the policies of voluntary restraint and
fact-finding.

The more severe remedies were rejected because the Com

mittee reasoned that the problems posed by excessive market power were
not that serious yet, and because the state of our knowledge and experi
ence was not yet advanced enough to invoke more severe market limita
tions successfully in peacetime.
The final specific policy recommendation of the Committee to reduce
the concentration of market power is the pursuit of a vigorous and effec
tive anti-trust policy.

Of the five policy recommendations dealing with

cost-push inflation, revived anti-trust and tariff reductions were the
only ones designed to eliminate the cause of excessive market power.
The other specific policy recommendations were designed to mitigate the
adverse or unwanted effects that resulted from excessive market power.
But the Committee did not advocate an enlarged scope for antitrust
actions:

they were to remain confined to the product market.

The Committee felt that although the exercise of market power by
strong labor unions had probably been a factor in the inflation, applying anti-trust laws to unions would not be an appropriate solution.

31Ibid.. p. 436.

31

102
They reasoned that stricter anti-trust enforcement in the product market
would have favorable indirect effects on wage pressures.
Why did the Committee not recommend
to labor union activities?

the extension of anti-trust laws

Primarily it was because they foresawdiffi

culties of application.
... strictly speaking, the application of the anti
trust laws to the labor market would strike at the
very existence of unionism and collective bargain
ing itself. The very reason of unions for being is
to limit the forces of competition, and the phi
losophy underlying onr entire public policy toward
collective bargaining has been that unions per se
are desirable because ttbe unrestrained forces of a
"free" competitive labor market place the individual
worker at a grave disadvantage vis-a-vis the employer.
We must presume, therefore, that the phrase
"application of the anti-trust Laws to labor unions"
is not to be construed literally to mean that any
restraints on competition will be unlawful, since
this is tantamount to stating that unions per se
will be unlawful.
To avoid declaring unions tSmrajselves unlawful by extending the anti
trust laws to them, it is necessary to specify in detail which union
activities will be considered as a violation of anti-trust laws.

In cer

tain specific areas of union activity the existing anti-trust laws
already apply (e.g., direct collusion with the producer to rig product
prices) and other union activities bave been restricted by labor laws
(e.g., closed shops, secondary boycotts, and jurisdictional disputes).
There are, however, two other interpretations of the phrase "extend
anti-trust laws to trade union activities," viz.. to make industry-wide
collective bargaining unlawful, and to make national union participation
in bargaining unlawful.

Both off these interpretations, the Committee

noted, concern the use of market power in the wage setting process,

^ I b i d ., p. 434.
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rather than in other artas of union concern.

With regard to industry

wide bargaining, the Committee reported:
Actually, there are very few industries in the
United States where this type of bargaining occurs
— railroads, steel, and coal, are the major ones.
Ln the great majority of industries, bargaining is
carried on between one company and representatives
of the local and national union in that company.
There is no evidence to suggest that this latter
type of bargaining results in any lower settlements
than where industry bargaining occurs; in fact,
most industry-wide bargaining has developed as a
device to strengthen the bargaining position of the
employer rather than the union. The elimination of
industry-wide bargaining, therefore, would have lit
tle or no effect on the problem at hand,33
The interpretation which wouLd restrict or eliminate the role of
the national union in collective bargaining is "...based on the premise
that it is the power of the national union which creates the upward pres
sure on wages, so tha

tionary pressure."

34

local union bargaining would result in less infla-

The JEC rejected this premise as doubtful.

they found that the opposite may be true.
Some of the strongest unions in the United
States, where wages have risen at least as rapidly
as elsewhere, place primary responsibility for
bargaining on the local union, with the interna
tional unions having virtually no role— the build
ing trades' unions are a clear case in point. Of
greater importance, however, is the fact that
there is much evidence to suggest that local bar
gaining units may well be more aggressive in fight
ing for wage increases than are national union
representatives. In general, national offices are
more insulated from the internal political pressure
of the membership and are more able to understand
the broader economic problems of the industry.
Local union bargaining, therefore, could create
an atmosphere of interlocal rivalry which would

33Ibid., p. 435.
3 4T
va
Ibid.

In fact

1.0 4

accentuate rather than reduce the pressure for
wage increases.^5

The Executive Branch
The economic policy shaping documents of the executive branch--the
Economic Report of the President and the Annual Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers— contain official statements on appropriate approaches
to the cost-push problem.

This section shall concentrate on wage-price

policy recommendations contaiTKi in these two publications since 1957.

36

T'_(. :conomic Reports of the Pres 1 ;ent. 1957-1961.
T.i- 1^57 report recognized the existence of cost-push inflation and
calj>_i for appropriate private policies to support government monetary
and fiscal policies in combating inflation.

37

However, this report

failed to provide any substance to the question of just what "appropriate
private policies," were and how they were to be achieved.
35

Ibid.. pp. 435-436. The minority endorsed the major proposal for
expanding and strengthening the business anti-trust program but differed
from the majority in two ways. First, the minority rejected concentra
tion ratios as a superficial guide for anti-trust policy. Second, the
minority called for action to counter union market power on the grounds
of logic and symmetry. See pp. 87-88.
36
This should not be construed to mean that wage-price problems did
not exist before this time or that the executive branch failed to recog
nize the problem before this time. For a more detailed discussion of
the Chief Executives' approaches to this problem prior to 1957, see
Appendix A, Chronology of Wage-Price Policy, 1945-1960.
37
The Economic Report of the President together with the Annual
Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (Washington,D.G.i O.S.Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 44. Since both documents are always
contained in the same volume, all future references will refer to the
one under discussion by title, year and page number.
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The 1958 Economic Report of the President addressed itself to these
two points.

It defined appropriate private policies as those in which

wage increases stayed within the limits of over-all productivity gains
and price increases did not go beyond increases in costs.

38

The report

called for voluntary private restraint within these boundaries, but in
the event that such restraint was not shown voluntarily it could be
guaranteed "...by a public opinion that is alert to the consequences of
wrong policies and insists on policies which will yield economic growth
without inflation."

39

This threat of public reprisals against wrong pri

vate policies seems rather hollow in view of the complexity of the issues.
These early admonitions seemed to have little effect on the parties,
as wages continued to rise during the recession of 1958.

Thus, the 1959

Economic Report of the President called for more positive action.

The

report begins by repeating the call for voluntary self-discipline and
restraint— for consumers to become better shoppers, businessmen to wage
a ceaseless war against costs, labor unions to become aware of the essen
tial nature of stable prices, and government to follow appropriate money,
credit, and debt management policies to achieve full employment, growth,
and stable prices.

To this extent, the report is merely reiterating the

position taken in the two previous reports.
However, the 1959 report goes beyond the admonition stage to recom
mend four additional governmental actions to assist in maintaining price
stability.

40

First, to strengthen the government's role in combating

38

Economic Report of the President. 1958. pp. 8, 9. Presumably,
prices should be increased only to the extent of the dollar increase in
costs, not a markup percentage of cost increase.
39

Ibid.. p. v.

40Ibid., 1959, pp. 52-53.
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inflation, Congresi should amend the Employment Act of 1946 to make price
stability an explicit goal of public policy, coequal and coordinate with
full employment, production and purchasing power.

Second, a Cabinet

level Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth was established
to achieve the following objectivesi

to study cost-price activities,

to study relationships between price stability and growth, to seek ways
of improving productivity, to build better public understanding of the
need for price stability, and to recommend ways that this goal could be
achiever!.

41

Third, a Committt" on Government Actvities affecting Prices

and Costs was established to ft I1ow the operation of Federal procurement,
_onstructi->n, stockpiling, and commodity price support programs and to
recommend ways of bringing the administration of these programs in line
with the objective of reasonable price stability.

Finally, in an effort

to provide more and better statistical information on prices, wages,

4lA Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth was
appointed by President F.isenhower on January 31, 1959, with Vice Presi
dent Nixon as Chairman.
Its purpose was that of focusing public atten
tion on the dangers of inflation. Its final report, delivered on
April 17, 1960, concluded the following with respect to growth, infla
tion, and the compatibility between these two goals. Growth: During
the most meaningful period for measuring growth (1948-57), the growth
rate was more than adequate, since GNP increased at an average rate of
3.8 per cent per year. Inflation: 90 per cent of the price increase
since 1939 occurred before 1952, i.e., before the Eisenhower administra
tion. Furthermore, price increases since 1952 may not be as much as
10 per cent since price indices do not allow for improvements in quality.
Compatibility of goals: The goals of price stability and growth are
compatible if the economic policies of the Eisenhower administration
are continued. Since the final committee report was essentially a
defense of the economic policies of the Eisenhower administration and a
call for their continuance, it was more of a campaign document than a
vehicle for furthering public understanding. Certainly, the accuracy of
the statistical interpretation is questionable. Is GNP the most accu
rate device for measuring growth? Why was 1939 chosen as a base year?
Why do the price indices fail to measure quality changes only since
1952? See: Federal Economic Policy. 1945-1967. op. cit.

earnings, and productivity, the President requested that the Bureau of
the Budget "accelerate programs for enlargement and Improvement of public
information.
In the 1960 Economic Report of the President, self-discipline and
restraint was again the theme.

This report recommended that labor-man-

agement disputes In basic Industries be settled without resort to dis
ruptive strikes and "...on terms that are fair to the public at large as
well as to the parties directly involved."

43

The fairness of collective

bargaining agreements could be decided by whether such agreements contri
bute to inflation:

the national average of wage rate increases should

not exceed sustainable rates of improvement in national productivity.
How could such non-inflatlonary settlements be achieved?

Only through a

broad understanding of the relationship between productivity, costs, and
prices.

In fact, the report argued that:
It would be a grave mistake to believe that we
can successfully substitute legislation or controls
for such understanding.
Indeed, the complex rela
tionships involved cannot be fixed by law, and
attempts to determine them by restrictive govern
mental action would Jeopardize our freedoms and
other conditions essential to sound economic
growth.

However, the 1960 report failed to provide any concrete suggestions for
ways of improving public understanding.
The President's 1961 report discussed the three basic policy
alternatives for combating inflation— fiscal policy, monetary policy,
and control of unit production costs.

The difficulty in achieving a

sound co-ordinated policy was a result of the dispersion of decision42
43

Economic Report of the President. 1959, pp. 52-53.
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making power:

fiscal policy decisions lie with the Administration; mone

tary policy decisions are

made by the Independent Federal Reserve System;

whereas private Individuals and groups are primarily responsible for
decisions that affect unit production costs.
How can these decisions be coordinated?
government policies affect costs?

Specifically, how can

The report recognizes that:

An important aspect of cost control is the
achievement and maintenance of a proper relation
ship between wage and productivity changes in the
economy as a whole. In general, if average
increases in wages and salaries are inconsistent,
over the long run, with average improvements in
productivity, prices may be expected to trend
upward.
But in the final analysis, costs and price decisions are made by
private economic units in the private sector in their private interests.
The problem is one of making these private economic units aware of their
public responsibility for inflation when inflationary decisions are made.
Again the problem was recognized, but the difficulty of Juggling goals,
policies and programs resulted in a return to the comfortable paths of
admonition and education.
The Council of Economic Advisers
In its 1962 Annual Report, the President's Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA) recognized two varieties of inflation:

the traditional

or aggregate demand induced inflation and the new or cost induced infla
tion.

When excessive aggregate demand exists, "... prices will be bid

up in all markets, and, as business firms try to expand output in order
to seize the profit opportunities presented, increases in wages and in
45

Economic Report of the President. 1961, p. 58.
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cost of materials will follow.

The resulting rise in incomes will

reinforce and renew the process."

46

Excessive aggregate demand inflation

poses an additional threat to the economy in that it brings forth
little or no gains in output and real Income."

47

Presumably the Council

did not feel that this type of inflation posed serious policy problems
since inflationary pressures of this type could be eliminated by policies
designed to weaken aggregate demand.
The Council recognized that inflationary pressures may also
arise because of cost pressures on the supply side of the market.

This

new inflation originates "...in those sectors of the economy where com
petitive forces are weak and large corporations and unions have a considerable degree of discretion in setting prices and wages."

48

Wage and

price decisions in these monopolistic sectors of the economy put upward
pressures on the price level in two ways.
First, prices may be increased when demand is
not strong in the aggregate or even in the specific
industries involved. Because the prices of these
industries affect costs elsewhere, increases in
their prices tend to spread throughout the economy.
Second, prices in these sectors may remain constant
in the face of declining demand, although they rise
in times of increasing demand. The result in the
long run is an upward drift in prices in these
industries, which again tends to be transmitted to
the whole economy.
Furthermore, this new inflation could not be treated with the stan
dard anti-inflationary prescription of aggregate demand reductions, not
46
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. 1962. (Washing
ton, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 45. Hereinafter
referred to as 1962 CEA Report.
47Ibld.. p. 68.
4^Ibid.. pp. 45-46.
49

Ibid.. p. 46.
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because the patient would not respond to the proposed cure, but because
he might respond too much.

50

The 1955-59 cost inflation had taken place

despite unused capacity and high unemployment.

To reduce aggregate

demand enough to eliminate the pressures of cost inflation would likely
cause unemployment to climb to even higher levels.

The Council felt that

this alternative must be rejected, because it would mean
...sacrifice rather than achievement of both the
major goals that price stability serves: equity
would be sacrificed because the economy as a
whole, and the unemployed in particular, would
suffer as a result of the manner in which a few
individuals and groups exercise their economic
power. Eventually, the balance of power would
also be weakened: under conditions of prolonged
unemployment and excess capacity, the investment
needed to keep our exports competitive in quality
and cost would be unlikely to occur.^
As the President's chief economic adviser, the Council's task and
intent was clear— to recommend a more realistic and appropriate policy
alternative to deal with cost inflation.

However, before that task

could be accomplished, the Council had first to establish the major
standards for judging the appropriateness of all proposed cost inflation
policies.

After a discussion of alternatives, the Council concluded

that an acceptable or appropriate price-stability policy would be one
which (1) is consistent with individual price and wage rate flexibility,
(2) does not reduce dynamic competition, and (3) works to maintain and
increase the freedom of the private economy.

Acceptance of these stan

dards automatically makes unacceptable certain policy alternatives such
as direct wage and price controls, the abandonment of collective

50 Ibid.. p. 47.

bargaining, or attaining stability at the cost of high levels of
unemployment.
Moreover, the Council recognized that In addition to meeting these
standards, an acceptable policy alternative should be directed toward
eliminating basic causes, not symptoms.

Since in the Council's opinion

the new inflation originated in monopolistic sectors of the economy and
was a direct result of monopolistic wage and price practices, the most
obvious policy alternative to be considered would be that of increasing
competition in these sectors of the economy.

The critical questions

were how more competition could be fostered in the monopolistic sectors
of the economy, and what effect an increase in competition would have
on the cost-inflation problems.
In considering the best ways to promote competition, the Council
concluded that:
Competition in product markets is promoted by
an increase in the number and diversity of market
alternatives available and by removal of anti
competitive restrictions on business behavior.
Examples of the former are reduction of Import
barriers and encouragement of new and growing
businesses. Examples of the latter are attempts
to halt tendencies toward monopolization and to
eliminate collusive agreements among firms through
anti-trust policy. 53
In addition to fostering competition, these policies would have
important by-products, in particular and in general.

A reduction of

import barriers, for Instance, would directly widen and strengthen com
petition in domestic markets.

Broadening the competitive base would

tend to encourage cost reductions, to spur innovation and to stimulate
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economic vitality, as the European Common Market experience clearly

demonstrates.

54

Encouraging the development of small business would

strengthen that sector of the economy and contribute to overall economic
efficiency and economic growth since small firms are often more percep
tive to changing market needs and can often adjust to such changes
easier

55
than larger, more bureaucratic enterprises.

The direct effect

of asuccessful anti-trust suit is to promote competition

oreliminate

unfair methods in that case; the by-product is the deterrent effect
which successful prosecution has on other potential offenders.

56

The

generalized by-products of policies designed to foster competition are
summed up by the Council as follows:
Public policies to encourage economy-wide
competition not only contribute to the goal of
price stability; they also promote efficiency
and the advance of productivity. Hence, such
policies serve both the goal of economic growth
and the goal of balance of payments equilibrium.
In addition, such policies have an independent
justification in that they make the economy more
responsive to the demands of consumers and thereby
improve the qualitative nature of the output gen
erated by the economy at rising levels of activity.

Improving the range of consumer choices is an im
portant facet of economic progress, and one that
gives ultimate meaning to policies of full employ
ment and economic growth.^'
The Council of Economic Advisers recognized that increasing compe
tition among firms in the product market would not be enough.

Competitive behavior throughout the economy
involves more than rivalry among firms selling
similar products in a single market; it also
involves hard bargaining between firms buying
54T, . ,
Ibid.
~*~*rbid.

No evidence was offered to support this assertion.

56Ibid.. pp. 184-185.
57Ibid., p. 183.

and selling from each other and between firms
and unions. Abridgement of competition may
be evidenced as much in permissive wage
increases which are simply passed along in
higher prices as_i® agreements among firms to
divide markets. ®

weapon against the wage-price spiral, a

Thus, to be an effective

policy of stimulating competition

must ultimately produce more price

rivalry and harder wage bargaining than had been the case.
The policy alternative of combating seller’s inflation by increas
ing competition among sellers in both the product and resource market
was rejected by the Council for several reasons.

For one thing, the

new inflation had originated in a few sectors of the economy where the
parties could exercise considerable discretion over wage bargaining and
price decisions.
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In those

sectors, competition was insufficient to

insure the automatic and effective market discipline that a competitive
free-enterprise economy requires to prevent the monopolistic dictation
of terms to economically weak economic
an automatic and impartial regulating
individual initiative and freedom
economic power

alternatives:

device only in an economy in which

When competition falls to perform

adequately, society's policy-makers have two

increase the amount

responsibility for the

Competition can work as

of choice are encouraged and where

is relatively equal.

its disciplinary function

units.

and degree of competition or assume

disciplinary measures needed.

evidence that the competitive

The

CEA offers no

regulating mechanism has broken down in

all sectors of the economy.
If the competition-promoting
policy would appear to be one

alternative were chosen, the correct

of promoting competition in the inflation-

generating sectors only.

Yet the Council's discussion is in terms of an

Increase in competition for the entire economy.

According to the Coun

cil's diagnosis of the problem, specific end directed policies appar
ently were in order but tbe Council chose to discuss general, non-dlrected competition-promoting policies.
The CCA recognized tbe contributions that economy-wide-competition-increasing policies would make:

increased price stability, pro

ductivity increases, economic growth; a balance of payments equilibrium;
and an economy more responsive to the demands of the consumer, and
therefore with a better quality of output.^
added two additional contributions:

The Council could have

an increase in the impartial and

automatic discipline of tbe market, and a great likelihood that private
decisions would be in tbe public interest.
Why, then,
tion notaccepted?

was tine alternative of increasing economy-wide competi
Was it because the CEA felt that the measures pro

posed could not be strong enough to increase competition in those sec
tors where competition was weakest without adversely affecting other
sectors of the econony where competitive pressures were stronger?

Why

not consider specific competitionincreasing measures directed toward
those sectors of tbe economy which produced the inflation, such as the
iron and
One

steel, automobile, machinery, and equipment industries?

61

cannot say with any degree of certainty why the CEA rejected

this alternative, but no doubt considerations of equity, effectiveness,
and political feasibility were important.

Also, competition-increasing

policies, whether general or specific, would have to be introduced
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gradually over a period of time to minimize any disruptive adjustments
which might occur, whereas the need was for an immediately applicable
policy because of the large number of major collective bargaining agreements which were to expire in 1962.

62

Another consideration in the decision not to choose competitionincreasing policies Day have been that these policies were directed pri
marily toward the product market rather than the labor market, and there
fore could not he depended upon to produce the hard bargaining which the
Council indicated was desirable.

Indirectly, increased competition in

the product market might bring such a result, since it would be more
difficult for management to pass large wage increases on to their con
sumers in the form of higher prices, but there was no guarantee that it
would do so.

Even if the desired result could be achieved, it could not

be achieved in tine for the 1962 bargaining sessions.

Nor is it very

realistic to expect e strong spillover effect from the product to the
labor market or e softening of wage demands by unions in an economy commited to full employment.

It is also unlikely that the American public

would be willing to accept the consequences of very hard bargaining—
strikes, lockouts, public inconvenience, and possibly violence.
The CEA sought a policy which would halt the wage-price spiral, but
would not interfere with individual wage flexibility, economic growth,
balance of payments equilibrium, stable prices.

Furthermore, they indi

cated that the new policy should not conflict with any of the basic
values or ideals of the economic system, such as decentralized decision
making and economic freedom.

Nor should it interfere unnecessarily with

the operation of a market-oriented economy.
62

Additionally, the Council

Ibid.. p. 0 8 .
(basic steel, aluminum, fabricated metals, con
struction, aircraft, airlines, and the maritime industries).
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wanted a policy which could be Implemented Immediately because of the
large number of important collective bargaining contracts expiring dur
ing 1962.

Increasing economy-wide competition would improve the opera

tion of tbe economy, but probably would not sever the tap root of the
inflation, or, if effective, would be too time consuming.

The remaining

alternative was that of devising a way in which government discipline in
the public interest could be substituted for market pressure and produce
the desired result.

The CEA's proposal was wage-price guideposts.

Summary and Conclusions
Tbe 1955-59 inflation shook many preconceptions about the nature of
tbe inflationary process, raised new doubts about the compatibility of
tbe economic goals of full employment and stable prices, and stimulated
an extensive dialogue on the nature, causes, and cures for the infla
tion.

— A consensus emerged from the policy dialogue on several key points.

First, tbe inflation of 1955-59 presented a new inflationary pattern in
that it occurred during a period of unemployment and excess capacity.
Second, tbe greatest inflationary pressures came from those sectors of
tbe economy where companies and unions possessed considerable market
power.

Unions pressed for outsized wage increases and multi-year con

tracts; management granted these increases and passed the higher costs
on to tbe public as higher prices.

Key wage settlements then became the

target settlements for other sectors of the economy.

Third, the bene

fits of the current policy of encouraging collective bargaining were so
great and widespread that any governmental intervention in—collective
bargaining should proceed cautiously.

Fourth, while monetary and fiscal

policy could prevent excess demand inflation, these policies were

117
ineffective against cost Inflation, so that the final point of consensus
was that new policy measures must be devised.
The chief matter of concern for the policy makers was the formula
tion of policies which could cope with this new inflation, but not at
the expense of full employment or economic growth.

There seemed to be

some recognition in the executive branch and among some economists
(Slichter, Anderson, Lerner, Budd, Machlup, Gordon) that what was needed
was a policy that would prevent wages from increasing faster than econ
omy wide productivity while not destroying the collective bargaining
process.
The most widely recommended proposals for combating the new infla
tion can be classified under four major headings, as follows:
1.

Increase the amount and degree of competition in both the product and labor markets.
making groups

64

A number of economists

63

and policy

attributed the new inflation to concentrations

of economic power that allowed some unions and companies to
administer wages and prices.

Unions secured wage increases

greater than productivity increases, and management passed
the higher wage costs along to consumers by raising prices.
The existence of administered wages and prices was taken as
prima facie evidence of the decline in competition, at least
in some key labor and product markets.
General agreement that the decline of product and labor
market competition produced the new inflation did not produce
agreement as to the reasons for the decline of competition
63
Heyer, Lanzillotti, Fellner, Lerner, Okun, Segal, Heller, Redford, Eckstein, and Fromm.
64
Joint Economic Committee, JEC Staff, and Council of Economic
Advisers.
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or what could be done to increase it.

Machlup, Gordon, and the

staff economists for the Joint Economic Committee attributed
the decline of competition to the full employment guarantee of
the Employment Act.

This guarantee reduced market discipline—

the major factor keeping nlarket power in check.

Guaranteeing

full employment, they argued, permitted unions to pursue higher
wages without fear of large-scale unemployment, and permitted
employers to seek higher prices without a great fear of loss of
sales.

Other economists agreed that market discipline had

decreased, but for entirely different reasons:

the protective

nature of current tariff, trade and import policies;^ agricultural price supports and other subsidies;

66

government stock

piles;^ or the growth of organized labor and collective bargaining which produced a downward rigidity in wages.

68

Sugges

tions for increasing competition generally ran to removing
these causes and/or to more efficient application of the anti
trust laws,^ as a means of reducing wage and price increases.
2.

Increase economy wide productivity.

Wage agreements greater

than economy wide productivity were seen as the major cause of
the new inflation.

Increasing competition was suggested as a

65
Slichter, Jacoby, Hildebrand, Ulman, Segal, Machlup, JEC, CEA.
^Slicter, Jacoby.
67 T
K
Jacoby.
68

Heller, Gordon, Musgrave, Pierson, Slichter, Fellner, Schultz.
Downward wage rigidities may have resulted either from long term con
tracts or from the shift in employment from variable cost production jobs
to fixed-cost non-production jobs which increased the proportion of fixed
to total cost.
^CEA, JEC, Jacoby, Lanzillotti, Fellner.
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way of reducing wage demands and Increasing productivity was

suggested as a way of increasing the allowable limit for wage
increases.

Again there were differences of opinion

specificst

Keyserling,

as to

Anderson, and Hildebrand argued for a

higher rate of economic growth while the JEC and their staff,
and Segal felt that productivity could best be increased by
improving the functioning of the labor market (training, re
training, information, mobility), by enlarging government sup
port for education and scientific research, and by developing
special programs for tlv rehabilitation of depressed areas.
3.

Encourage the use of voluntary restraint in wage and price
decisions.

This could be accomplished in two ways.

First,

through Presidential admonitions to the parties to consider the
public interest in making their decisions.

Second, by staging

an annual conference of labor, management, and government offi
cials for the purpose of discussing the state of the economy
and the probable effect of certain levels of wage and price
settlements on the economy.
4.

70

Development of informed public opinion as a court of last
resort on wage-price matters.

Essentially this was a device

for forcing the parties to defend the legitimacy of their
claims before the public, thereby prohibiting the use of market
power to secure inflationary settlements.

Because of the tech

nical nature of the material the public was asked to evaluate,
there might be a need for a study center to develop the facts
needed (Hoover, Redford), or for a requirement of advance

^ T h e Chief Executive, JEC, Gordon.
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notice of Intent to change wages and prices (Segal, Redford),
or for fact-finding boards with the power to recommend settle
ments In the public interest,^ or for standards for use by the
public In judging the Inflationary Impact of wage and price
decisions.^
While each of these recommendations would add to the policy maker's
tool kit, the first three were essentially long-run in effect.

Yet

short-run recommendations were noticeably needed, because 1962 promised
to be a critical year, for numerous major collective bargaining contracts
were to be re-negotiated.

This dialogue on the inflation problem and

possible solutions produced a better understanding of the inflationary
process.

It also created a climate of public awareness and concern.

The official wage-price policy which finally emerged from this dialogue
was the guidepost policy.

71
Musgrave, Heller, Redford, JEC.
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Keyserling, Hoover, Gordon, Redford, CEA.

CHAPTER 5
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION:

WAGE-PRICE GUIDELINES

President Kennedy included the CEA Chairmanship appointment among
his initial pre-inaugural appointments; an act which demonstrated his
concern with economic matters and his intention to deal with them
actively.*
the economy.

The immediate economic problem was the chronic slackness of
The recession had to be analyzed and countercyclical pol

icy had to be formulated and implemented.

By late 1961, the recovery

was exceeding expectati ms and the Council began to turn to other prob
lems:

how to attain maximum employment and full production, improve

defenses against future inflations, reduce the balance-of-payments defi
cit, stimulate investment and growth, and avoid inflation.
Thus, in 1962, the Administration's activist philosophy and eco
nomic conditions combined to force the wage-price problem on the Coun
cil.

The Council's task was that of devising a policy recommendation

which would effectively immunize the economy against the seller’s infla
tion virus.

But there were restraints:

the new policy could not inter

fere with the attainment of the economic goals of improving the balanceof-payments position and achieving full employment and maximum economic
growth; nor could the new policy be in conflict with any of the basic
values or ideals of the economic system, such as decentralized decision
making and economic freedom; nor should the new policy interfere

*Edward S, Flash, Jr., Economic Advice and Presidential Leaderships
The Council of Economic Advisers (New York: Columbia University Press,
1965), p. 175.
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unnecessarily with the operation of a market-oriented economy.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the
mended by the Council of Economic Advisers.
investigated in this chapter are:
prescription?

Why

policy recostt-

Some of the

What was the Council's

questions
diagnosis and

was the guideline alternative chosen over

all others?

What were the major intentions, expressed or implied, of the guideline
approach?

What is the nature, essence, and rationale of the guideline

approach as initially formulated by the Kennedy Council?

How have sub

sequent Councils modified, strengthened, extended, or restated the
guidelines?

What is the current status of the guidelines?

The central

concern of this chapter is the guideline concept, as it was initially
formulated and as it has evolved.

Application of the guidelines and

the probable effect of the guidelines on collective bargaining will be
treated in later chapters.

Formulation of the Guidelines
The Council did not attempt to suggest a wage-price policy for an
idealized market economy; rather they took the actual economy as the
basis for their policy recommendation.

The actual economy was one

characterized by market imperfections:

an economy in which government

made commitments to price stability, full employment, economic growth,
an improving balance-of-payments, agricultural price supports, collec
tive bargaining, and other welfare-capitalism goals; an economy in which
large, affluent trade unions bargained on a company-wide or industry
wide basis; an economy not of atomistic firms but of gigantic world-wide
firms.

In the American economy of 1962, large firms and well-organized

employees were insulated from the rigors of a highly competitive market.
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Size, resources, barriers to entry, and governmental welfare commitments
made up the layers of this insulation.
In

spite of their insulated positions,

unions were allowed to

reach price and wage

individual self-interest.

business

firmsandtrade

decisions onthebasisof

Had the decline in the automatic regulating

force of competition produced a case of acute arthritis in the invisi
ble hand?

The Council seemed to think so, for they stated:
Individual wage and price decisions assume
national importance when they involve large num
bers of workers and large amounts of output
directly, or when they are regarded by large seg
ments of the economy as setting a pattern.
Because such decision? affect the progress
of
the whole economy, there is legitimate reason
for public interest in their content and conse
quences .

Furthermore the forthcoming year promised to be a period of stronger
aggregate demand and a period in which collective bargaining contracts
would be negotiated in the steel, aluminum, fabricated metals, construc
tion, aircraft, airlines, and maritime industries.

Excessive wage

increases and subsequent price increases in any of these industries
would probably generate more inflationary pressures and worsen the bal
ance of payments problem.

Thus, wage and price decisions in 1962 could

not be regarded solely as private decisions but as quasi-public deci
sions .
When viewed in this fashion, the policy question dealt with how the
parties to nationally important wage and price decisions could be forced
to consider the public interest, and how the standards for the public
interest could be decided upon.

Of the many alternatives considered, the

Council chose to rely on the compelling force of informed public opinion

^1962 CEA Report, p. 185.
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and consumer sovereignty as the mechanism to achieve the desired result.
Their position was that:
An informed public, aware of the significance
of major wage bargains and price decisions, and
equipped to Judge for itself their compatibility
with the national interest, can help to create an
atmosphere in which the parties to such decisions
will exercise their power responsibly.**
However, major wage and price decisions were normally clouded by
secrecy and surrounded by propaganda smokescreens.
public

How, then, was the

to judge whether particular wage-price decisions were

national interest?

in the

The secrecy and propaganda must be reduced, and

labor, management, and the public must have some standards for judging
the national interest.

The most obvious general standard was that these

decisions should not be inflationary which meant that the Council had to
suggest a specific wage-price policy.

The Council recommended the pro

ductivity guidepost policy.
The proposed productivity standards would "...describe in broad
outline a set of guides which, if followed, would preserve over-all
price stability while still allowing sufficient flexibility to accomodate objectives of efficiency and equity."

Assuming no change in the

relative shares of labor and non-labor incomes in a particular industry,^
the Council suggested the following as a general guide for wages:
The general guide for noninflationary wage
behavior is that the rate of increase in w$ge
rates (including fringe benefits) in each indus
try be equal to the trend rate of overall

3Ibid.
4Ibid.. p. 178.
5
One question the Council did not discuss was whether a change in
the structure of labor income, such as the shift from production to
white collar jobs, would change labor costs per unit of output for the
economy as a whole.
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productivity increase. General acceptance of
this guide would maintain stability of labor
costs per unit of output for the economy as a
whole— though not of course for individual
industries.
The general guide suggested for prices is as follows:
The general guide for noninflationary
price behavior calls for price reductions if the
industry's rate of productivity increase exceeds
the over-all rate— for this would mean declining
unit labor costs; it calls for an appropriate
increase in price if the opposite relationship
prevails; and it calls for stable prices if the
two rates of productivity increase are equal.^
Admittedly these were advanced by the Council as general guidelines
or first approximations.

To reconcile them with the constraints of

equity, efficiency, flexibility, and economic freedom, the CEA felt modi
fications would be necessary.

The Council suggested the following modi

fications to the general productivity guide for wage increases.
Wage rate increases would exceed the
general guide rate in an industry which would
otherwise be unable to attract sufficient labor;
or in which wage rates are exceptionally low com
pared with the range of wages earned elsewhere by
similar labor, because the bargaining position
of workers has been weak in particular local labor
markets.
Wage rate increases would fall short of the
general guide rate in an industry which could not
provide jobs for its entire labor force even in
times of generally full employment; or in which
wage rates are exceptionally high compared with
the range of wages earned elsewhere by similar
labor, because the bargaining position of workers
has been especially strong.®
In short, individual wage rates should be flexible enough to change in
response to local conditions.

6Ibid.. p. 189.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.

The exceptions to the general price
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guidelines were couched in similar terms.
Prices
would risemore rapidly, or fall
more slowly,
than indicated by the general guide
rate in an industry in which the level of profits
was insufficient to attract the capital required
to finance a needed expansion in capacity; or in
which costs
other than labor costs had risen.
Prices
would risemore slowly, or fall more
rapidly than indicated by the general guide in an
industry in which the relation of productive
capacity to full employment demand shows the
desirability of an outflow of capital from the
industry; or in which costs other than labor
costs have fallen; or in which excessive market
power has resulted in rates of profit substan
tially higher than those earned elsewhere on
investments of comparable risk.^

I

Faced with the problem of recommending a policy for combating
inflation produced by market power, the Council chose to recommend wageprice guidelines based on economy-wide productivity.
not rules?

What is economy-wide productivity?

Why guides?

Why

How is it measured?

The Council had to deal with these questions in order to fully justify
their choice.
The Council carefully and clearly indicated that they were proposing
productivity as a guide rather than as a rule for administrative and for
technical reasons— the former implied, and the latter stated.

The use of

the term "guide” rather than the term "rule" implies a different admini
strative and enforcement procedure.

In administrative or management

terms, "rules" are precise statements of what may or may not be done
when a given situation arises.

Furthermore, rules imply enforcement by

a higher organizational authority and usually include a statement of the
punitive action to be taken if violated.

Guides, on the other hand, are

parameters to be considered in reaching decisions— they are not precise
9

Ibid.
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statements off v. ±t may or may not be done; they are not enforced by
high organizational authority; nor do they include statements of punish
ment for violators.
Legally, the Council was in no position to prescribe rules,for it
was an advisory rather than a policy-making or policy-enforcing group.
Yet

Council was within its legitimate administrative boundaries when

it suggested! guidelines for non-inflationary wage and price behavior.
The Council indicated that the guidelines merely "...describe— briefly
and mo domfot incompletely— how prices would behave in a smoothly func
tioning. competitive economy operating near full e m p l o y m e n t . T h e
Council felt that the guidelines would "...serve their purpose if they
suggest t© the interested public a useful way of approaching the
II
a p p r a i s a l . o f wage and price decisions that are of national inpor
ta':; ..

The Council, serving as an advisory group, had recognized the

problem, Isolated its causes, identified the interrelationship of this
problem t© other problems, forecasted trends, predicted severity and pro
vided advice in the form of guides for "acceptable" behavior.

The public

was given the responsibility for evaluating actual behavior and taking
corrective action by economic and political means.
Even had the Council been empowered to develop rules, it apparently
-would have refrained from doing so because of the three major technical
problems posed by the productivity guideline:

measurement, relative

income shares, and the problem of maintaining flexibility of individual
prices while maintaining general price level stability.

^Ibid., p. 188. Furthermore, the guidelines were intended to be more
flexible than miles for the guidelines do-not "...constitute a mechanical
formula for determining whether a particular price or wage decision is

3LiIbid.

With regard to the measurement of productivity, the Council
recognized several difficulties!

time period, trend and cyclical

cfasaga, and the different statistical ways of measuring input and out
put.

Concerning the appropriate time interval, the report stated that

ldtile very short intervals "...may give excessive weight to businesscycle movements in productivity, which are not the relevant standards
for wage behavior... very long intervals may hide significant breaks in
trends....” 12

The difficulty is selecting the most meaningful period.

As Table 5-1, on the next page, shows, different time periods provide
different figures.

For instance, output per man hour increased more

rapidly in the post-World War II period than in the total period from
1909 to 1960.
It would be totally inappropriate for contemporary wage behavior
13
to be governed by long past events, as the Council recognized,
but it
is difficult to be sure that a recognizable trend can be discovered by
examining only the post-war years.

The Council sidesteps the time-

period issue, for it makes no attempt to choose the most appropriate
time period, other than to indicate that it should not be a distant
, . 14
period.
12

Ibid.. p. 187. For a discussion of methods and techniques of
productivity measurement, see Appendix C, Productivity Measurement
Concepts.
13Ibid.
14

Questions can be raised at this point as to the quality of the
Council's advice. If the public needs guidelines to judge the accepta
bility of wage-price behavior, and if the Council thinks productivity
provides the best basis for guidelines, w h y then did the CEA evade the
critical issue of the appropriate time interval to use for measuring
productivity? This evasion would have been more serious had the Council
proposed a rule.
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Table 5-1
Annual rates of output per man-hour, 1909 to 1960
(based on establishment series)

Industry Series

Average annual percentage change**
1909-60

1947-60

1947-54

1954-60

Total private economy

2.4

3.0

3.5

2.6

Non agriculture

2.1

2.4

2.7

2.2

Non manufacturing

(*;

2.2

2.6

1.9

Manufacturing

(*)
(★)

2.8

2.9

2.9

2.8

2.8

3.1

Manufacturing corrected
for varying rates of
capacity utilization

★Not available.
★★Computed from least squares trend of the logarithm of the out
put per man-hour indexes.
Source:
data.

CEA report, p. 186, compiled by CEA from Department of Labor

Another measurement problem centers around the separation of cycli
cal and trend forces.

For productivity to serve as an effective guide,

changes due to business-cycle forces must be separated from trend move
ments in productivity.This could be done, the

Council felt, by adjust

ing for changes in the

rate of capacityutilization, although they did

not suggest a specific

technique to use for the best results.

The third productivity measurement problem recognized by the Coun
cil arose from using different statistical techniques to measure output
and input.
...there often exists alternative statistical
measures of output and labor input. The
alternatives may differ conceptually or may
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simply be derived from different statistical
sources. A difficult problem of choice may
emerge, unless the alternative measures hap
pen to give similar results.^
Because different productivity measurement devices can produce
entirely different productivity figures, the Council felt that it was
impossible to say that one figure was clearly superior for all pur
poses. ^

However, the Council intended to use productivity figures for

only one purpose— as the basis for wage-price guidelines, and, because
of this limited purpose, should conceivably have been able to choose an
appropriate productivity figure.
The second major reason for the Council's choice of guides rather
than rules is the effect rules would have on income shares.

The Council

realized that the "...proportions in which labor and non-labor incomes
share the product of industry have not been immutable throughout Ameri
can history, nor can they bt expected to stand forever where they are
today."

17

Yet the application of a rigid productivity rule with no

exceptions would freeze the relative shares of Income at the present
level, whereas the productivity guide with its exceptions would allow
flexibility.
The Council preferred to suggest guidelines rather than rules for
another reason:
wages and prices.

the different effect each would have on individual
The desired objectives of any wage-price policy is a

stable price level, "...within which particular prices rise, fall, or

15Ibid.. p. 188.
^ T h e most frequently used productivity measurements may be clas
sified on the basis of coverage, treatment of output, or treatment of
Inputs. For a more detailed discussion see Appendix B.
17Ibid.. p. 188.
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remain stable in response to economic pressures.

Hence*. price stability

within any particular industry is not necessarily a correct guide to
price and wage decisions within that industry."

18

If the only goal of

wage-price policy were a stable price level then perhaps rules would be
a more effective policy.

But rules would not permit individual price

fluctuations within a stable price level, because administrative equity
would demand the same rule be applied in all cases regardless of their
contribution to the wage-push problem.

Furthermore a rule would be very

difficult to enforce in an economy characterized by decentralized deci
sion making.
i

Guidelines, on the other hand, could be applied judiciously

only those cases which contribute to wage or cost-push inflation—

those in which firms and labor unions possessed excess market power.
Hence, flexibility, efficiency, and equity demanded a general guide
rather than a specific rule.
The Kennedy Administration's Council of Economic Advisers inherited
a new inflationary phenomenon— cost-push inflation— against which tradi
tional anti-inflationary policies had proven ineffective.

Additionally,

the new administration was commited to getting the economy rolling while
avoiding inflation.

The Council attempted to fill the cost-inflation

policy void with wage-price guidelines based on the trend of economy-wide
productivity.
It is no accident that productivity is the
central guidepost for wage settlements. Ultimately,
it is rising output per man hour which must yield
the ingredients of a rising standard of living.
Growth in productivity makes it possible for real
wages and real profits to rise side by side.
Rising productivity is the foundation of the
country's leadership of the free world, enabling
it to earn in world competition the means to dis
charge its commitments overseas. Rapid advance
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of productivity is the key to stability of the
price level as money incomes rise, to fundamental
improvement in the balance of International pay
ments, and to growth in the Nation's capacity to
meet the challenges of the 1960's at home and
abroad. That is why policy to accelerate eco
nomic growth stresses science and technology,
plant and equipment, education and training—
the basic sources of future gains in produc
tivity.19
This section has dealt with the development and presentation of the
wage-price guidelines; the following section will deal with the evolution
of the guideline concept in subsequent reports of the Council of Eco
nomic Advisers.

Evolution of the Guideline Concept
The guideposts were first formulated and presented in the 1962
annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers.

Subsequent reports

restated, modified, or strengthened the concept of the guidelines.
short, the guidelines have evolved.

In

Consequently, any investigation of

the guideline concept must include an analysis of this evolution.
In their 1963 annual report, the CEA was primarily concerned with
the persistently sluggish demand which had plagued the economy for the
preceding several years.

The general policy recommended by the Council

as a cure for this sluggishness was tax revision and reduction.

The

proposed reduction and revisions in taxes for individuals and corpora
tions would cause an initial increase in disposable income and invest
ment, which would generate a cumulative expansion in GNP via the consumption and investment multipliers.

20

1963 CEA Report, pp. 43-52.

20

The question the CEA had to
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face was whether guidelines, introduced as a device for combating infla
tion during periods of sluggish aggregate demand, would be necessary

during a period when aggregate demand was expanding.
The Council answered affirmatively, for during an expansion, "As tine
margin of unemployed labor and idle capital narrows, and as markets for
goods and services become tighter, the guideposts will gain in importance."

21

Thus, the guideposts could not be considered as measures to

be applied in slack periods only.

The 1963 Council restated the guide-

posts and the specific qualifications outlined in the previous amnnnal
report and stated the major purpose of the guidelines more positively.
The"ie guideposts vere designed to provide
standards for evaluating those price and wage
decisions where the public has an interest in
their content and consequences. They cannot,
and should not, replace the normal processes
of free private d< els ions and negotiations.22
In their L96h annual report, the Council of Economic Advisers
recommended a combination of private and public efforts to restrain
cost-price pressures in 1964.
of effort in public policy:

Specifically, they recommended five kHimds
increased competition, increased labor

mobility, increased productivity, improved government purchasing fcechniques, and the development of an environment conducive to responsible
private wage and price decision making.
Several means were offered for the accomplishment of these goals.
Vigorous internal competition was to be promoted by more active enforce
ment of antitrust laws to curb price-fixing, mergers, and other anti-

21Ibid.. pp. 85-86.

22

Ibid.. p. 85. The CEA began using the term "guideposts" in ttMs
report. Hereafter the terms will be used interchangeably. The Joint
Economic Committee failed to deal directly with the guideposts in the
1963 Joint Economic Report.
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competitive practices as well as by resisting proposals sflnjLcBn womld
inhibit or reduce the vitality of competition.

23

Labor imbtoilitty could

be improved through improved education, training, and rettralmfm® which
would make it possible for firms to meet their labor needs witthmQitt
increasing costs and prices.

24

The CEA expected the peniinug tax M i l

to stimulate investment enough to promote large and snsttaflmsMe produc
tivity improvements.

And the CEA pledged the government torn redcrafellng

its efforts to get the full value for each dollar spent ®m ©mmds and
services.
The area of greatest overlap in private and public efforts tro>
restrain cost-push pressures lay in the area of private cost and price
decisions and the price-wage guideposts.

By formulating, anmfi here

reaffirming, the guideposts, the government was coramiting itself to pro
viding an environment conducive to noninflationary wage amufl price deci
sion making.

The CEA made it clear that it was not tbe ©jDwejramBsmt'’s

intent to direct or change the method of making decisions inn the private
sector.
The decisions that can make or break this
country's price stability record rest in private
hands, and they should remain there. Yet it is
the responsibility— and the determined purpose—
of the Administration to do all it properly cam
to promote the right outcome.
The government can devise policies which:
...can only provide an environment conducive to
responsible private price and wage decision

231964 CEA Report, pp. 117-118.
24

Ibid.. p. 118. Improved labor mobility would also make £t
possible for workers to increase real take-home pay by mtowinBg to dif
ferent jobs.
23Ibid.. p. 112.

(Italics mine.)

making. By choice our Government can advise,
inform, and bring to bear the pressure of pub
lic opinion— but it cannot direct.*6
The Administration was thus to advisa and to Inform tha dacisionmakers of tha consequences of thair actions and to bring to baar tha
pressure of public opinion in cases in which the decision makers did not
consider the public interest.

The guideposts were proposed as standards

by which union and business leaders and the general public could appraise
particular wage and price decisions.

27

The Council also clarified the intent and purpose of the guideposts.
They were not designed to freeze individual prices or wages; or perman- ntiy freeze labor and non-labor shares of total industrial income; or
channel all of the gains from productive improvements into either labor
or capital.

'’B

Nor were the modifications of the general guideposts

designed to become the general rule for all private wage and price
decisions.
casest

The guidelines ware intended to apply to a relatively few

these in which tha parties possessed considerable room for

decision making largely unhampered by the rigors of the marketplace.
The exceptions to the general wage and price guidelines wera to apply
to an even smaller number of cases.

Statement of the exceptions was

due to a recognition that (a) the guideposts could not provide all of
the adjustments the economy would require over an extended period, and
(b) certain considerations of equity and resource allocation.

^ I b i d .. p. 118.
27

(Italics mine.)

Ibid.. pp. 118-119. See p. 120 for discussion of need for price
decreases in industries whose trend productivity gains exceed the
national trend.
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In this 1964 report, the CEA contributed to the further evolution
of the guideline concept in several ways:

(1) by clearly delineating

the responsibility of government, business snd Labor for avoiding a fur
ther cost-price spiral; (2) by reaffirming the guideposts and by further
explaining the rationale behind their wage-price policy choice; (3) by
stating emphatically that the guideposts were not initiated as replace
ment for private decision making, but only as devices for promoting the
right outcome; and (4) by making clear that the administration would not
hesitate to call public attention to major private decisions which over
stepped the guideposts.

The Council also set the stage for much of the

1 iter oppo- I.tion to the guideposts by implicitly adopting
computing productivity trends.

29

a method for

30

Two new aspects of thr guideposts grew out of the 1965 annual
report of the Council of Economic Advisers:

fact-finding missions and

'9

In Tables 20 and 21, pp. 114-115, the Council adopted a single
method for computing the trend rate of productivity— a five year moving
average. While the text of the report does not use a single figure for
productivity, the tables do indicate a single figure applicable for the
year— 3.2 per cent. Thus the Council chose a method for computing pro
ductivity and single figure for judging "responsible" wage behavior.
This choice of technique and use of a single figure was to prove damag
ing to the objectivity of the guidelines as later discussions, particu
larly those of 1966, will show.
30

The JEC majority report on the 1964 CEA report again fails to
mention the guidelines explicitly. It states that self-interest of
various economic groups with regard to real income must coincide with
the national interest. Furthermore, prices and unit costs in manufac
turing should remain stable or decline moderately to offset inflationary
pressures in the service areas of the economy. Senator William Proxmire
(Democrat, Wisconsin) objected to the Majority (Democratic) view on the
grounds that it erred in Judgment and refused to face the fact that
inflationary pressures were present in the economy. The hope for auto
matic decreases in industrial prices was both vain and unrealistic.
The Minority Report lists several objections to the guideposts:
(1) they are a concentration of Government power not sanctioned by law
or checked by the legal process; (2) they will not produce price sta
bility but may impede economic growth by Interfering with the effective
operation of a free market economy; (3) guideline exhortations to make
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additional exceptions to the guideposts.

In his economic report,

President Johnson announced that he intended to ask the CEA for
"...special, detailed analysis of price or wage Increases in key sectors
of the economy."

31

He did not indicate whether he would ask for fact

finding studies before collective bargaining negotiations began (thus
setting limits for acceptable wage settlements) or whei price increases
seemed imminent (thus setting acceptable price changes); but the impli
cation was that he would ask for fact-finding studies whenever he felt
that labor and industrial leaders were not doing their full part to pro
tect and extend price stability.

Furthermore, while he made no direct

statement as to whether the results of these fact-finding studies would
be made public, the implication again was that they would be made public
if necessary to protect price and wage stability.

The obvious result of

making such studies would be to challenge the legitimacy of the par
ties' decisions thereby leaving then without a propaganda leg to stand
on.

"responsible" price and wage decisions dulls economic motivation,
cannot be equated with enlightened self-interest and is of no use as
a substantive guide to policy making; (4) problems of productivity
measurement render the concept useless; (5) guideposts are least appli
cable in those areas of the economy taking the largest part of the con
sumer dollar— housing, transportation, medical care and services; (6)
the changing composition of the labor force from production to clerical,
managerial, research, and service workers has caused average labor
costs to accelerate; (7) guideposts will result in frozen distribution
of income; (8) ceilings suggested by guideposts will come to be regarded
as the floor; and (9) guidelines help only to indicate something is
wrong— they do not give corrective prescription. See: 1964 JEC Report
on Economic Report of the President, pp. 8-10, 18-19, 37-39.
31

From the Economic Report of the President, 1965, contained in the
1965 CEA Report, p. 13. The President invoked this fact-finding pro
cedure in January 1965, for the steel industry and in October 1965, in
the aluminum industry. For more details see the 1966 CEA Report, p. 89.

The second evolutionary change contained in the 1965 report was in
the exceptions to the wage guidepoat.

The original wage guidepost

recommended that changes in total employee compensation be equal to the
national trend rate in productivity, with two exceptions:

in industries

which faced labor shortages and in industries which had particularly
low wages.

The 1965 report made it clear that these original exceptions

were rarely applicable however, "...because the industries in which mar
ket power is concentrated are largely high-wage industries with a relatively low long-term rate of increase of employment."

32

In other words,

the wage guideposts were to apply without exception in the majority of
major collective bargaining situations.

After apparently clarifying the

application of the wage guidepost the Council muddied the waters again
by adding a new exception.

Wage increases above the guidepost level may

be necessary and allowable "...where changes in work rules create large
gains in productivity and substantial human costs requiring special
adjustment of compensation."

33

The Council did not elaborate further to

make the intent and application of the new exception clear, but they may
have offered it in an attempt to reduce union resistance to changes in
work rules and rapid technological change.
In their 1966 annual report, the CEA made three further contriburtions to the evolution of the guideline concept:

clarification of the

method by which productivity gains would be shared if the guideposts
were followed, further clarification of exceptions to the price guide
line, and the determination of a firm productivity figure.

^1965 CEA Report, p. 108.
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Frequent charges had been made that If the guidelines were

followed, labor would be rewarded with all of the saving* resulting
from the increased productivity.

That 1*, if both productivity and

wage* increased by the same amount, then there would be no rewards
remaining for the other factors of production.

The Council rejected

this view and replied:
Adherence to the standards would mean that all
the participants in the productive process—
employees and owners of invested capital— would
share in the over-all gains in productivity created
by the growth of capital equipment, improved tech
nology and a.better educated, healthier, and more
skilled labor force. :‘
The CEA used the following e x a m p t o

illustrate that all factors of

production would share in productivity gains in relation to their con
tribution to output if the tuideposts were followed.
Suppose output in an industry is 1 million
units, each selling at $1, for total sales of $1
million. Suppose labor compensation is $600,000.
If productivity and wages both rise 3 per cent,
and employment remains unchanged, production will
expand to $1,030,000. Labor compensation would
rise to $618,000. Labor would thus receive 60
per cent of the added value, keeping unchanged the
share of labor costs in total revenues. If prices
of materials and other purchased inputs were un
changed, and the quantities used were expanded in
proportion to output, then gross income of owners
would rise in the same proportion as wage income.
Thus, the division of income between labor and
capital would remain unchanged. And with capital
requirements per unit of output unchanged (as has
been approximately true), the return per unit of
capital would remain unchanged as well.^*
34
35

1966 CEA Report, p. 90.

Ibid.. p. 90. Obviously one can ask if the example chosen was
not too simple. The example is static, while decisions are made in
dynamic situations. Furthermore, the example does not identify either
the cause of the increase in productivity or the cost of obtaining this
increase in productivity. It also assumes that capital requirements
per unit of output and the prices and quantities of all inputs remain
unchanged. These omissions are critical while the assumptions are
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The second contribution to the evolution of the guidepost concept
contained in the 1966 CEA report was the further clarification of the
price guideline.

In the original formulation of the price guideline,

price increases above the general price guidepost would occasionally be
appropriate in two cases:

first, where unit material costs have

increased, to the extent that such increases are not offset by decreases
in other costs and significantly impair profit margins; and second, when
an industry finds itself unable to attract needed capital.

The plaguing

question was the extent to which each of these exceptions applied.

The

Council did not attempt to deal with the applicability of the first
exception, perhaps because of the difficulty of measuring cost shifts,
but they did clarify the applicability of the second exception.

The

Council's position was that:
The large firms to which the guideposts are
primarily addressed typically have ready access
to sources of capital; moreover, the profits of
virtually every industry have risen sharply and
are at record levels as a by-product of the
general prosperity in the economy. The second
exception is thus not widely applicable in the
present environment.36
Furthermore, if the price guideline produced the expected results,
then implicitly there would be little likelihood that material costs

doubtful. The Staff of the Joint Economic Committee identified four
factors which may cause changes in productivity: (1) a change in tech
nology (shift in the production function); (2) the realization of
economies of scale; (3) a shift in industry or product mix, or (4) the
substitution of one productive factor for another. None can be realized
in a firm without cost or without changing capital output ratios or the
prices and quantities of other inputs. The Council's shift from the
firm to the economy and back is perhaps the cause for these omissions
and assumptions. See: JEC Productivity. Prices and Incomes. Materials
Prepared by the Committee Staff, (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), pp. 16, 17, 20-22.
36Ibid., p. 91.
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would register significant increases.
The remaining development contained in the 1966 annual report of
the CEA dealt with the short-run and trend elements in productivity as
they relate to the general wage guideposts.

The goal of the wage

guidepost is to relieve wage-cost pressures by stabilizing unit labor
costs, i.e., by preventing wages from increasing faster than the sus
tainable trend of productivity.
The original formulation of the guideposts did
not specify any particular trend productivity figure,
but rather listed various historical averages, cover
ing different time spans and various segments of the
economy. Since the economy was just recovering from
the second of two recessions in a very short interval,
it was difficult to identify the trend productivity
rate from the immediately preceding experience. This
difficulty was compounded by speculation that the
trend rate might be accelerating as a result of
faster technological change, particularly the spread
of automation.3'
Neither the 1962 nor 1963 CEA Reports had attempted to specify any
particular trend productivity
figure

figure.

In the report of 1964, no single

for trend productivity was specified in the body of the report,

but a single figure did appear in a related table in a column labeled
"Trend Productivity"— the now well known 3.2 per cent figure.
were the figures in that column to be explained?

38

How were they computed?

The figures in that column were described as
the "annual average percentage change in output
per man-hour during the latest 5 years." A 5-year
period was chosen because, at that time, it was
sufficiently long to include both the extraordi
narily high productivity gains of a year of
recovery (1962) and the extraordinarily low pro
ductivity gains of a year of recession (1960).
Under the conditions of 1964, a 5-year average

~^ I b i d .. p. 92.
90

1964 CEA Reports, pp. 114-115.

How

(See Tables 20 and 21.)
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gave a good approximation of the trend productivity,
because, in effect, it averaged out the ups and
downs of cyclical productivity swings. These same
conditions prevailed in i964, and the 3.2 per cent
figure appeared for that year in a similar table
in the 1965 Report. Subsequent revisions of GNP
data would have made the 5-year average 3.4 per
cent in both 1964 and 1965.^9
However, in 1966 the economy was at the end of its fifth year of unin
terrupted expansion.

So the Council perceived that a 5-year moving

average would no longer give a reasonable approximation of a true or
sustainable productivity trend because:
The last recession year drops out of the
average, yet the unsustainable productivity gains
of a year of recovery and 4 years of improving
utilization are retained. If the use of the 5year average were continued this year and in coming
years, the figure yielded by the 5-year moving aver
age would rise at this time to 3.6 per cent and
would undoubtedly fall substantially thereafter.^®
Consequently, the Council concluded that 3.6 per cent would not be an
accurate measure of the true or sustainable trend of productivity.
Rather, the long term sustainable trends, independent of short-run
cyclical movements, was only slightly over 3 per cent.

41

The Council

then specifically recommended that the general guidepost of 3.2 per
cent a year be continued for 1966.

They made this recommendation in

light of the following additional considerations.
(1)

With the economy approaching full employment and the
crucial test of our ability to reconcile our employ
ment and cost-price goals at hand, it would be
inappropriate to raise the guidepost.

39

1966 CEA Report, p. 92. See Appendix C, "Productivity Measure
ment Concepts" for additional information.
40-,..
Ibid.
41

Ibid.
The Council did not clearly indicate the method used to
arrive at this later figure of 3 per cent.
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(2)

The actual productivity gain that can be expected
over the next few years is not likely to be above
the trend value.

(3)

The 3.2 per cent rate has been consistent with
the approximate stability of industrial wholesale
prices which has strengthened our competitive
position in the world. Now is not the time to
abandon that standard.

(4)

On January 1, (1966) employer payroll taxes to
finance social security and Medicare rose sub
stantially, raising labor costs per man hour
by an average of two-thirds of a per cent.
These taxes are not included in the definition
of employee compensation for purposes of the
guideposts, since the rates and benefits are
determined by law rather than by collective bar
gaining. Nonetheless, recognition has to be
taken of the extraordinary increase in these
taxes at this time, which will both raise unit
labor costs and yield future benefits to em
ployees .42

42

Ibid.. pp. 92-93.
In their 1966 annual report based on the
Economic Report of the President, the Joint Economic Committee reached
a split decision on the guideposts. The Majority suggested the estab
lishment of a continuing body to review the guideposts and to require,
on a selected basis, advance reports of wage and price decisions in
situations where such decisions would be of critical importance. (1966
JEC Report, p. 11) Senator Proxmire, an oft-times critic of the guide
lines, affirmed the need for the guideposts because he felt that they
did a job that fiscal-monetary policies could not do, and because of the
example they set. However, he argued that the 3.2 per cent wage guidepost formulated in the 1966 CEA Report would shortchange labor and
reward management. For if labor received a 3.2 per cent wage increase
and a 0.66 per cent increase in social security benefits while prices
rose the projected 2\ per cent, labor's real wages would increase only
about 1.4 per cent. Employers, on the other hand, he argued, would
enjoy a profit increment of 1.6 per cent on labor costs and
per cent
on non-labor costs. Consequently he recommended either abandoning the
inflexible 3.2 per cent figure or adjusting it upward for changes in
the cost-of-living. (1966 JEC Report, pp. 22-27) The Republican Minority
took several swipes at the guideposts (calling it a disguised form of
direct control without sanction of law, having no provision for redress
of grievances, and guilty of selective and discriminatory enforcement,
plagued by the problem of measuring the trend) before concluding that
while the guidelines had been effective in producing a more intelligent
dialogue, they should be rejected when enforced as rules (1966 JEC
Report, pp. 45-48). Later in the year, Representative Henry S. Reuss
of Wisconsin introduced a bill (HR 11916) to amend the Employment Act
of 1946 to provide Congressional review by the Joint Economic Committee
of the guideposts proposed by the CEA. The bill was referred to the
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The Council's decision to recommend the continuation of the guidepost figure of 3.2 per cent for 1966 instead of the actual figure of
3.6 per cent seriously undermined the legitimacy of the guideposts among
union leaders.

The legitimacy of the guideposts for union members and

leaders depended not so much on their logic or mathematical exactness
as on the consistency with which they were applied.

Unions accused the

Council of changing the rules in the middle of the game and once again
asking the workers to bear the burden of fighting inflation despite
recent increases in prices and profits.

Because of the Council's breach

of faith the unions served notice that they no longer considered themselves bound by the guideposts.
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Two very conspicuous departures from the previous evolutionary
strains occurred in the 1967 report.

First, the Council shifted empha

sis away from the guidelines as specific "rules" and back to guidelines
as generat""guides."

Originally the guideposts were presented as gen

eral guides based on the trend Increase in productivity in the entire
economy.

In this early period, 1962-63, no specific estimate was given

Executive and Legislative Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations for study and action. After study, the Subcommittee adopted
a report entitled "Strengthening the Wage-Price Guideposts" (HR Report
No. 2231, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D. C.t U. S. Govern
ment Printing Office, Oct., 1966), This report concluded that the
guideline initiation procedure then in effect should continue but that
the JEC should report specific recommendations and findings on the
guideposts to Congress and that the President's Advisory Committee on
Labor-Management Policy should be used as the administrative organization
for applying the guideposts in specific situations. A minority dissent
concluded that the guidelines at present lay shattered but could be
reconstructed if again conceived of as guides and if applied equitably
in each case.
43
See testimony by Nathaniel Goldfinger, spokesman for AFL-CIO in
the 1966 JEC Hearings on the Economic Report) A. H. Raskin, "Labor's
Political Frustrations," The Reporter. Vol. 34, No. 7 (April 7, 1966)
pp. 26-28,33; "Unions Press Harder Against the Guideposts." Business Week
(March 5, 1966), pp. 117-118; "Why the Wage-Price Guide Raises a Ruckus,"
The National Observer (Feb. 14, 1966), p. 12.
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of this trend, but in later reports, the Council specifically recom
mended that the general wage guidepost be 3.2 per cent a year.

This

shift was interpreted by many as a shift from general "guides" presented
as a basis for discussion, to firm, though voluntary, "rules."

The

Council abandoned the specific trend productivity figure in their 1967
report, preferring to call for wage restraint and collective bargaining
settlements within the boundaries of the (unstated) productivity trend.
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The Council placed more emphasis on the educational function of
the guidelines in their 1967 report.

They began by admitting that some

mistakes in presentation and application had undoubtedly been made,
owing perhaps to the fact that the wage-price-productivity issue was
more complex than had been suggested in earlier reports or perhaps
because the Administration had to feel its way toward a proper defini
tion of the Government's role in the process of information and persuasion.
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One aspect of the information-providing process that had

been overlooked somewhat was the educational benefit that could occur
from recognizing and answering some of the main objections levied against
the guideposts— particularly the wage guidepost.

Should the wage guide-

post be adjusted to recognize in some way the recent increase in the
cost of living?

Should further exemptions be made in the wage guide-

post to correct for low wages, to narrow wage differentials, for workers
in industries with rapid productivity gains, or for workers in firms
able to pay higher wages?
The Council rejected the idea of adjusting the wage guidepost to
account for increases in living costs on the grounds that such an
l±l\

1967 CEA Report, pp. 123, 128-129.

45Ibid.. p. 125.
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arrangement would only intensify the wage-price spiral.

A full allow

ance for productivity plus an additional cost-of-living allowance would
push unit labor costs up at a rate that would require price increases
to preserve profit margins, and the wage-price spiral would be in
operation again, gaining momentum with each round.
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Should a specific guidepost exemption be made for low wages?

The

Council said that such an exemption always has been made, but that this
exemption is of limited relevance for collective bargaining since few
strong unions exist among low-wage workers.

Furthermore, the guidepost

principle also allows for wage increases larger than trend productivity
where it is necessary to reallocate labor toward shortage occupations
and industries.
However, the Council suggests that, as a
general principle, an exemption to the guideposts for workers in a shortage occupation
should be claimed only where the union involved
stands ready to lift every artificial barrier
to entry into the occupation, and to cooperate
fully in public, private efforts to train what
ever numbers of workers may desire to enter the
occupation.47
As for allowing an exemption in the guideposts for the narrowing of
differentials paid in different industries or by different employers for
similar work, the Council rejected the suggestion on the grounds that
the public cannot accept inflationary settlements every time this justi
fication is alleged.

For the most part, the Council felt that claims

for differential narrowing exemptions are alleged only— not proved.
Wage comparisons made in collective bargaining often have little or no
relevance to resource allocation or equity; similar work does not

46Ibid., pp. 128-129.
47Ibid.. p. 130.
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always mean equal work, even if job titles are the same; and many wage
comparisons showing wide differentials are made only with wages that
are higher than those seeking the exception.

48

If wages were allowed to rise faster than the average in industries
with rapid productivity gains, such an exemption would impart an infla
tionary bias to the system, for unit labor costs, wages, and prices
would have only one direction in which to move— up.

Slor should an

exemption be made in the wage guidepost because the employer possesses
the ability to pay higher wages.

This proposed ability-to-pay exemp

tion refers to the profits of employing firms; but what the proponents
fail to realize is that these profits fluctuate over the business cycle.
Profits inevitably rise faster than total employee income during periods
of expansion, but they also fall more rapidly when utilization rates
decline.

Unions generally are unwilling to accept the same wage or wage

cuts just because profits declined.

F urthermore, past attempts by

unions to redistribute income from profits to wages through large wage
increases have not been successful.

Firms in those positions merely

raised prices, redistributing income from the rest of the community to
their workers.
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48Ibid., pp. 130-131.
49Ibid.. pp. 130-132.
~^ I b i d ., p. 132. The JEC in 1967 made a strong statement endorsing
the guideline philosophy but expressing concern over how public and pri
vate policy makers could be induced to follow them. The JEC recommended
"target" guideposts and the creation of a Price-Productivity-Income
Office (PPI Office) in the Executive Branch as the administrative agency
for the guideposts. The PPI Office, assisted by imdustry-wide PPI
boards made up of representatives of labor, management, and consumers,
should be authorized to hold fact-finding hearings and make recommenda
tions concerning wage-price behavior considered to be in the public
interest. In the meantime, the Government should assume a more aggres
sive role in applying the guidelines but within a less-structured frame
work. See: 1967 JEC Report, pp. 18-25.
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The major new development in the guiffletiiiimg concept contained in the
1968 report was the announcement of the esthaMfsftmeiiit of a Cabinet Com
mittee on Price S t a b i l i t y . F i v e major areas off activity were outlined
for this Committee.

First, they were to prepare arrdi publish in-depth

studies of economic conditions in those fmcflustmriLes which were a persis
tent source of inflationary pressure.

Secamfl,,

were to prepare

studies and to make recommendations r.rmrjpTmrninnjg all aspects of Government
policy affecting prices in particular sectors <oif the economy.

As a

related part of this activity, the Committee was also to develop and to
coordinate inter-agency programs to deal wriLttfin structural problems of
particular industries where such problems were parcKfucing inflationary
biases.
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Third, the Committee was

tD

"...weirik with representatives of

business, labor, and the public to enlist cooperation. toward responsible
wage and price behavior and structural impmmeirtggifcs that promote the
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achievement of over-all price stability,'"

whttEmiuit,. however, becoming

involved in specific current wage and price matters..

Fourth, the Com

mittee was to conduct a series of conferences with representatives of
labor, management, and the public in an attempt ttos

(a) reach a con

sensus on appropriate general standards t® <gm£afie private wage-price
decisions; (b) identify problems inhibiting price stability in particular

"^1968 CEA Report, p. 127. The Committee was to consist of the
Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce, Labor, tribe IMreetar of the Budget
and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Aflwisers. Heads of other
Government Agencies would participate as reqpmredL The Council Chair
man was to coordinate the work of the Committee ami its small profes
sional staff.
52Ibid., p. 127.
Ibid.
Presumably the CEA would comttlmue tto> be the government's
major overseer of current wage and price (decisions..

areas; and (c) attempt to design cooperative programs to deal with
these problems.
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Finally, the Committee would occasionally recommend

legislation ”...which would advance tine objective of price stability in
a free market e c o n o m y . T h e s e dmties and functions were merely
stated— no elaboration was provided.
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Furthermore, no numerical trend

of productivity was offered in this report.

Summary and Comclusioms
The guidelines, as originally conceived, were to provide answers
to two basic questions:

one concerning the public responsibility of

unions and managements possessing excessive market power, and

the

other concerning the proper role of government in such decisions.
Unfortunately, the guidelines posed more questions.

Which of the sev

eral measurements of economy-wide productivity available was most appro
priate?

How could trend and cyclical productivity measurements be

separated and should they be?
to be applied?

How were the guidelines and exceptions

What would happen iff the guidelines were not observed?

Subsequent Council Reports dealt with these and numerous other
questions concerning the guideposts.

In the process the guidepost con

cept and the intent of the guideposts changed from vague general guides

^ I b i d .. pp. 128-129.
55Ibid.. p. 129.
"^The JEC hailed the proposed Cabinet level Committee on Price
Stability as a move in the right direction, but noted that it did not
go far enough. The new office, they felt, should be empowered to deal
specifically with current wage-price problems, on a case-by-case basis.
They called for the administration to develop a more effective, realis
tic and definite set of guideposts, and to establish a high-level unit
in the executive branch to assemble and analyze data, prepare reports,
and administer these guideposts. (See: 1968 JEC Report, pp. 24-26).
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(intended only to provide direction) to specific rules (providing
limits that had to be balanced against other policy goals) and then
back to vague general guides, t M s time administered by a new committee
within the executive branch.

Even though the form and general intent

of the guideline concept was altered, the Council made it clear on
several different occasions that the guideposts were not originated as
replacements for the private decision-making process.

Collective bar

gaining and private price decisions were to be retained, but the par
ties were to be made aware off the consequences of irresponsible deci
sions.

Furthermore, the guideposts did not and could not be applied in

all private decision-making processes.

They were intended to apply

only in cases where excess market power was unchecked by any other means.
Intent may differ from consequences, however.

What remains to be

investigated is the impact off the application of the guidelines— in
general and in specific cases— on the collective bargaining process.
The following chapter will deal with the guidelines as they have been
applied in collective bargaining.

CHAPTER 6

THE G0IDELI1SES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The previous chapter established that the guidelines were not
intended as a threat to the private decision-making process of collec
tive bargaining.

Yet they could be administered in a way which could

constitute a serious threat to collective bargaining, particularly when
the parties to the bargaining rea,:h an agreement which is considered to
be inflationary by the administrators of the guideposts.

In such a

case, the administration must decide whether the settlement is critical
i.e., will be pattern setting, and how to convince the parties to settl
within the bounds of the guidelines without destroying free collective
bargaining.
Since the purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the
impact of the guidelines on collective bargaining, this chapter will be
concerned primarily with the application of the wage guidelines.

In

examining the effect of the administration of the wage guidelines on
collective bargaining, several questions must be answered.
critical collective bargaining situations to be identified?
guideline pressure applied in these critical bargains?

How were
How was

What have been

the results of major collective bargaining settlements during the guide
line period?
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Identifying Critical Wage Negotiations
The Counci-L-'s wage-price guideposts were based on two premises:
that large firms and/or well-organized groups of employees in important
sectors of the economy had some discretionary ability to affect the
levels of their prices and wages, and that many of their decisions had
adversely affected the public interest by generating cost-push infla
tionary pressures.

The guideposts were proposed as standards which

could be used by an informed public to judge and to influence these
critical wage and price decisions.

In short, the guideposts defined the

public interest.
However the question of application still remained.

Which of the

numerous wage decisions reached each year were critical?

Which unions

and firms actually had such discretionary power?

Informed public opin

ion could not be brought to bear unless the public could first identify
those wage bargains which might adversely affect the public interest.
Not until their 1967 annual report did the Council provide any
operational guide for the public by announcing that "...strong labor
unions are concentrated in manufacturing, mining, construction, and
transportation."^

Unfortunately, this guide is so general that it is

practically useless, since these sectors are also the ones which have
the greatest degree of union penetration.
The Council made no attempt to include in any of their annual
reports a summary of forthcoming critical wage bargains or a summary of
the cases in which guideline pressure had been applied during contract
negotiations.

Therefore other means of identification must be found.

^1967 CEA Report, p. 124.
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An investigation of major collective bargaining activity for the 196268 period will help to identify those bargains in which unions possess
significant market power, will identify critical wage settlements, and
will reveal a number of the operational difficulties of guideline
enforcement by the public.
What factors combine to provide some unions with market power suf
ficient to force wage and fringe benefit increases significantly above
those which would result in a more competitive situation?

The details,

of course, have to be sketched for individual unions and particular bar
gaining situations.

But, in general, union bargaining power, or the

ability to secure agreement on the union's terms, is related to the
general economic climate, immunities from financial losses inflicted by
the other party, the strategic location of the bargaining unit, and the
nature of the demands, i.e., whether the demands are for direct or indirect benefits.

2

In an economy committed to the goals of full employ

ment, price stability, and economic growth, the general trend of eco
nomic activity becomes a permissive factor— it allows unions to press
for improvements largely without regard for market discipline.

Bargain

ing over the balance of direct and indirect benefits is mainly a dispute
over the composition of benefits.

Thus the crucial or active elements

of union bargaining power are immunities from financial loss and stra
tegic location.

While no accurate single measurement of these elements

exists, the size of the bargaining unit will be used as an approximation
of industrial union bargaining power for three reasons.
2

First, the size

See Chapter 3. In considering immunities from financial losses
inflicted by the other party the union must include an evaluation of the
extent of the firm's immunity from strong market forces just as they
must evaluate the general permissiveness of the economic climate.
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of the unit helps to determine the financial insulation of the union,
since the number of members in a unit and the dues and initiation fees
per member determine the major financial resources of the union.

Sec

ond, it can be reasonably assumed that collective bargaining agreements
covering over 1,000 workers provide the union with a strategically
located bargaining unit because continued operation of most plants
would be difficult if large numbers of workers struck.

Finally, some

data on major collective bargaining agreements is available.
Table 6-1 on the next page summarizes the action taken in major
collective bargaining agreements during the 1962-68 period, while
Table 6-2 on the following page provides a partial record
behavior in these agreements for the same period.
clusions can be drawn from these data.

of wage

Several general con

First, there are a large number

of major collective bargaining contracts in this country:

nearly 400

agreements affecting 5,000 or more workers each and about 2,000 contracts covering 1,000 workers or more each.

3

Second, major collective

bargaining agreements account for a large proportion of the workers
covered by collective bargaining agreements.

There are over 100,000

collective bargaining agreements currently in existence in the United
States, exclusive of welfare and pension plans negotiated separately.
Yet the 400 largest cover about one-third and the largest 2,000 cover
about one-half of all workers under collective bargaining agreements.

4

3
Cordelia Ward and William Davis, "The Wage Calendar for 1967,"
Monthly Labor Review (Dec., 1966), p. 1341. The Bureau of Labor Statis
tics gathers information on major agreements either from its file of
agreements or from published reports. The Bureau does not collect rail
road and airline agreements (filed with National Mediation Board, as re
quired by Railway Labor Act), but information for major collective bar
gaining situations in these industries is made available to the Bureau.
Government contracts are excluded. Hereinafter the Ward and Davis
article will be referred to as MLR Reprint No. 2511.
4Ibid.
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Table 6-1
Actions in Major Collective Bargaining Agreem e n t s ^ 1962-68
by Number of Agreements and Number of Workers Covered
(Lower figure in each category refers to
number of workers covered by thousands.)
1962
Current
Agreements
Available( 2)
Current
Agreements
Not Available
No Action
Indicated

(3)
Agreements
Terminated
Wage
Reopening

(4)
Automatic
Cost-ofLiving Review
Deferred
Wage Increase

(5)

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

2^4

306

1,548

1,962

4,463

4,490

5.244

7,028

8,818

55

46

53

45

*

*

767

1,126

1,015

434

*

*

287

286

307

4.526

4,859

47
1,262

.

*

*

*

19

12

*

*

Vr

*

*

198

196

*

*

143

94

119

134

93

709

860

1,835

1,178

1,889

1,577

976

3,149

2,789

81

78

79

84

65

*

*

1,305

1,737

1,802

1,540

1,228

*

*

51

54

51

36

58

*

*

1,209

1,173

1,018

940

1,425

*

*

77

123

117

100

174

*

*

1,614

1.988

1,449

2,055

3,399

4,500

4,600

1) For the 1962-1966 period, major collective bargaining agreements are
defined as those covering 5,000 or more workers; but for the 1967-68
period the figures are for agreements covering 1,000 or more workers.
The changed definition is due to reporting changes by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
2) Sums of individual wage provisions items may exceed totals since
agreements frequently provide for more than one wage action. Possi
ble wage reopenings, automatic cost-of-living reviews and deferred
increases scheduled prior to termination date are counted for con
tracts terminating in the year in question.
3) Includes open-end agreements, i.e., those with no specific expira
tion date.
4) Includes both specific and possible wage reopenings.
5) Refers to all workers covered by agreements, including instances
where deferred increases were rented to specific groups or occupa
tions only.
*

Indicates not available

Source:

Compiled from Monthly Labor Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U. S. Department of Labor. See MLR Reprints No. 2379, 2405,
2431, 2450, 2483, 2511.

Table 6-2
Major Collective Bargaining Settlements

-

1962

1963

Average wage and
benefit package increase
(percent per year) (3)

*

*

Average wage rate
increase during the
entire life of the
contract (4)

*

Average first-year
wage rate increase (4)

*

-

-

.....

1962-1968

1965

1966

1967

1968

*

3.3

4.1

5.2

6.2

2.3

3.0

3.3

3.9

5.0

5.6

3.0

3.2

3.8

4.8

5.7

7.4

1964

...

1) Collective bargaining agreements covering 1,000 or more workers for 1962-64, and 5,000 or more
workers for 1966-68.
2) For first

three months of 1968 only.

3) Assumes changes went into

effect at equalintervalsduring

thelife

of the contract.

4) Expressed

as a percent of straight-timeaveragehourlyearnings annually.

*

comparable data not available

indicates

Source:

Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor, News Release— Major Wage Developments,
1964-1968.
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Third, there are a large number of wage actions each year such as
negotiations, reopenings, deferred increases, and escalator changes.
Frequently, the number of wage adjustments exceeds the number of major
agreements since more than one type of wage adjustment may be stipu
lated in an agreement.

At least 75 per cent of workers covered by

major collective bargaining agreements receive some type of wage and
benefit increases in most years; yet contract termination settlements
reached during any particular year determine wage and fringe changes
for only a minority of workers covered by major collective bargaining
5

agreements.

Furthermore, since 95 per cent of workers covered by

major agreements are covered by contracts which specify changes in
wages and benefits from 18 months to 5 years in advance,

6

one can only

conclude that deferred increases may be more critical for the guideposts than newly negotiated increases.
Fourth, wage settlements in major contracts have followed a steady
upward trend throughout this period, although it appears that wage
behavior was more restrained when the economy was suffering from less
than full employment (1962 to 1966) than during the demand-pull infla
tion of 1966-1968.
The large number of major collective bargaining agreements and the
overlapping varieties of wage and benefit changes make the public's
task of judging the economic desirability of each wage change much more
difficult than the CEA statements indicate.

Furthermore, it is extreme

ly doubtful that the public could be provided with all the information

^Cordelia Ward and William Davis, "The Wage Calendar for 1968,"
Monthly Labor Review (Jan., 1968), p. 20. Hereinafter cited as MLR
Reprint No. 2553.
SlLR Reprint 2511.
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necessary to evaluate each wage change properly.

For example, the

public would need advanced notice of all proposed wage changes as well
as a detailed economic profile of the firm, the industry, and the set
tlement package.

Even if they could be provided with all of the infor

mation necessary to evaluate proposed wage changes, it is unlikely that
they could assimilate all this information, separate facts from propa
ganda, and reach an effective conclusion.

If the public had to examine

all of the major collective bargaining situations, and apply the guide
lines to them, they would be required to pass or veto between 2,000 and
3,000 wage decisions each year.

Obviously, the public would not have

the time, knowledge, or patience to sit in judgment on such a large num
ber of cases.

Nor did the Council intend for the guidelines to apply

in all major collective bargaining situations.
The growth of pattern bargaining since World War II has made it
unnecessary to exert guideline pressure in all major collective bargain
ing situations.

Consequently, the maximum area eligible for guideline

pressure can be reduced first to those situations involving pattern bar
gaining, and further to the "key settlement" which establishes the
pattern.^
Pattern bargaining generally occurs in industries which exhibit the
following characteristics:

^See Frederick H. Harbeson, et al., "Toward a Theory of LaborManagement Relations" in Insights into Labor Issues, ed. Richard Lester
and Joseph Shister (New York: MacMillan Co., 1948), pp. 3-24; George
Seltzer, "Pattern Bargaining and the United Steel Workers," The Journal
of Political Economy, LIX:4 (Aug., 1951), pp. 319-32; Robert E. Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry: A Study of the
Public Interest and the Role of Government (Washington, D. C.: U. S.
Department of Labor, 1961); and W. H. Carpenter, Jr., and Edward
Handler, Small Business and Pattern Bargaining (Babson Park: Babson
Institute Press, 1961).
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1. industry competition which is regional or national in scope;
2. an industry which is dominated by a few large firms but also
contains a segment of small or independent companies actively
competing with one another and with the major firms;
3. labor unions which have penetrated extensively into firms of
all sizes;
4. centralized collective bargaining negotiations; and
5. attempts by the union to secure similar contract terms from
competing employers.®
Table 6-3, on the next page, lists the industries in which major col
lective bargaining agreements were reached in each of the years in the
1962-1968 period.

As indicated by this chart only a few industries

negotiated significant agreements in any one of these years (from 8 to
13).

Not all of the industries listed possessed the characteristics

necessary for pattern bargaining, however.

The construction, utilities,

apparel, and food processing industries can be eliminated as wage pat
tern setters.

The longshoring, trucking, coal, maritime, railroad, and

airlines industries could probably be put on the doubtful list.

On the

other hand, the steel, aluminum, automobile, rubber, meatpacking,
machinery, and electrical products industries are generally regarded
as pattern setters.

While there would normally be several bargaining

agreements in each of these pattern making groups, only a few such
agreements could be regarded as "key agreements."
In collective bargaining situations where pattern setting condi
tions are present, the union typically singles out one of the leading
employers of the industry as the initial bargaining target for the year.
All of the union's bargaining efforts and resources are then directed
g

See Carpenter and Handler, 0£. cit.. pp. 6-7; and Lloyd G. Reynolds
Labor Economics and Labor Relations. 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 165.
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Table 6-3
Significant Contract Expirations and Reopenings by Industry, 1962-68

1962

.

Steel
Aluminum
Construction
Aircraft
Fabricated
metal products
Railroads
Trucking
Maritime
Transportation
equipment*
Trucking

1963

1964

1965

Rubber
Telephones
Electrical
products
Utilities
Construction
Appare
Steel*
Railroad
transpor tation*

Trucking
Apparel
Construction
Meatpacking
Machinery
Automobiles
Longshor m g
Fabricated
metals

Fabricated
metals
Rubber
Steel
Construction
Aluminum
Shipbuilding
Maritime
Aircraft
Apparel
Ordnance
Airlines
Cans**

* indicate reope lings
**carryover from previous year

1967

1966

Construction
Pacific
Longshoring
Apparel
Communications
Electrical
products
Railroads*
Bituminous
coal*
Anthracite
coal*

Apparel
(dresses)
Commun ica tions
Food products
Trucking
Rubber
Construction
Meatpacking
Automobiles
Machinery
Trucking*
Railroads**
Airline pilots*

i968

Fabricated
metal
Glass
Construction
Men's clothing
Shipbuilding
Steel
Aircraft
Maritime
Airlines

* indicate reopei .ings
**carryover from previous year

Source:

Monthly Labor Review. Reprints No. 2379, 2405, 2431, 2450, 2483,
2511, 2553, U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
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toward getting the most favorable wage and benefit package in this "key
bargain."

After the union succeeds in securing the key bargain, it

insists that all the other employers in the industry sign up on the
same terms under penalty of a strike.

The key bargain thus establishes

the wage-benefit pattern for a given industry.

Furthermore, the key

bargain may also have an inter-industry aspect which leads to target
negotiations.
The major unions also watch each other's
patterns carefully, and if one makes a good
settlement this tends to be taken as a target
by others. One reason is that unions such as
the Steelworkers, Machinists, Auto Workers,
and Electrical Workers are multi-industry
unions with overlapping jurisdictions which
often bring them into direct rivalry with each
other. No one can afford to be left much
behind the others in a particular year.
Through this complex network of relationships
a few key bargains with major corporations
have an influence out of proportion to the
number of workers directly involved.^
Thus, despite the decentralized aspect of collective bargaining in
this country, it may be possible to limit the application of guidepost
pressure to a few critical negotiations each year, namely those key
bargains which establish intra-industry and inter-industry targets.
Success with this approach will depend in large part on the policyadministrator's ability to identify these critical bargains and to
secure information on wages, prices, and productivity trends for those
industries.

No hard and fast identification rules are available, but

the guidepost administrators should consider the timing of negotiations

Reynolds, op. cit., p. 166. Reynolds asks why employers in these
industries do not more frequently stand together to resist the union's
demands as they do in local market industries. His answer; no outsider
can say, but traditionally intercompany rivalry in product markets, fear
of anti-trust laws, and resistance to industry-wide bargaining no doubt
play an important part.
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(i.e. how early in the year the bargaining occurs) and how many
negotiations (and reopenings,)) remain after the key bargain is reached.

Government's Role fan Promoting Guidepost Adherence
This section will deal with the general approaches used by the
government in promoting adherence t® the guideline standards.

The next

section will treat the specific ways this role was carried out.
For the most part the problem ©ff getting the parties to adhere to
the guideposts was left to the prestige of the Presidential office and
the public support that this office could rally.

But the guideposts

did not specify how the prestige if this office could best be used or
how public support could he rallied against guidepost violators in spe
cific cases.

The Council attempted t© deal with the problem of role

definition in their 1967 ammonal report when they stated that...
Clearly, it was not enough merely to publish...
[the guidelines] -and assume that the job was done.
The public does not have the information that would
permit it to apply ir.be guidiepost standards to par
ticular cases of wage or price movements. Some
reporting is necessary to help the public make
intelligent judgments of labor and business behav
ior. Likewise, so far as business and labor are
concerned, the educational process is not achieved
by a single annual statement. Thus, it is clear
that the government must take an active and con
tinuing interest in interpreting and explaining
the guideposts to both labor and industry on the
one hand, and to the general public on the other.
This statement was both an admission that the public must have complete
and accurate information on critical wage and price decisions and a
recognition that only government can provide such

information. The

government role, therefore, was that of providing

information, educating,

and persuading the parties to collective bargaining to voluntarily

^1967 CEA Report, p. 125.

accept the guideposts.

The Council recognized the possibility of role

conflicts.
Indeed, there may even be some conflict
between the objective of effectively persuading
labor and industry to accept voluntarily the
disciplines implied by the guideposts, and that
of informing the public so that it can focus
its judgments, favorable or unfavorable, con
cerning particular wage settlements or price
changes. The Administration has been gradually
feeling its way toward a proper definition of
Government"s role in the process of information
and persuasion. Undoubtedly some mistakes have
been made. But some real progress has been
achieved.^
In carrying out these roles, the government was engaged in several
major activities:

public speeches, private communications, formal

statements and fact-finding.

Public speeches about the guideposts have

been made before business and labor groups and to the general public by
members of the Council of Economic Advisers, various Cabinet and sub
cabinet officials and the President himself.

"As might be expected,

the Council of Economic Advisors has taken a leading part in this activ
ity, with literally dozens of speeches, articles for the popular press,
and radio and television appearances."^
The second major type of activity undertaken by the government to
promote adherence to the guideposts was "...an increasing number of pri
vate communications and meetings between Government officials and
leaders of business and labor designed to underscore the public interest
factors in wage and price decisions and to solicit cooperation of union
and corporate leadership in specific situations."

12Ibid., p. 126.

13

The largest number
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of contacts with industry have been made by the Council of Economic
Advisors and the Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture,
Interior and Defense.

Most of the contacts with labor organizations

were made by the Secretary of Labor and his associates.

Fragmentation

of authority, informal procedures, incomplete or non-existent records,
closed discussions, and privileged information combined to produce a
situation in which very limited information was available to the
public.

14

The Council did describe the general procedure they followed

in the fifty situations involving price increases in which they inter
viewed during 1966.
Where the Council learned of an important
actual or impending price increase, its procedure
was to send letters or telegrams to all principal
producers of the product. In urgent cases, tele
phone calls substituted for letters or telegrams.
If some firms had already announced price increases,
they were asked to reconsider. Those who had not
so announced were asked to avoid them if possible.
In all cases, an invitation was extended to meet
with the Council to discuss the matter.
In the private discussion which often followed
these communications, the companies explained the
reason why a price increase was considered appro
priate, and the Government representatives presented
any information available to them which appeared
relevant to the price decision.... These meetings
are ordinarily not reported publicly, unless
revealed by the company involved. In a few of the
cases that arose in 1966, in which the price prob
lems off the industry appeared to be rather general,
a number of the leading producers were invited to
meet with Government representatives to discuss
the price situations in their industries. Some of
these meetings were publicly reported.^
The procedure for communications and meetings with labor union officials
about increases in excess of the wage guideposts could not be
14
Requests for more specific information from these government
agencies about these private communications and meetings failed to pro
duce any additional information.
15Ibid.. pp. 126-127.
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ascertained, but it seems reasonable to assume that the Secretary of
Labor and the Council would follow the same general procedure in wage
guidepost cases as they did in price guidepost cases, especially with
respect to the privacy of the meetings.
The Council did observe that they encountered one major problem in
the meetings with business leaders— their lack of enough detailed infor
mation to permit a clear judgment as to the appropriateness of the pro
posed price change.^

Again it can be presumed that detailed informa

tion concerning wages was also lacking.

The Council felt that fact

finding was an important activity and should be intensified because of
the educational benefits that fac

finding produced— for the public,

for the parties, and for the Council.
A third form of activity engaged in by the Government chiefly
through the Council, is the issuance of formal statements to the public
about particular wage or price decisions.

During 1966, the Council

issued statements on wage increase in the New York Transit Authority
bargain, the July -August airline strike, and the American Airline case.
Public statements on price increases were issued for steel, copper,
aluminum, and molybdenum.^

Thus, by 1966 public judgment had become

not the initial and sole enforcer of guidepost principles as the 1962
Council had apparently intended, but a court of last resort.

Informed

public opinion was to be used as an enforcer only after the government's
educational and persuasive efforts had failed.

But for the public to

function effectively as a court of last resort, specific and detailed
information about the case in question had to be made available.

16Ibid., p. 126.
° I b i d .. p. 127.
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Formal Council statements to the public, often backed by the results of
fact-finding missions, was the way in which the necessary information
was made available.

Specific Cases of Government Activities to Promote Guidepost Adherence
The general means used by the government to promote adherence to
the guideposts varied with the timing of the wage-price decisions.
Before these decisions were reached, the prestige of the Presidential
office was used to try to get the parties to adhere to the guideposts.
Communication, discussion, information, education and moral suasion
were the chief weapons.

If these devices did not produce decisions

within the guidepost limits, government activity shifted to rallying
public support against the violators by undermining the legitimacy of
the violator's position, fact-finding boards, the release of information
to the public, and the marshalling of the economic power of the govern
ment against the violators.

In carrying out these efforts did the

government endanger collective bargaining?

An examination of specific

collective bargaining situations in wfyich wage guideline pressure was
applied will provide enlightenment.

18

1962
On April 6, 1962, the United Steelworkers of America and Bethlehem
Steel Company signed a new collective bargaining agreement which became
18
The data on guideline confrontations is not readily available
for two reasons: periodic or detailed reports are required, and the
most meaningful contracts must be kept confidential because of the sen
sitivity of the relationships between the administration and the par
ties. (Personal correspondence from Charles B. Warden, Special Assis
tant to the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, June 28, 1968.)
Consequently the material that follows has largely been gleaned from
the press.
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the pattern for other negotiations in the steel industry during the
year.

The parties agreed to a number of fringes designed to improve

job security but direct wages were not increased.

They estimated that

this agreement would cause employment costs to increase about 2^ per
cent— an amount substantially below previous post-war agreements.

The

Kennedy Administration expressed pleasure with the new agreement:

it

had been reached nearly three months before the old contract expired,
a crippling steel strike had been avoided and the agreement was noninf lationary.
The non-inflationary aspect of the settlement was especially
pleasing to the Administration because it represented the apparently
successful culmination of a campaign of several months.

19

The 1959

agreement of the steel industry was to run until June 30, 1962, with a
wage increase in October of the previous year.

In the summer of 1961

there were widespread rumors of an impending increase in steel prices.
The pressure against the rumored price increase mounted:

the Council

of Economic Advisers launched a study of steel prices; the Kefauver
Sub-committee on Antitrust and Monopoly

20

began to devote more attention

to the steel industry; and there were numerous news stories quoting
unnamed government officials on the inflationary aspects of the rumored
increase in steel prices.
19

The following record of the 1962 steel case was compiled from
Grant McConnell, Steel and the Presidency— 1962 (New York: W. W. Norton
Inc., 1963); New York Times (April 23, 1962), pp. 1, 25; 1962 CEA Report
pp. 181-3; Testimony of the Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of
Labor, in 1962 JEC Hearings on the Economic Report, pp. 210-46; Monthly
Labor Review (May, 1962), pp. 552-4; Time (April 20, 1962), pp. 23-5,
89-90; U. S. News & World Report (April 23, 1962), pp. 37-41, 109-10,
124, and (April 30, 1962), pp. 41-5, 109; Monthly Labor Review (April,
1962), pp. iii, iv, 431-2.
20

Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
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By late August the information on prices in the steel industry
gathered by the Council had been passed on to a group of friendly
Senators

21

who used the information to argue that a steel price increase

would not be justified.
bility in steel:

The President joined the call for price sta-

in a press conference

22

he appealed to the steel com

panies not to raise prices because a steel price increase might set off
another inflationary spiral, put a brake on economic recovery and have
adverse effects on the balance of payments.

On September 6, he made

the appeal more personal and direct by sending letters to the Chairmen
of the Boards of the twelve largest steel companies urging them not to
raise prices and to reach an agreement in the forthcoming collective
bargaining negotiations which would be within the limits of productivity
advances and price stability.

23

On September 13, the President sent a

similar letter to David J. McDonald, President of the Steelworkers
Union.

The scheduled wage increases took place in October, but the

feared price increase did not materialize.

Everyone close to the prob

lem realized, however, that the real test was to come when the steel
agreements expired the following June.
In December, Secretary of Labor Goldberg told the delegates to the
AFL-CIO convention that all wage increases should be related to produc
tivity.

While at the convention, he held private talks with McDonald

to explore ways of reaching an early, peaceful and non-inflationary
21

Led by Senators Albert A. Gore and Paul H. Douglas.

^August 30, 1961.
23See 1963 CEA Report, pp. 181-83.
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settlement.

24

In early January, the annual report of the Council of

Economic Advisers announced the wage-price guidelines as standards for
judging the inflationary potential of wage-price actions.

The Admini

stration began to apply pressure to get the talks started early:

in a

White House meeting of Mr. Blaugh of U. S. Steel, Mr. Goldberg and
Mr. McDonald; in the testimony of Mr. Goldberg before the JEC; and in
numerous press releases.
Bargaining began in February, broke-off early in March and was
resumed through the intersession of Mr. Goldberg on March 14.
ment was reached in early April.
tie improvements in job security.

An agree

The union was especially pleased with
Mr. Cooper of U. S. Steel stated

that while the settlement was not wholly within the limits of antici
pated increases in industry productivity, the agreement did represent
progress in the development of voluntary collective bargaining.
The Administration was pleased with the cooperation of the par
ties, and the achievement of an early, peaceful and non-inflationary
agreement.

The Administration regarded the settlement as non-infla-

tionary because it was within the plausible range of productivity
increases for the economy.
or morally justified.

25

Therefore no price increase was necessary

However, on April 10, U. S. Steel announced that

it intended to increase prices by about 3.5 per cent at noon the
following day.

Apparently plans for such an increase had been made

24
Mr. Conrad Cooper, U. S. Steel's Vice President for Industrial
Relations also held private talks with McDonald in December, presumably
to explore the coming negotiations.
25

Note that the Administration was seeking a non-inflationary set
tlement before the guidelines were formally announced. Early drafts of
the 1962 CEA Report, particularly the productivity guidelines, undoubt
edly influenced and shaped many of the Administration's statements in
the fall and winter of 1961.
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several weeks before and had been a much-discussed topic inside the
corporation.

The corporate leaders had no illusions about the popu

larity of the proposed price increase but they agreed that price
increases are never popular and that there was never a good time for
one.

26

U. S. Steel maintained that the company's position had been

made clear long before:

prices should not be discussed with the union,

the company would not participate in negotiations which involved a com
mitment on prices, and the company had not entered into any agreement—
27
express or implied— with the government regarding future price actions.
The next day Bethlehem, Republic, Jones and Laughlin, Youngstown and
Wheeling Steel announced they would also increase prices to equal those
of U. S. Steel. The steel industry appeared to be playing their tradi
tional game of follow the price leader.
President Kennedy regarded U. S. Steel's actions not so much as an
attack on the guidelines but as an attack on the power and prestige of
the Presidency.

28

Consequently to accept the price action taken by

U. S. Steel was unthinkable.

Thus the President resorted to what has

been called the greatest powers of the Presidency:

persuasion, public

ity, appeal to public opinion, and the marshalling of the purchasing
powers of the Government.

At a news conference on the day following

U. S. Steel's announcement the President charged that the price
26

McConnell, o£. cit.. pp. 79-80.
Ibid.

30

From an interview with President Kennedy at the White House on
December 16, 1962, by news representatives of three broadcasting net
works.
Interview broadcast on radio and television December 17. Inter
viewers were William H. Lawrence of the American Broadcasting Network;
George Herman, Columbia Broadcasting System and Sander Vanocur, National
Broadcasting. The full text of the broadcast interview was published
in U. S. News & World Report, December 31, 1962, pp. 54-62.

increases in the steel industry constituted a "wholly unjustifiable and
irresponsible defiance of the public interest."

He charged that the

price increases could not be supported by the facts:

non-imflatiomary

agreements, rapidly rising productivity in the industry, declining
labor costs per ton of output and a bright industry profit outlook.

29

The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission begam am
investigation of the price actions of the steel industry and the ©efemse
Department and other government agencies began to review their procure
ment policies.

Later Secretarv of Defense McNamara indicated that the

announced steel price increase v uld add one billion dollars to defense
costs; consequently the department would require defense contractors to
buy steel from firms that had not raised prices.

He followed this with

an announcement that Lukens Steel Company had been awarded a 5 million
dollar contract for special steel to be used in the Polaris program.
30
Lukens had not raised its prices.
Meanwhile the Administration's other efforts centered around con
vincing Inland Steel not to follow the price increases.

Inland was mot

one of the giants of the industry but it occupied a very strategic
position:

modern plants, space-age products, close and friendly cus

tomer relations, one of the best profit records in the industry, and
efficient management that had displayed an independent spirit in their
29
McConnell, o£. cit.. pp. 87-88; Monthly Labor Review ((May, 1962),
p. 552, New York Times (April 23, 1962), pp. 1, 25. Note: the 1962
agreement provided for improvements in fringe benefits designed to
increase job security but no increase in hourly wages. The parties
estimated that this agreement would increase employment costs by 2\ per
cent. Yet President Kennedy argued that labor costs per tom of output
had been declining in the steel industry. Both positions could be cor
rect: the first estimate does not consider changes in productivity
while tlje latter does. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to deter
mine the costs of changes in certain fringe benefits.
^McConnell, _o£. cit., pp. 9, 93, 95.
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decisions, plus Inland held about one-fourth of the important Chicago
steel market.

31

Several other smaller firms that had not previously-

raised prices adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

Although the total com

bined output of these firms probably represented only 25 per cent of
the market, it was necessary to convince them not to raise prices in
order to break the price leadership pattern.
13th the break in the price front came.

Around noon on Friday the

Inland and Kaiser Steel

announced their decisions not to raise prices while Armco announced
that they were still studying the problem.

Around midafternoon, Beth

lehem Steel, the industry's second largest producer and the other major
seller in the Chicago market, announced that it was rescinding its
previously announced price increase.

U. S. Steel capitulated a short

time later— steel industry prices would remain at their old level.
The Administration's decision to change government purchasing
policies and its ability to break the price pattern combined to put
intense economic pressure on those companies that had increased prices.
Publicity and appeal to public opinion, on the other hand, created the
31

Ibid., pp. 12, 95. U. S. Steel's defense of their decision to
increase prices was quite interesting. Price increases were necessary
to improve profit positions which were in turn needed to purchase
machinery and equipment. For several years the American steel industry
had been facing serious economic problems: the steel market had been
shrinking and changing in form, other countries were leading in tech
nological breakthroughs, and new competition from these countries was
squeezing the American steel industry. Technological improvements were
no doubt necessary, but the question in dispute was how this advance
ment should be financed— by company stockholders or by their customers?
From 1946 to 1960, McConnell reports (p. 31), more than 90 per cent of
U. S. Steel's capital expansion had been financed out of current
profits. The second plank in U. S. Steel's defense of their price
raising decision was that higher prices were needed in order to meet
competition. Just how a price increase would enable U. S. Steel to
meet competition was not explained.
It is true that profits for the
entire industry had been dropping— from after-tax profits of 13 per
cent on stockholder's equity in 1955 to 6 per cent in 1961.
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grounds for legitimacy for governmental action.
necessary.

Both were perhaps

While the guidelines were used during contract negotiations,

there is no evidence of their direct use in the government's campaign
to stop the announced increase.

Indirectly, the guidelines contributed

to governmental claims of legitimacy and they gained weight as a factor
to be taken into account in pattern-setting wage and price decisions.
The steel industry conflict ''...was the first to raise a troublesome
issue left unmentioned in the ^original) presentation of the guideposts.

What happens if they are ignored?"

32

The parties now had an

answer.
In the aftermath of the stee! case, the Administration's efforts
in the wage-price area for the rest of the year can all be classified
as educational.

The guidelines had to be explained, growing business

hostility toward the Administration had to be averted,

33

labor's fears

that mechanical rules would replace negotiations had to De laid to
rest, and the administration had to head off inflationary settlements
in the forthcoming negotiations in the construction, automobiles,
32

John Sheahan, The Wage-Price Guideposts (Washington, D. C., the
Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 37. For further evidence of legiti
macy of the Government's position against the price increase in steel,
see editorials in New York Times, April 14, 1962 (p. 24) and April 28,
1962 (p. 24).
'
33

Feelings among the business community that the new Administration
was anti-business was probably due to the following combination of cir
cumstances: (1) The publicity given to some questionable tactics by
the F.B.I. during the steel case; (2) an offhand remark by the Presi
dent which was derogatory to businessmen; (3) a fear of further
Governmental interference into the private decision-making process, and
(4) the rapid and sharp decline of the stockmarket (Dow-Jones Indus
trial average was slightly over 690 at the time of the steel crisis,
but fell constantly to a low of about 540 in June before rallying to
over 640 at year's end.) An all-businessmen's club emerged complete
with lapel button, and grim anti-Kennedy jokes appeared.
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railroad, aluminum, and can industries.

Consequently the Administration

plunged into a series of speeches, interviews, conferences, and press
statements designed to clarify the guidelines and allay fears among the
principals to collective bargaining.
President Kennedy spearheaded this educational effort with
speeches to the United States Chamber of Commerce,
the United Automobile Workers,
address.

36

35

34

a convention of

and in his famous Yale commencement

In his Chamber of Commerce address, he stressed the need

for responsible action by Government,

Business, and Labor to achieve

economic growth, avoid inflation, and improve the balance of payments.
He denied that the Administration wanted the burden of setting indi
vidual prices for individual products, or that the Administration was
anti-business.

The President closed by calling for an investment tax

credit, high capacity utilization, rising productivity, and non-inflationary wage settlements.
The United Automobile Workers (UAW) held a uniquely critical role
in the collective bargaining picture remaining in 1962 since they were
the principal union in the forthcoming automotive and can industry sett 1 ements.

Furthermore, there were those who wondered if the President

34

"Government and Business: Basic Issues and Relationships,"
delivered to the United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D. C. by
John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, on April 30, 1962;
Reproduced in Vital Speeches of the Day. Vol. XXVIII, No. 16 (June 1,
1962), p. 482-4.
35

Full text appeared in The New York Times (May 9, 1962), p. 28;
excerpts on guidelines appeared in U. S. News &. World Report (May 21,
1962), p. 70.
36

"The Myth and Reality in Our National Economy: Big Government—
Fiscal Policy— Confidence," delivered at Yale University commencement,
New Haven, Conn., by John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, on
June 11, 1962; Reproduced in Vital Speeches of the Day. Vol. XXVIII,
No. 19 (July 15, 1962), pp. 578-81.
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would talk as firmly to labor as be bad to management after the steel
price increase.

37

President Kennedy assured the delegates that his

administration had not and would not undertake to fix wages and prices
in the economy.

But, he continued, the Government would not hesitate

to suggest guidelines, point out tbe national interest, enforce anti
trust laws and invoke governmental machinery in national emergency.
The President made it clear that voluntary collective bargaining would
continue to be the principal form of arriving at wage settlements.
Nevertheless, the public interest demands that the government use its
efforts to secure "...a wage policy which seeks its gains out of the
fruits of technology, instead of che pockets of the consumers."

38

Labor unions must, therefore, exercise restraint in their bargaining
demands.
In the Yale commenceme- z address, President Kennedy discussed
three great myths concerning the economy which may prevent effective
action:

fiscal irresponsibility; the Government is big and bad— and

steadily getting bigger and worse; and that business downturns are the
result of a lack of confidence in tbe Administration.
two myths relate to the guidelines:

Only the latter

refutation of the second would

clearly establish the need for the guidelines while refutation of the
third would carry charges that the steel crisis caused the existing
slump in the stock market.
Concerning the second myth, the President noted that although
37

Specifically charged by Merriman Smith, White House Reporter
for United Press International at a meeting of the Regional Editors
and Publishers of U.P.I. See The Mew York Times (April 24, 1962),
p. 24.
OQ

The New York Times (May 9, 1962), p. 28.
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Government spending toas toeen constantly increasing since before World
War II, relatively, ttto (Government sector has grown less rapidly than
the economy as a whole.

Furthermore, while size may bring dangers, it

may also bring benefits.
In discussing tttoe third myth, President Kennedy pointed out that
business confidence is net sufficient in itself to prevent business
cycles.

Business tod full confidence in the Administration in power

in 1929, 1954, 195®, and 1960, but this confidence did not prevent
recessions in eaclh ©ff trtose years.

As he pointed out, "What matters

is the capacity ©if the nation a- a whole to deal with its economic
problems and its opportunities."
Other Adminis tration officials assisted in this educational
effort through news releases, interviews, speeches and participation
at conferences.

40

Fertops the most important phases in this educa

tional program occurred as a result of the activities of the Presi41
dent's Advisory Committee on Labor Management Policy.
In their
39

Vital Speeches ((July 15, 1962), _o£. cit., p. 580.

^Secretary ©ff Commerce Luther H. Hodges said (The New York Times,
April 25, 1962), fftot guideline pressure was not necessary in all bar
gaining situations, ©rnly those in basic industries in which the nation
al interest was not toeing taken into account. Walt W. Rostow, Chairman
of the State Department"s Policy Planning Council, assured the League
of Women Voters ttot heavy handed and direct governmental controls were
not necessary no force tttoe kinds of wage and price discussions demanded
by the public interest ((The New York Times, May 4, 1962, p. 7). Secre
tary of Labor Goldtoerg, Walter W. Heller, Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers; and William E. Simkin, Director of the Federal Medi
ation and Conciliation Service were some of the other members of the
Administration joiming this educational effort.
41

Created toy Executive Order No. 10918 signed by President Ken
nedy on February lfi>, I’M)!. The Committee was composed of the Secre
taries of Labor and Commerce (alternately serving as chairman) and
nineteen other mentors appointed by the President— seven each from
labor and management and five representing the public at large. The

Ill
42
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second report
on Collective Bargaining
the committee reached the
unanimous view that "collective bargaining was an essential element of
economic democracy," but that it must be responsive to the public
interest.

To give considerations to the national interest, unions and

managements unst have reliable information on the state of the economy
and future expectations.

Therefore, the Committee recommended periodic

conferences under Government auspices addressed to these matters.

The

first such conference, the White House Conference on National
Economic Issues, met in Washington, D. C. on May 21 and 22, 1962.

44

T\w© of the four major topics discussed were related to the guide
line educational effort:

free and responsible collective bargaining

and industrial peace, and economic growth and sound wage and price
policies.

In the collective bargaining session it was generally agreed

that some form of sound wage and price policy was perhaps necessary in
the public interest but the Committee would like a better definition

committee was to study, advise and recommend policies to promote free
and responsible collective bargaining, industrial peace, sound wage
and price policies, higher standards of living and increased product
ivity.
42

Their first report was Automation, President's Advisory Commit
tee on Labor-4Mamagement Policy, (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, January 11, 1962). Also entitled The Benefits and
Problems Incident to Automation and Other Technological Advances.
43

Collective Bargaining, President's Advisory Committee on LaborManagesment Policy, (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, May 1, 1962). Also entitled Free and Responsible Collective
Bargaining and Industrial Peace.
/ji

Proceedings of White House Conference on National Economic
Issues. {Washington, D. C., May 21, 22, 1962), p. iii. Attended by
over 200 conferees from labor, management, government and other groups.
Each discussion followed the same basic format: four speeches on each
topic— one each by persons representing government, labor, management
and the public; general discussion of the topic; and a summation of
the roundtable discussion of the topic.
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of the public interest.

The roundtable dealing with wage and price

policies reached four interesting conclusions:

First, the principal

purpose of the guidelines— to initiate discussion— perhaps had been
attained in some measure.

Second, the general guidelines, especially

the averages, are the least important aspect of the wage-price policy
as guides for private wage-price determinations.

The averages are to

be the end result of a series of private wage-price discussions— the
important part of the guidelines for decision-makers are the exceptions.
Third, the guideline policy was not precisely understood and its appli
cation in private decision-making would be somewhat difficult.

Finally

the parties to collective bargaining must come to realize that the
guideline policy has changed the environment within which negotiations
take place and they must adjust to this change.

45

As the debate continued through the remainder of the year, three
previously unasked questions were raised, but not answered.

If the

government is forced to choose between an inflationary wage settlement
or a national emergency strike, which goal will take precedence?
the guidelines also apply to federal wage decisions?

Will

And how can guide

line pressure be applied in a basic industry characterized by decen
tralized collective bargaining, e.g. the construction industry?

1963-1964
Price and wage increases remained restrained during the expansion
of 1963-64.

The government continued its education and persuasion

campaign on behalf of the guidelines;
45

in fact, members of the Kennedy-

The Joint Economic Committee Hearings on the State of the Econ
omy and Policies for Full Employment. (Washington, D. C.: August,
1962) offered a limited forum for economists to discuss the guidelines.
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Johnson administration discussed the guidelines so much and so often
that they became tabbed as "jawbone" controls.

It was difficult to

ascertain the actual effect of the guideposts in specific bargaining
situations, but undoubtedly they affected the bargaining strategies
of the parties.
In the most important single wage action in 1963, the wage
reopenings in the steel industry in May, the guideposts received a
boost from the market.

The steelworker's union and eleven major steel

producers reached the lowest-cost agreement since World War II in late
June.

The union chose to forego a general wage increase to concentrate

on job security improvements, and they stayed well within the guideline
limits.

The major reason for union's settlement on these terms was

the declining employment opportunities for production workers in the
steel industry; employment in the industry failed to regain its pre
vious level after every major post-war recession— in fact the number
of production workers employed by the industry declined 20 per cent
from 1957 to 1964^
Contract negotiations in the coal, trucking and automobile indus
tries dominated the collective bargaining scene in 1964.

Agreements

reached in the first two cases were generally agreed to be non-inflationary, but the automobile settlements were estimated to have cost
46

In another significant move in the steel industry, Kaiser
Steel reached an agreement with the union agreeing to the same wage
increase granted by the Eastern companies, plus 32.5 per cent of
any savings in production costs the company achieved by increasing
productivity or decreasing costs, (labor costs account for about a
third of Kaiser's total costs.) (Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 86, No. 2,
February, 1963, p. 177.) See pp. 154-160 for full text of the Kaiser
Sharing Plan. In March, Kaiser employees received bonuses averaging
$79 for the month. (Time, May 3, 1963, p. 95).

between 4.7 and 5.0 per cent

although the fringe benefit part of the

package made all cost estimates highly tenuous.

The administration

accepted the final settlement without any strong reaction.

Despite

the guideline-exceeding settlement in the automobile industry, overall
wage increases in 1964 were roughly comparable to the previous two
years.

However, the failure to find a way to achieve guideline set

tlements in the decentralized construction industry, and the wellpublicized guideline-breaking settlements in a few major industries
continued to put tension on the guidelines.
1965
Bargaining over new steel industry contracts was the single most
important negotiation during the year because the steelworkers had not
had a wage increase since October 1961.

Also, major agreements in the

rubber, aluminum, maritime and aerospace industries were scheduled to
expire during the year.

In addition, President Johnson invoked the

guidelines to justify his recommendation of a 3 per cent ceiling for
a pay raise for federal employees.
The Johnson Administration added a new tactic to those in previous
guideline campaigns.

Selective steel price increases and the pending

wage negotiations in the industry prompted the President to request the
Council of Economic Advisers to prepare a report on steel prices.

48

This report recommended a wage settlement consistent with the wage
guideline, and based on such a settlement, the continued overall
4.7
Phyllis Groom, "An Account of American Labor in 1962,"
Monthly Labor Review. (Dec., 1964), pp. 1385-1392.
48

1966 CEA Report, p. 89.

181
stability of steel prices.

49

This report lent factual and moral cre

dence to the guideposts and obviously put pressure on both sides to
reach a guideline-acceptable settlement.

President Johnson also

emphasized the importance of a non-inflationary, peaceful settlement
because of the Viet Nam war, and he followed a pattern of "escalated
intervention," to secure such an agreement.
Pressures from administrative agencies, the White House staff,
Congress, and finally from the President himself, were steadily
increased.

Also, the President appointed troubleshooters, supplied

with a "statistical referee"

50

and virtually locked up the parties for

five days to keep them in constant negotiations.

51

The final settle

ment, according to government economists, was close to an acceptable
3.2 per cent level.
While the administration had succeeded in gaining acceptable
agreements in the steel and maritime agreements, other major settlements were exceeding the guidelines:

aluminum, 4.1 per cent;

52

cans, 3.5 per cent; autoworkers, 4.8 per cent; and California construction workers, 6.1 per cent.

53

keep federal pay increases to

In spite of administration attempts to
3 per cent, the final bill provided for a

3.6 per cent across-the-board pay increase for about 1.8 million
49

.
Council of Economic Advisers, Report on Steel Prices (Washing
ton, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, (April, 1956). Sum
mary and conclusions reproduced in Monthly Labor Review (June, 1965),
pp. 673-674. This report was largely the work of Otto Eckstein, a
former Harvard economics professor.
"^Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.
^Business Week, (September 11, 1965), pp. 24-25.
52

The New York Times, (June 6, 1965), pp. 1, 12 (Sect. c).

~^ Time, (September 10, 1965), p. 81.
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federal employees.

54

The market became a less effective disciplinary

ally for the guidelines in 1965 as the economic expansion continued to
move forward for the fifth year.

Furthermore, as the Revenue Act of

1964 had become effective, unemployment had declined for the second
straight year to the point where the unemployment rate averaged 4.6
per cent for the year— down from the 5.7 per cent of 1963.

1966
Although 1966 would normally have been considered a fairly light
year for collective bargaining, the guideposts were severely tested.
The economy chalked up another banner year with gross national pro
duct, industrial production, employment, and corporate profits reaching
new record levels.

However, these and other gains brought with them

a significant measure of inflation.

Prices increased sharply as

demand pressed on productivity capacity.

In addition, for the third

straight year the President's Council of Economic Advisers pegged the
wage guideposts at 3.2 per cent— despite the fact that by their own
method of calculation the guidepost figure would have been close to
3.6 per cent.

The Council chose to stick with the 3.2 per cent figure

because they reasoned that productivity would increase at a much lower
rate as more industries began to operate at near capacity and to press
less efficient productive equipment into s e r v i c e . F a c e d with a
lessening of market discipline, demand-pull inflation, record level
profits, and an arbitrary change in the rules of the game, labor
54

/
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1965. (Washington, D. C.:
Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 649.
55

National Observer. (Feb. 14, 1966), p. 12. The Council expected
productivity for the private economy to be about 3 per cent.

expressed their disillusionment with the guidelines by turning a aSeaff
ear to government admonitions.
Collective bargaining was diverted away from fringes and towamfl
wage increases in the major agreements reflecting the worker’s DmmDemm
for their smaller take-home pay resulting from inflation and tihe
increase m

social security taxes.
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About 4.1 million workers (Dowered!

by major agreements received deferred wage increases during the year;
the increases in meatpacking, aerospace, retail trade, and consitnmcttiawm
industries ranged from 1.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent while the auto
workers received increases of 3.4 per cent.^

Major agreements

expiring during 1966 covered less than a fifth of the total number ©ff
workers under major agreements.

However, over half of these workers

received first year adjustments ranging from 3 to 4.5 per cent; while
one fourth of the covered workers got raises of 5 per cent ox more.

3$

Several individual agreements subjected the guidelines to sewere
tests.

For instance, the Council of Economic Advisers asked fox ami

secured arbitration on the wage terms of an agreement reached by
Local 825 of the International Union of Operating Engineers and ttifap
Associated General Contractors of New Jersey.
cant for three reasons:

59

This case was sl®miffi—

it was one of the very rare occasions in

which a union has allowed state and Federal labor officials to arbi
trate a wage dispute; it was the first time the White House had

"^The new social security provisions that went into effect im Jamuary increased the tax on wages to 4.2 per cent and the base to
a year.
57

Karen E. Ondras, "A Review of Labor Relations in 1966,” MomtTbUy
Labor Review (December, 1966), pp. 1356-1361.
Ibid., p. 1358.
The union members operate cranes and other large machinery.
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publicly succeeded in rolling back wage demands; and it occurred in
the fragmented, decentralized construction industry whiclfa bad presented so many administration problems for the guidelines.

60

In rail

road bargaining the operating unions secured wage increases estimated
to be at about 5 per cent.^
The problem of crippling strikes versus the guidelines continued
to plague the Administration.

Given a choice between a peaceful but

inflationary settlement and a crippling strike in a major industry,
which alternative should be chosen?

In at least three cases, the

Administration was willing to trade labor peace for higher wages:

New

York Transit negotiations, the dispute between the five major airlines
and the Machinists union,

62

and in the coal industry negotiations.

Settlements in all three cases were substantially above the guide*
63
posts.

In March, President Johnson asked Congress to enact legislation
which would provide an average increase in wages and fringe benefits
for federal civilian employees amounting to 3.2 per cent of total
compensation.

64

The guidepost concept was a key factor in debate on

the bill,^ and the Administration succeeded in holding the federal

^ T h e New York Times (March 29, 1966; March 31, 1966; and March
17, 1966).
^Ondras, _0£. cit.
62

For the details of the settlement see: Report to the Presi
dent by the Emergency Board No. 166 (Washington, D. C.: W. S. Gov
ernment Printing Office, June 5, 1966); New York Times (June 9, 1966;
June 10, 1966; and July 31, 1966); and 1966 Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, pp. 789-97.
Ondras,
64

ojj.

cit.. p. 1359.

1966 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 1250-51.

65Ibid.. p. 547.
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pay raise bill to a figure which it said was within the guideposts.^
Construction continued to present a problem.

Contractors often

deal with many different

craft groups on a single

site

and theyoften

bargain in associations,

thus making it easier to

pass

increased

labor costs along to buyers by increasing job bids throughout the
area.

One mid-year survey found construction contract settlements

ranging from increases of 4 to 16 per cent, but settlements in the 5
to 7 per cent range were
Throughout the year

the most common.67
the Administration kept mp its jawbone

campaign for wage-price stability.

The activities of (Gardner Ackley,

chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, during the
year indicates the extent of this campaign.

In testimony before the

Joint Economic Council in January, Mr. Ackley said the Administration
saw no need for Congressional reinforcement of the wage-price guideposts but admitted there would be problems in maintaining wage-price
stability in 1966.

68

In February, Mr. Ackley discussed “economic

problems and prospects" before the Economic Club ©f ©etroit,

69

cifically discussing the fruitlessness of a wage-price spiral.

spe
On

66
The legislator's method of computing wage boosts drew some
criticism. See: Wall Street Journal (April 26, 1966), p. 14, and
The New York Times (May 4, 1966).
67

"Whipsaws That Drive Building Wages Up," Bus1mess Week
(June 18, 1966), pp. 150-56. There are 18 unions in the building
trade sector of the construction industry. Over 8,®®® local nego
tiations are handled annually— for the most part by highly autono
mous local union business agents.
68

Joint Economic Committee, Hearings on the 1966 Economic
Report of the President (Washington, D. C.: U. S.
Printing Office, 1966), pp. 4-104.
^Gardner Ackley, "Economic Problems and Prospects,1” speech
before the Economic Club of Detroit, February 28, 1966.
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March 27, Mr. Ackley met the radio press to answer questions about the
economy— some of which dealt with the guidelines.^

In April, he

defended the guidelines against attacks by Milton Friedman and Robert
M. Solow at a conference on the guidelines at the University of Chi
cago. ^

In May, Chairman Ackley identified "The Businessman's Role

in Fighting Inflation" in a speech before the 5Ucb Annual Meeting of
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

He argued that business

men must resist excessive wage increases and moderate their pricing
policies.

72

August found Mr. Ackley delivering the mid-year commence

ment at the University of Michigan.

He admitted that the guidelines

had experienced "a couple of defeats" as an anti-inflationary tool
but voiced his opposition to any legislation that would impose
restraints on wages and prices.

73

Mr. Ackley also admitted that the

educational goal of the guidelines was not being achieved completely
either.

He said that the guidepost policy:
...is surely far from ideal and has recently
suffered some stunning defeats. But what is
more disappointing than the specific defeats

"Meet the Press," March 27, 1966. Guest: Gardner Ackley,
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers. Panel: Edwin L. Dale, The
New York Times; Lawrence Fertig, The New York World Telegram and Sun;
Austin Kiplinger, Changing Times; Sander Vanocur, NBC News. Produced
by Lawrence E. Spivak. Mr. Ackley admitted that the big price
increases have been in food, farm products, and a few internationally
traded raw material— sectors of the economy where the guidelines hard
ly apply.
^Gardner Ackley, "The Contribution of Guidelines" in Guidelines.
Informal Controls and the Market Place, ed. George P. Schultz and
Robert Z. Aliber (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 67-78.
72

Gardner Ackley, "The Businessman's Role in Fighting Inflation"
speech before the 54th Annual Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, Washington, D. C., May 2, 1966.
^ T h e New York Times (August 7, 1966), p. 24.
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is the absence of much apparent recogni
tion on the side of either labor or manage
ment that this problem must be solved if we
are to maintain full employment and the full
measure of wage and profit income that only
a full employment economy can provide.^
While there can be little doubt that the guidelines were producing an
extensive dialogue,

75

particularly in

the popular press, there is

considerable doubt that the dialogue was increasing the level of
understanding.
price

At three major conferences dealing with the wage-

guideposts7^

the opponents and proponents of the guidelines

7^The New York Times (August 8, 1966), p. 8.
75

For example, see: "Chamber Seeking Wage-Price Curb," New York
Times (Jan. 29, 1966); "Plea for Wage-Price Restraint by Chamber
finds Labor Cool," New York Times (Jan. 28, 1966.); "Wirtz Disturbed
by Building Labor Contracts," New York Times (Feb. 1, 1966); "Labor
Unmoved by Wirtz in a Confrontation on Pay," New York Times (Feb. 22,
1966); Labor Denounces U. S. Wage Policy," New York Times (Feb. 26,
1966); "History and the Spectre of Wage-Price Controls," National
Observer (April A, 1966); "Guiding the Nation's Reluctant Tigers:
The Guidepost Economy," Business Week (April 23, 1966); A. H. Raskin,
"Which Way Away From the Guideposts?" New York Times (May 2, 1966);
"Lesser of the Evils," Business Week (May 28, 1966); Hobart Rowan,
"The Passing of the Guideposts," Washington Post (June 12, 1966);
Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "Tottering Guideposts," New York Times," (Aug. 9,
1966); Alan Greenspan, "Those Battered Guideposts," Challenge (Sept./
Oct., 1966), pp. 38, 40-1, 50-1; William Burke, "Hammering on Guideposts," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San FranciscoJ
(April, 1966); Edward M. Bernstein, "Prices, Wages, and Guideposts,"
in Quarterly Review and Investment Survey, Model, Roland and Co..,
Inc., Second Quarter 1966; and A. H. Raskin, "Labor’s Political
Frustrations," The Reporter (April 7, 1966), pp. 26, 28, 33.
76U. S. Chamber of Commerce, "National Symposium on Inflation,
Guideposts and Economic Policy," Washington, D. C., February 1966,
see: The Washington Post (Feb. 10, 1966); New York Times (Feb. 10,
1966); Wall Street Journal (Feb. 10, 1966); Journal of Commerce
(Feb. 10, 1966). The University of Chicago Conference on the Guide
lines, proceedings in Guidelines. Informal Control and the Market
Place, ed. Gfeorge P. Schultz and Robert Z. Aliber (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1966); "A Symposium on Business-Government Relations,"
sponsored by the American Bankers Association, Washington, D. C.,
April 1966.
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drew hard and fast battle lines and adopted no-retreat battle plans.
It is doubtful, therefore, if these conferences made any significant
contribution to achieving the guidepost's educational goal.
Perhaps the most significant contributions to improved under
standing came from the President’s Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy.^

President Johnson revived the Committee in May,

after an 18-month hiatus, and charged it with the task of suggesting
ways of improving the guideposts.

The Committee first endorsed the

original guidepost concept— general guides rather than a mechanical
formula— and then called for a new procedure for administering the
guideposts.

First, a quarterly economic review by the President's

Council of Economic Advisers to pinpoint major inflationary trouble
spots and to "identify the nature and apparent chief causes" of these
inflationary areas of the economy, the Council's quarterly reports to be
forwarded to the President’s Labor-Management Advisory Committee for
discussion.

After discussion, the Committee would forward recommenda

tions on appropriate corrective action to the President.

This

approach would give representatives of labor, management, and the
public their first opportunity to play a role in shaping the wageprice policy of the country.

Policies and administrative decisions

reached in this fashion would more likely be supported by labor and
management.
Despite restrictive monetary and fiscal policies

78

and continuous

^See: Report Setting Forth the Committee's Views on the Guideposts for Noninflationary Wage and Price Behavior, Aug. 18, 1966;
Monthly Labor Review (Oct. 1966); Mew York Times (Aug. 19, 1966); and
Business Week (May 14, 1966).
Excise tax reductions for automobiles and telephone services
were rescinded, withholding rates of personal income taxes were
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guideline pressure, consumer and wholesale prices in 1966 registered
their largest Increases since the mid-1950's.

Inflationary pres

sures generated am 1%6> were to carry over into 1967, as defense
expenditures comtimmed t© increase and as labor pressed for cost-ofliving adjustments am addition to other demands.

1967-196B
The omission off a fixed guidepost figure from the 1967 Economic
Report represented a decided shift in the Administration's wageprice policy, amd imitiated a shift in their educational effort.
The reason for fltne.se shifts was summarized early in the |rear by CEA
member Arthur M. ©tom© when he said:
Hie gmideposts reflect a recognition that, in
the Ikimd ©f economy we have and want to have,
there cam he cost-push and profit-push pressures
on prices amd wages, and that these pressures and
temptatioms are greater in a high employment
economy. fflemce, guideposts have a major role to
play, Bunt gmideposts are not meant to and cannot
stem tine tides ©f excess demand inflation.... If
we try t© mse gmideposts to restrain an excess
demand inflation, we will, in the process, sharply
limit their msefmlness for what they are really
designed t© d © . ^
This shift indicated that the Administration was not planning
to apply the gmideposts to restrain the demand pull inflation of
1966-1967.

Therefore, they would avoid further direct, and well-

publicized, confrontations to enforce the guidelines during 1967,

increased, and the collection of corporate taxes were speeded up.
See: Hyman L. Lewis, "TThe Economy in 1966," Monthly Labor Review
(Feb. 1967), pp. 1-4.
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Arthur M. GHkmm, "'Challenges in Sustaining Prosperity, Seminar
on Manpower Policy amd Program," sponsored by Manpower Administra
tion, U. S. Department of labor (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govern
ment Printing ©ffffice, lam. 1967), p. 14.
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despite trifag fact that it promised to be a heavy collective bar
gaining year.

Settlements were reached in the rubber, women's

apparel, meatpacking, metal working, petroleum refining, railroad,
telephone, fflmitamabile and trucking industries during the year.

Of

the approximately 4.5 million workers covered by major settlements,
about t£>75„(!D(!I)® were employees of the Big Three auto producers, and
over 4®©,ffiX®ffi) were truckers, so it is fair to say that the automo
tive and trucking settlements highlighted collective bargaining
activity ffor tribe year.

The median first year increase for manufac

turing was 6>.5 per cent primarily because the automobile settlements
provided larger wage increases in the first than in the second or
third contract years.

80

When the actual timing of wage and benefit

changes was taken into account, the median package increase was 5.6
per cent a year— nearly 25 per cent higher than the timed package
increase ffor tribe previous year.
The large automobile settlement was particularly worrisome for
the administration for three reasons:

it was considerably in excess

of the guidelines (package settlement of between 6 and 7 per cent),
the protracted auta strikes damaged the Administrations struggle
for labor peace, and the timing of the auto pacts (November) could
easily mteann trihat they would become the pattern for agreements expir
ing in 194®.

This last factor would be particularly troublesome,

for while only 5®2 major contracts covering about 2.3 million workers
were to expire in L968 (compared to 709 major pacts covering 3.1 mil
lion workers in 1967), the 1968 bargaining schedule was to include

vWdltter IP. Reuther called for a productivity based pay increase
during negotiations, but he wanted to use company or industry produc
tivity. See: Onristian Science Monitor (Oct. 6, 1967).
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the traditional trouble spots of steel, aerospace, railroads,
docks,

81

aluminum and metal fabricating.

82

The timing of these

agreements added to the problem, since bargaining for them would be
bunched in the summer and early fall months.

Thus, 1968 would be a

year in which the administration would again be caught on the horns
of the policy dilemma of how to secure peaceful, but non-inflationary, settlements in key bargaining situations.
been sharpened:

And both horns have

labor unions have grown more militant (seeking sub

stantial wage increases and cost-of-living adjustments to recover
real income eroded away by inflation) and management has become
increasingly more firm (because of recent declines in corporate pro
fits, and the slowdown in productivity gains).

Summary
The central objective of this chapter was that of determining
whether the guidelines had been applied in such a way as to consti
tute a serious threat to collective bargaining.

The scope of the

investigation was limited to the administration of the wage guidepost on the grounds that price decisions normally are not bargainable.

The investigation was built around three major questions con

cerning how critical bargaining situations were to be identified,
how wage guideline pressure was applied, and with what results.

In

the process of finding answers to these questions, many administra
tive problems were uncovered.

®^Wall Street Journal (Oct. 20, 1967).
S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
INews Release, Wage Calendar for 1968, issued December 29, 1967.

The Council of Economic Advisers clearly intended to apply the
wage guidelines in those segments of the economy where labor unions
exercise considerable discretion over the terms of the wage bargains.
To the Council, this meant those wage bargains regarded as pattern
setting by large segments of the economy.

Identifying agreements

which cover large numbers of workers is fairly easy:

There are

nearly 400 collective bargaining agreements affecting 5,000 or more
workers each and about 2,000 agreements covering 1,000 or more work
ers each.
year.

However, not all of these agreements expire in any given

The task is to identify those major agreements expiring dur

ing the year that have pattern-setting potential and then concen
trate guidepost pressure on those wage decisions.

But the problem

is complicated by the fact that normally the number of wage actions
in a given year exceeds the number of new wage negotiations for wage
actions include reopenings, deferred increases, escalators, cost-ofliving adjustments, as well as expirations.

While the major bargains

represent only a small proportion of the total number of collective
bargaining agreements negotiated each year, there are still enough
major bargains to pose administrative problems; the chief one being
the difficulty of applying the guideposts in what is still essen
tially a decentralized wage-bargaining situation.

The list can be

narrowed by selecting only those major bargains which are likely to
be inter-or intra-industry pattern-setting agreements.

Normally,

the strategic location of the industry and the timing of the nego
tiations assist in locating the potential pattern-setting agreement.
When these criteria are applied, there would probably be less than
a dozen pattern-setting agreements a year in which guideline pres
sure is necessary.
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How was wage guideline pressure applied?

The original guide-

post concept called for the marshalling of public opinion as a
court of last resort to deal with excessive wage or price increases.
But like most court actions, adverse public opinion is an after-thefact device.

The Administration, however, soon came to realize the

importance of preventive measures, of before-the-decision pressure.
Consequently, the Administration engaged in an extensive three-stage
campaign to influence wage (and price) decisions.
First, the Administration initiated a program of continuous
education.

The nature, need, and purpose of the guideposts were

explained.

The public interest was constantly defined and discussed.

And the responsibilities of the parties in collective bargaining for
the total or economy-wide impact of their decisions was a constant
theme in discussions of the guideposts.
Second, the Administration undertook a program of persuasion.
Through letters, phone calls, private meetings, and conferences, the
Kennedy-Johnson Administrations attempted to get the parties to pattern-setting wage and price decisions to keep within the guidelines.
In all of these contacts, the economic costs of inflation to the
entire country and the transitory and self-defeating nature of gains
made during a wage-price spiral were emphasized.

Private restraint

in the public interest became the Administration's theme song.
Third, if the initial efforts to educate and to persuade
failed, the government could initiate fact-finding procedures.
Ordinarily the Council of Economic Advisers does not have the de
tailed information which would permit it to make a clear judgment
as to the appropriateness of every major wage change proposed during
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any given year.

Nor does the Council have the resources to extract

detailed information for each guidepost case.

But if it appears

that the public interest is being ignored, then specific information
becomes a necessity.

Once the facts about a specific case have been

gathered, the next step depends upon whether the decision in ques
tion has been made.

If it has not, the specific information can be

used by the Council in additional persuasive attempts.

Normally,

results of the fact-finding study would not be made public while
attempts at persuasion were continuing.

However, if the attempts

fail, or if an inflationary decision were made before the fact-find
ing study were completed, then the results of the study could be
released to the public.
What effect have the wage guideposts had on wage and fringe
settlements during the period!

There is good evidence to suggest

that wage behavior was more restrained in the period 1962-1965 when
the economy was struggling with less than full employment, and that
the average wage-benefit package significantly exceeded the guideposts during the pure demand-pull inflation of 1966-1967.

Attempts

to isolate the guidepost effect are largely inconclusive because of
the influence of other factors, but the guidelines apparently were
one of the factors causing wages (and prices) to increase less than
had been predicted for them on the basis of previous experience.
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The contribution of the guidelines to increased public understanding
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See: Sheahan, ojj. cit., pp. 83-95. He identifies four
reasons for this stabilizing of wage and price behavior: (1) a
lessening of inflationary expectations, (2) increase in competitive
pressure from abroad, (3) a more even growth, and (4) the guideposts. See also: Arthur F. Burns and Paul A. Samuelson, Full
Employment. Guideposts, and Economic Stability (Washington, D. C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1967), pp. 58-64.
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of the wage-price-productivity relationship is even more difficult
to measure.
This survey of the administration of the guidelines points out
several problems.

First, not all critical wage decisions cover

large numbers of employees (e.g., the building trades).

Second,

often a choice had to be made between the guidelines and some other
economic goal, such as the avoidance of a major strike.

Third,

without a clearly established administrative philosophy, the Admin
istration had to feel its way along from providing a definition of
the public interest in collective bargaining to an active role as
a third party participant in key bargains in the public interest.
Fourth, economic conditions changed during the period.

The economy

shifted from unemployment and inflation to more than full employ
ment and inflation, and the guideposts were not found to be equally
applicable in both situations.

Sixth, the Council encountered

technical problems relating to the measurement of productivity and
encountered severe criticism for "changing the rules" in the middle
of the game.

Seventh, failure to secure guideline settlements in

all cases in which guideline pressure was applied and the vagueness
of the exceptions led to charges of unfairness.

Eighth the Council

encountered constitutional law problems— their lack of explicit
legal sanction and their violation of the separation of powers con
cept in their roles of formulator and principal administrator of
the guidepost policy.

Finally, the CEA also found that it did not

have enough time to devote to all the guidepost cases which were
arising.

CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary purpose of this dissertation was to examine the effect
of the guideposts on the collective bargaining process.

This study asks

what changes, if any, the guideposts have produced in collective bargain
ing.

Do they signal the end of collective bargaining?

Or will they

merely help to produce bargaining ■esults more compatible with the public
interest?
This study was divided into two major parts.

The first part, con

sisting of chapters 2 and 3, was devoted to establishing a basis for
measuring change through an examination of pre-guidepost collective
bargaining.
posts.

The second part was devoted to an examination of the guide-

It consisted of an examination of the dialogue among policy

makers which led to the guideposts (chapter 4), the intent of the guideposts (chapter 5), and application of the guideposts (chapter 6).
major purpose of this chapter is to put

The

together the findings of these

two parts and use these findings to develop conclusions and recommenda
tions.

The Development of Collective Bargaining and the Guideposts
Collective bargaining is the name given to the process of bilateral
determination of the rules governing the employer-employee relationship.
It is only one of several ways in which these rules can be established.
Other ways are by unilateral decisions by management or unions, or by

government fiat.

The historical survey of the development of collec

tive bargaining contained in chapter 2 demonstrates that each of these
alternatives has been tried in the past and rejected, the first two
because of the violence associated with their use and the third because
of its incompatibility with the value of economic freedom and self-de
termination.

Pre-guidepost collective bargaining was, in effect, a com

promise and a combination among these three alternatives.

In this

earlier collective bargaining, the market set the economic costs of the
parties' actions, and the government prescribed the legal restraints in
the form of the rules of the game.

Within the boundaries imposed by the

legal and economic constraints, the representatives of labor and manage
ment were free to negotiate rules governing the work environment.

The

parties were not required to reach an agreement, but any agreement
reached was presumed to be in the best interests of the parties and the
public.
Pre-guidepost collective bargaining did not arrive at this mature
state in a short period of time, however.
tinct periods:

It evolved through three dis

the early or hostile period, the favorable period

between the two world wars, and the contemporary period since World
War II.

In each of these periods, collective bargaining was influenced

and shaped by three forces:

the prevailing value system of society as

expressed in its laws and court decisions, economic conditions and
forces of the market and industry, and the philosophy of the parties
toward collective bargaining.

John T. Dunlop, "The Social Utility of Collective Bargaining,"1
Challenges to Collective Bargaining, ed. Lloyd Ulman, (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 168-80.
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In the early period, all three forces were hostile to the develop
ment of collective bargaining.

The dominant social values of Individ

ualism, self-help, and lalssez falre created an Intellectual environ
ment In which concerted economic action was considered contradictory.
The courts, In their role as chief formulator of public policy toward
unions and collective bargaining, translated these values into decisions
which were decidedly anti-union and anti-collective bargaining.

The

courts seemed preoccupied with freedom of contract and property rights;
they apparently did not regard freedom of contract in an individual
labor contract or human rights as questions calling for court decisions.
Fluctuating economic conditions throughout this early period also
retarded the development of collective bargaining.

Trade unions flour

ished and floundered with the phases of the business cycle; they made
gains in good times and lost them when business conditions changed for
the worse.

This fluctuating membership made it virtually impossible to

develop the permanent trade union organizations required by collective
bargaining.

The philosophy of the parties toward the determination of

the rules of the work place was also hostile to the development of col
lective bargaining in the early period.

Unions tried to impose their

demands unilaterally whenever they felt strong enough.

And management

resisted these efforts— sometimes subtly, sometimes openly, often with
force.
By the interwar period, two of these forces had changed:

perma

nent union organizations with a bargaining philosophy had emerged and
public policy toward collective bargaining had changed direction.

By

the end of the first World War, trade unions had learned how to develop
permanent organizations which would withstand both economic
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fluctuations and employer opposition.

Past failures had taught the

unions to build their financial strength, to pursue economic goals
through collective bargaining, and to avoid entanglements in a sepa
rate labor party, while working to secure favorable legislation
through established political parties.

The formulation and direction

of labor policy also shifted in this period— from the courts to Con
gress, and from hostility to the promotion of collective bargaining,
which was now seen as the most acceptable social instrument for re
solving union-management problems.

Public policy was channeled toward

providing workers with bargaining power more nearly equal to that of
their employer, substituting reason for force, and promoting labor
peace.
Several basic changes in public policy were necessary in order to
promote the development of collective bargaining.
basic union rights had to be legally guaranteed:

First, a number of
the right to orga

nize, to bargain collectively, to be free of employer interference or
domination, to exclusive representation, and to mutual interdependence.
The guarantee of these union rights was, in effect, a recognition that
effective collective bargaining requires effective trade union organi
zations, and that collective bargaining is the core function of American trade unions and the fundamental reason for their existence.

2

Therefore, anything that adversely affects trade unions will adversely
affect collective bargaining, and vice versa.

Second, the encourage

ment of collective bargaining made it necessary to establish those
things to be required of the parties to the bargain.
2
Jack Barbash, The Practice of Unionism (New York:
thers, Pub., 1956), p. 406.

Management would

Harper & Bro
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have to recognize and bargain with the certified bargaining representa
tive of their workers.

Both the union and management were required to

bargain in good faith and refrain from unfair labor practices.

Third,

an orderly election procedure had to be substituted for organizational
strikes, and finally, an agency to administer the new legislation had to
be created.
Despite the shift in public policy away from hostility and toward
the promotion of collective bargaining, the value system remained bas
ically laissez faire.

The legislation adopted to promote collective

bargaining was all of the rules-cf-the-game type, designed to get the
parties to the bargaining table peacefully, where good-faith bargaining
was required.

Government was to play an active role in providing and

enforcing the rules, a passive role in contract negotiation and enforce
ment, and a hands-off role toward the content of the agreement.
role concept was defended on several grounds:

This

the desire for the

economic freedom of the parties, the belief that those who had to live
with an agreement would best be able to set its terms, and the belief
that competition between opposing interests would provide results com
patible with the public interest.
3
In the post-World War II period, or age of affluence,

there is

increasing evidence that public policy, economic conditions, the value
system of society, and the philosophy of the parties toward collective
bargaining have again changed— this time in the direction of adding
other constraints to unions and requiring additional obligations from
collective bargaining.

William Miernyk argues, for example, that the

3
York:

William H. Miernyk, Trade Unions in the Age of Affluence (New
Random House, 1965).

new economic environment of affluence has produced conditions which
have again placed unions in a defensive posture.
factors to support his contention:

He lists several

the relative decline in trade union

growth, the decline in the dynamism of unions, the decline in the poli
tical influence of unions, growing public and worker resistance toward
unionism, the growing conservatism among the American people and a
growing inability of old-line labor leaders to cope intellectually with
the new environment created by affluence.

4

John Dunlop reaches the

same general conclusion as to the additional constraints and obliga
tions toward collective bargaining in the contemporary period, but he
points to another set of factors:

new standards of democratic proce

dures for unions, a growing public intolerance toward the inconvenience
of strikes, new standards of efficiency with regard to featherbedding,
and the guidepost standards for wage negotiations.

5

The intent of this dissertatioaowas to examine the impact of one of
these changes— the guideposts— on collective bargaining.

The second

part of this study was devoted to an examination of the guideposts:
the need for the guideposts as perceived by the policy makers, the
development of the guidepost concept, and the methods used to apply the
concept.
The 1955-59 inflation raised doubts about the compatibility of
economic goals and the efficiency of existing economic policies and
stimulated an extensive dialogue among policymakers on the nature,
causes, and possible cures of the new inflation.

^Ibid.
5
John T. Dunlop, _o£. cit.

Several key points

of consensus emerged from this dialogue.

First, this was a different

kind of inflation, since it had occurred in a period of unemployment
and excess capacity.

Second, substantial inflationary pressures were

generated in those sectors of the economy where companies and unions
possessed market power.

Unions pressed for wage increases in excess

of nation-wide productivity and for multi-year agreements.

Management

granted high wage increases and passed the higher costs on to the
public in the for® of higher prices.
the target for other wage bargains.

Key wage settlements then became
The ful1-employment goal helped

to create a permissive environment in which these actions were possible
without a substantial increase in unemployment or a substantial decline
in sales.

Yet suggestions to abandon the goals of full employment or

price stability were rejected as too costly.

Finally, the policy

makers also agreed that monetary and fiscal policy were ineffective
against the new inflation, and that new policy measures had to be
devised, but they did not reach a consensus on the form of this new
policy.

The four most frequently discussed alternatives were:

increased competition, increased productivity, an annual labor-management-government educational conference on wage-price matters, and the
development of an informed public to serve as a court-of-last-resort
on wage-price matters.
Economic conditions (and the activist philosophy of the Kennedy
Administration) thrust the wage-price problem on the President's Coun
cil of Economic Advisers.

The Council discussed the need for improving

competition, productivity, and education on wage-price matters before
recommending the guideposts.
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The gmideposts were an implicit admission that the largely un
hampered pursuit of private interests in collective bargaining could
lead to results which were adverse to the public Interest.

In propos

ing the guideposts, the Council was recognizing that certain sectors
of the economy had became insulated from market forces, and that in
these sectors wages and prices were determined primarily by administra
tive decisions.

Market forces provided only a weak veto power over

such decisions.

Administrative wage decisions in a few major collec

tive bargaining negotiations spread via intra-industry and inter-indus
try pattern bargaining, causing costs and prices to increase in other
industrial sectors.

The traditional anti-inflationary policies called

for a marshalling of market forces, either through monetary or fiscal
actions, were designed for demand inflation and were either ineffec
tive against th<p mew inflation or could be made effective only be sac
rificing other economic goals.

After considering several alternatives,

the Council chose the guideposts as the most effective and equitable
short-run policy for cost-push inflation.
As originally conceived, the guideposts were to provide a broad
standard for non-inflationary wage and price behavior based on an
unstated trend rate of nation-wide productivity.

The Council made it

clear that the guideposts were not intended as rules for governing
individual wage and price decisions, but as a contribution to the
discussion of wages, prices, and the public interest.

They stated:

Am informed public, aware of the signifi
cance of major wage bargains and price deci
sions, and equipped to judge for itself their
compatibility with the national interest, can
help to create an atmosphere in which the par
ties to such decisions will exercise their
powers respons ibly.^
^1962 CEA Report, p. 185.
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Simfosespsnt events showed that the use of informed public opinion
as trifop jjundge for the acceptability of key wage bargains and key price
decisions was highly naive for three reasons.

First, it assumed a

flnflgTfoprr degree of knowledge on wage-price matters and on collective
bargaining than the public possessed or could reasonably be expected
to possess.

Second, it soon became apparent that detailed information

afamuatt tdffi economic conditions of specific industries was seriously
lacking— even the Council of Economic Advisers decreed their lack of
specific information for specific industries.

Third, referring all

major collective bargaining situa tions to the court-of-last-resort
violates a basic principle of administration, that only the exceptional
decisions shouLd be made by the highest decision-making body.

Conse-

apueniittly* ttlfo* Kennedy-Johnson Administration adopted an administrative
tteclfamiqpe different from the one originally intended.

This new tech-

ciapie consisted of early identification of all forthcoming major bar
gains wfinich could establish a pattern, followed by a campaign of per
suasion and education by the Administration.

These campaigns, while

varying in intensity and in form depending on the situation, were all
designed tr® show the self-defeating nature of a wage settlement which
woold Head to a wage-price spiral, to explain the intent of the
guidelines* and the necessity of keeping wage increases within the
guidepost Limits in key situations.

If the broad education campaign

failed* trine Government could then commission a fact-finding study of
wages* prices, and costs in the specific situation which threatened
t© exceed the guideposts.

This fact-finding study could be used to

intensity persuasive efforts— except that now discussions would have
moved ffrann the general to the specific.

If this second attempt at
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persuasion failed, the Government could make the facts available to
the public in a final attempt to evoke the response of informed public
opinion.
The Council made it clear that the guideposts were not intended
as replacements for collective bargaining.

As originally conceived,

the guideposts were voluntary general guides intended only to contri
bute to the discussion of wage-price matters and to provide direction
to the parties in their wage-price decisions.
cational and advisory.
tion as before.

That is, they were edu

Collective bargaining would continue to func

The guidelines would be used only to make the parties

aware of the consequences of inflationary wage decisions.

Even when

the guidepost concept became more rigid, i.e., more like specific
rules, the Council continued to argue that the concept did not threaten
collective bargaining because the guideposts defined only the upper
limit for the wage bargain.
this ceiling.

Bargaining could still take place under

Furthermore, the Council argued, the guidepost threat

to collective bargaining was overstated since wages and fringe bene
fits were only two of the many items discussed in negotiations.

The Impact of the Guideposts on Collective Bargaining
The guidepost statements in themselves can hardly be considered a
threat to collective bargaining because they are nothing more than a
piece of information.

The guideposts inform the parties and the public

that persistent wage increases exceeding increases in productivity will
be self-defeating because they will lead to inflation.

The guideposts

state that the average annual increase in total wages in the economy
cannot exceed the average annual increase in nation-wide productivity
without generating inflationary pressures.

Therefore, in the long run,
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wage settlements which exceed the productivity guideposts can only be
self-defeating.

On the other hand, the guidepost statements may be

helpful to collective bargaining by giving specific meaning to the
public's interest in non-inflationary wage settlements, and by estab
lishing which conditions would be necessary for a wage settlement to
be non-inflationary.
Guidepost policy, however, goes beyond a simple statement of fact;
it is a government commitment made by the Chief Executive to use the
guidepost information and the persuasive powers of his office to pro
duce non-inflationary wage and p 4ce decisions.

As previously noted,

it was originally intended that public opinion be used as the chief
enforcer of this policy, but experience in the administration of the
guideposts showed how difficult it was to attain public awareness of
the facts for all the major wage bargains each year.

Consequently, the

Executive Branch began to operate as a preliminary enforcer.

It

identified key bargains early, then applied intensive persuasive pres
sure to secure non-inflationary settlements.

Often the intensity of

the persuasive pressure being applied could be judged by the rank of
the Cabinet or advisory person applying the pressure, with persuasive
pressure by the President applied only in extreme cases.

News releases,

speeches, and private discussions and conferences were the most fre
quently used persuasive tactics.

If these attempts failed, then the

case was referred to the public.

Persuasive pressure from the Execu

tive Branch continued at the same time the public was being prepared
for the morality and necessity for more severe action.
This method of administration of the guidepost policy had several
advantages over merely stating the guideposts and leaving it up to the
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parties and the public.

It reduced the number of cases referred to the

general public by identifying potential inflationary agreements early
and using persuasion to try to shape the decision before it was made.
It also defined the public interest carefully in each individual wage
bargain referred to the public.

However, the nagging administrative

question left unanswered was what the public could and should do to
wage guidepost violators.

The government could and did use its status

as a major purchaser to bring economic pressure to bear on price viola
tors.

However, no comparably concentrated weapon was available to the

public for directly affecting labor unions or inflationary wage agree
ments .
The guidepost policy, as distinguished from the guidepost state
ments, had a different intent and a different effect on collective
bargaining.

Guidepost policy either produced, or was intended to

produce, six major changes in collective bargaining:

changes in the

definition of the public interest in collective bargaining; a nar
rower range for decision making; harder bargaining over wages and
fringe benefits; public review of the results of selected agreements;
a challenge to the legitimacy of trade unions; and a better under
standing of wage-price matters.

The total effect of the guideposts

on collective bargaining can be seen from a more detailed examination
of each change.
Enlarging the Definition of the Public Interest in Collective
Bargaining
For at least twenty-four years prior to the guideposts, govern
ment action in collective bargaining was aimed at preventing or mini
mizing strikes.

Several means were used to accomplish this goal.

First, a substitute for organizational and representational strikes
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was provided.

Nothing in the common law required the employer to

recognize or bargain with a union.

Strikes were the principal means

used by the union to gain recognition and to force the employer to
negotiate with the union.

Employers normally resisted these efforts

on the grounds that they could not be sure that the union represented
the majority of their employees, and that even if it did, there was
no requirement that they must bargain with a union.
Collective bargaining law substituted an election-certification
procedure for forceful attempts to gain recognition.

It provided that

when a legitimate question of representation arises, the union must
first prove to the National Labor Relations Board that a substantial
number of workers in the bargaining unit want to have a union.

Once

the NLRB is satisfied of this, it holds a representation election.
The labor organization receiving the majority of votes cast in the
election is certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for that bar
gaining unit.

The employer must recognize and bargain with that

labor organization.
The law did not require that the parties reach an agreement, only
that they must bargain with each other "in good faith."

Good-faith

bargaining generally means meeting at a reasonable time and place and
giving reasons for the positions taken.

If an agreement was reached,

the law provided means whereby agreements could be enforced.

This

election-representation procedure eliminated the need for recognition
strikes.
Second, contemporary collective bargaining law attempted to pre
vent either party from interfering with the legitimate rights of the
other.

This was done by defining carefully each party's rights in

collective bargaining, by making a violation of the other party's
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rights an unfair labor practice, and by prescribing methods for seeking
redress from unfair labor practices.

Consequently, strikes and lock

outs were no longer necessary to insure that either party’s rights were
not violated.
Third, government agencies were established to administer the
statutory law of collective bargaining.

These agencies were given the

power to conduct hearings and investigations, to order and conduct rep
resentation elections, to certify or de-certify bargaining agents, to
issue cease-and-desist orders, to establish rules and procedures, and
to petition the courts for the enforcement of its awards or orders.
The right to appeal was fully guaranteed and an appeal procedure was
established.

This administrative machinery provided a substitute for

forceful tactics by reducing the number of occasions in which it was
necessary to use force.

Contemporary collective bargaining law plus

grievance procedures established by the parties eliminated the need
for all but one kind of strike— the bargaining strike, to secure more
favorable terms during contract negotiations.
For the most part, contemporary collective bargaining law dealt
with the rights and duties of labor and management and the remedies
available to each for encroachment on their rights.

It was designed

to get the parties to the bargaining table peacefully, to require the
parties to bargain in good faith over legal subjects, and to enforce
legal agreements.

It was assumed that once at the bargaining table,

the parties would be motivated by self-interest and would be likely to
have different and even opposing interest on matters subject to nego
tiations.

Yet, it was felt that mutual dependency would produce bar

gains which generally would be in the public as well as the private
interests.

2IQ'

Nevertheless, the law recognized that it was possible ff©r the
parties to engage in practices which could be inimical it© the general
welfare.

Thus a small portion of labor law was devoted t© pr©tectfmg

the public from such practices.

Protecting the public welfare inn col

lective bargaining required identification of those practices BnamrftiL
to the public interest, provision for protection against vi®lati©ms of
these rights and remedies in case of violations.

Before the gmidlepests

the major practices deemed inimical to the general welfare were closed
shops and national emergency strikes.
bargaining subject.

The first was made am illegal

And a national emergency dispute pr©visi®m was

devised to deal with the latter.

The precedent for government inter

ference in collective bargaining negotiations in the public interest
was established by these provisions.
Prior to the guideposts, the public interest in collective bar
gaining could be defined as promoting labor peace and preventing
those few practices which were inimical to the general welfare-

The

guideposts enlarged the concept of the public interest in c©llective
bargaining to include non-inflationary wage settlements.
Narrowing the Range for Decision Making
The guidepost policy established a new, upper boundary ff©r wage
decisions by insisting that the increase in the total cost ©f all wagebenefit packages be less than the average increase in natimm-wide pro
ductivity.

Only by keeping wage changes within these limits, it was

argued, was it possible to prevent the continuation of the wage-price
spiral and the new inflation.
Before the guideposts, the range for decision making in c®llective
bargaining was determined by the economic forces of the market.

If
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either unions or management secured wage or price increases above what
the market warranted, then the market would automatically generate a
disciplinary force in the form of unemployment or declining sales.
But the serious commitment to the twin goals of full employment and
stable prices, complicated by the balance-of-payments probLe
vented market discipline from working.

pre

The guideposts were essentially

an attempt to establish boundaries to wage and price decisions through
public policies, similar to those which would be established by a
competitive market.
Harder Bargaining Over Wages and rringe Benefits

The primary intent of the guideposts was to produce wage and price
decisions closer to those which would be produced by a competitive mar
ket.

This was to be accomplished by reducing the size of the price

increase which management could secure and could Justify to the public.
This meant that certain price increases would he subject to close
scrutiny by an Administration which could and would use moral suasion,
consultation, fact-finding, public review, and the purchasing and
stockpiling power of the government to secure non-inflationary price
increases.

The expectation was that keeping the lid urn prices in key

industries would produce harder bargaining over wages anud fringe bene
fits as management sought to maintain profit margins.
Public Review of Selected Collective Bargaining Agreements
Prior to the guideposts, negotiations took place behind closed
doors which were only grudgingly opened for the admission of mediators
or for the release of news.

Collective bargaining is essentially a

conflict-resolution relationship which often produces hotth heightened
feelings and compromises, which, if generally knoap, might adversely
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affect the effectiveness of one of the parties.

Consequently the par

ties to collective bargaining have generally regarded contract negoti
ations as a private affair.

While copies of agreements were filed with

the Department of Labor, general public awareness of terms of agree
ments was noticeably lacking.

Terms of an agreement could be chal

lenged in the courts but these challenges had to be initiated by an
aggrieved party who had exhausted all internal remedies.

The guide-

posts clearly altered this pattern by allowing the wage-benefit pack
age of key agreements to be subjected to public review, if the Council
of Economic Advisers or the Department of Labor felt that a certain
agreement might contribute to inflation.

This tactic was felt to be

one way to insure that these packages in key settlements stayed within
the guidepost boundaries.

Fears produced by this change have less to

do with a threat to the continued existence of effective collective
bargaining than with a threat to the relative privacy of the terms of
an agreement.
Before the guideposts, it was relatively easy for the parties to
argue thatanagreement was non-inflationary, since only the parties
knew the cost of the wage-benefit package.

If the guideposts are to

be used to avoid cost inflation, then public review of the cost of the
package in key industries would seem to be necessary to insure that
these settlements stay within the guideposts.
A Challenge to the Legitimacy of Trade Unions
One result of the guideposts which was probably totally uninten
tional, was to produce a challenge to the legitimacy of trade unions.
American trade unions are essentially "bread and butter" unions, i.e.,
they are primarily concerned with improving the wages, hours, and

working conditions in return for the union dues paid in by the member
ship.

While they are not unconcerned with the public interest, they

are primarily concerned with their private interests.

As previously

noted, collective bargaining is tthe core function of American Unions
and the fundamental reason for their existence.

In collective bargain

ing, the wage-benefit package is not only income for the members, but
also the primary way in which the nnion demonstrates its value and
justifies its existence to its members.

The wage-benefit package is

a direct and highly visible measurement of the union's ability to
deliver the goods.

Mechanical v ;,ge formulas deprive the union of the

opportunity to demonstrate its value to its members.

This is especially

true for mechanical wage formulas which have been established without
the participation of the union.

Thus, the guideposts run counter to

the trade union's reason for being.

And by thus threatening the

security of the union the guidelines have the secondary effect of
threatening the security of the institution of collective bargaining,
for effective collective bargaining needs an effective and strong
trade union movement.
The more rigid the application of the guideposts, the narrower the
framework for decision-making, and the greater the threat to union
legitimacy.

If the guideposts were shaped into crisp rules based on a

set productivity figure and if they were used to censure all violators,
then they would become a greater potential threat to the craft union,
where the wage-benefit package may he the sole subject for negotiations.
It is unlikely that this potential threat would become an actual threat
however, for the following reasons:

some bargaining would still be

necessary; exceptions to the rules would be possible; and the highly
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decentralized nature of crafr union bargaining would make enforcement
of a rigid guidepost rule extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Enforcement in the industrial union case would be made easier by the
greater centralization of negotiations, but even here, enforcement
would be extremely difficult.

Not all the direct costs of a given

settlement can be computed easily and accurately and it is virtually
impossible to calculate secondary costs before they occur, e.g., the
increase in the wages and benefits of the non-production workers
which results from the increase in the production worker's wages and
benefits.

i_

A Better Understanding of Wage-Price Matters
The guideposts probably have contributed to a better understanding
of wage-price matters by management, labor and the public.

In evalua

ting the educational contribution of the guideposts, Kermit Gordon, of
the original Kennedy Council says:
Whatever may be one's view of r.he merits of the
guideposts, 1 believe it must be conceded that they
have had a salutary educational effect. The debate
over the value of the guideposts has served as a cram
course in wage-price economics. Public statements by
labor and business leaders, and reporting and discus
sion in the press, reveal today a markedly higher
level of sophistication concerning the economic rela
tionships among wages, prices, productivity, and
incomes. If public opinion is to influence decision
making in the public interest, it must be formed on
the basis of clear understanding. We have made
notable progress in that direction....^
Walter Heller, Chairman of the Kennedy Council also believes that
the guideposts have significantly advanced the rationality of the wage-

Kermit Gordon, "Price-Cost Behavior and Employment Act Objectives"
in Twentieth Anniversary of the Employment Act of 1946: An Economic
Symposium, hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, Eighty-ninth
Congress, 2nd session (February 23, 1966), pp. 64-65. Hereinafter
referred to as JEC Twentieth Anniversary Symposium.
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price dialogue.

On the management side, he feels that the guideposts

have contributed to a better understanding in two areas.

First, man

agement frequently held that any increase in wage rates was inflation
ary.

Because of the guideposts, management has come to realize that

rising wage rates are not necessarily synonymous with rising per unit
costs.

This dialogue has caused management to realize that rising wage

rates may also be consistent with either stable or falling unit-labor
costs, depending on whether productivity is equal to or greater than
the wage increases.

Second, Heller states that before the guideposts,

management frequently argued that if wage rates increased at the same
rate as economy-wide productivity, labor would reap all the benefits
of productivity increases.
this argument.

Furthermore, the public often agreed with

The guideline dialogue helped each to realize that

both labor and property incomes would rise at the same rate if the
g

guideposts were observed.
Heller also feels that the guideposts have also improved labor's
understanding of the interrelations among wages, prices, profits and
productivity.

Labor, he argues, has come to realize that wages are

costs as well as income; that industry-wide productivity is an inap
propriate standard for wage increases; that economy-wide productivity
results from increasing technology, capital improvements, inter-indus
try shifts, and better management in addition to higher skill and
greater effort by workers; and that real, not money, wage increases
are important for advances in average take home pay.

9

g

Mass.:

Walter W. Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy (Cambridge,
Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 43, 45.

9

Ibid.

216
While the guideposts may well have served as a cram course in wageprice macro-economics, there are reasons for doubting the validity or
usefulness of economy-wide productivity as the single most important
criteria for micro-economic wage bargaining.

For while real wages and

ecoeany-wide productivity appear to be closely related over the longrun, they diverge sharply in the short-run.

One reason for this

divergence is that changes in employment and capacity utilization and
changes im the price level can have significant, effects on short-run
productivity.

Also productivity and wages tend to follow dissimilar

patterns over the business cycie--product.ivity leading and wage rates
lagging.11®1 Thus while long-run productivity trends can be measured
and predicted fairly accurately, short-term productivity behavior is
volatile and difficult to predict,

Furthermore, wages and productivity

do not seem to be related on an industry-by-Industry basis.'1''1' Conse
quently, the wage and price guideposts are not expressed in criteria
that are meaningful to private decision makers who have to make wage
decisions im the short-run.

The diffuse structure of pricing and col

lective bargaining make the guidepost standards appear remote and un
realistic.

They not only have no simple application to specific wage

and price decisions, they do not appear relevant, or decisive for
decision making.^
The guidepost policy was clearly intended to produce four basic
changes in collective bargaining.

First, it was to broaden the public

10
Joseph H. Taggert and Clifford D. Clark, Wage Theory. Wage Rates
and Productivity. A Business Research Study of the Graduate School of
Business Administration, New York University (monograph).
ton:

■^Jobn Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States (Prince
Princeton University Press, 1961).

12
John T. Dunlop, "Guideposts, Wages, and Collective Bargaining"
in Schultz and Aliber, op. cit. p. 86.
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interest in collective bargaining to include non-inflationary settle
ments in key bargaining situations.

Second, it aimed at narrowing the

range for decision making on wage-benefit matters by the establishment
off a socially desirable maximum.

Third, it was to produce harder bar

gaining (and, consequently, an end to the cost-price spiral) on wagebenefit matters by making it more difficult for employers to plead a
moral case for a price increase each time wages were increased.

Fourth,

it hoped to contribute to the dialogue on wages, prices, and productiv
ity, thereby lead to a greater understanding of the relationship among
these variables by management, l^bor, and the public.

These changes

posed no serious threat to the collective bargaining process; they were
intended to establish new standards, make the discipline of informed
public opinion more effective, and contribute to a better understanding
off wages and prices.

However, as the goals of the guideposts changed

from education to single-figure limits and as the government assumed a
more active role in administering the guidepost rules, the guidepost
policy produced other results that did pose a threat to collective bar
gaining by threatening the legitimacy of one institution that must be
present before collective bargaining can be effective— the trade union.
Guidepost administrators did not give sufficient weight to two factors;
the union's use of the wage-benefit package to justify their existence
to the membership and the need to protect the privacy of the union nego
tiators in order to protect the integrity of the union as an institution.
Establishing rigid upper limits for the wage-benefit package and sub
jecting the terms of selected agreements to public review had the com
bined effect of threatening the legitimacy and the continued existence
off trade unions.

However, the voluneof decisions to be made, the
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remoteness and irrelevancy of the guideposts for those concerned with
specific wage and price decisions, the decentralization of collective
bargaining and the difficulty of arriving at exact cost estimates of
a given wage-benefit package combined to keep these factors from
becoming great threats to the continued existence of collective bar
gaining.

And, as the administration of guidepost policy shifts away

from rigid rules and toward flexible guides, as it is apparently doing
now, the threatening posture of these factors should be virtually
eliminated.

Recommendations
The guidepost policy is essentially a disciplinary policy
designed to supplement the imperfect discipline of a market which has
become insulated from economic forces.

The justification for the

guidepost policy may be summarized as follows:
The case for the guidepost policy rests...
on the proposition that any alternative strategy
for dealing with the grand dilemma would be more
objectionable— that there is no better way to seek
to resolve the apparent conflict among full employ
ment, price stability, and the preservation of free
economic institutions. The alternatives are (1) to
pursue a full employment policy and accept such in
flationary consequences as may ensue; (2) to main
tain enough slack and unemployment in the economy
to stabilize the price level; (3) to pursue a full
employment policy and institute mandatory wage and
price controls; and (4) to strip decision-makers
of market power by breaking up concentrations both
in business and labor.
With all of its warts and blemishes, the guidepost policy— or something very much like it— seems
preferable to any of these alternatives.13
As presently constituted, the guideposts suffer from several
defects as a disciplinary device.

First, they are not automatically

Kermit Gordon, j0£. cit.

rJ
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initiated by impersonal forces, as the discipline of a perfect market
would be, but are initiated by government action.

Furthermore, guide-

post discipline is a selective rather than a general disciplinary
action directed against a few major bargains.
is apt to bring cries of favoritism.

Thus, guidepost action

Second, because of the technical

problems of measuring productivity, the guideposts are subject to dif
ferent interpretations— by unions, management, the government, and the
public— and there is no scientific answer as to which interpretation
is best.

Third, the administration of the guidelines has not been

consistent.

Statements for voluntary guides began to be applied as

rules, and then as guides again.

Furthermore, the government has

invoked direct economic sanctions against management in several cases
but not against unions.

Fourth, there has been little participation

of the parties in the annual formulations of the guideposts and no
clearly established appeal procedure.

Finally, the guideposts are

not expressed in criteria thataremeaningful, relevant, controlling or
decisive to private decision makers.
The following recommendations are suggested as ways in which the
effectiveness of the guidepost policy can be improved while preserving
free collective bargaining.

Throughout these recommendations, the

rules of good discipline have been followed:

forewarning, immediacy,

impartiality, consistency, punishment fitting the severity of the
offense, and establishment of an appeal procedure.
First, the uncertainty surrounding the guidepost policy should be
eliminated.

The Administration should make it clear that collective

bargaining is a desirable institution in our mixed capitalistic system
which should be preserved, and that the public interest demands non-

220
inflationary wage settlements.

It should further indicate that mone

tary and fiscal policy is ineffective against cost inflation, that the
guideposts policy is preferable to all alternatives, and that the
guidepost policy will be continued.

By firmly asserting these posi

tions, the government would make it clear that neither collective bar
gaining nor the guideposts were being abandoned but were to be
strengthened.

Another step toward removing uncertainty would be

removing the doubtful legality of the guideposts.

This could be done

by amending the National Labor Relations Act's definition of the
public interest and by formulating an administrative procedure for
the guideposts.
Second, the efficiency of the guidepost policy can be improved
by increasing market discipline.

This can be done by promoting more

competition in both product and labor markets, by encouraging foreign
competition, and by improving the opportunities for upward mobility.
Liberalizing tariffs and reducing import restrictions on foreign
goods would reduce the amount of insulation from foreign competition
which many industries currently enjoy.

The steady progress that has

recently been made in this area should continue.
Third, administration of the guideline policy should be taken out
of the hands of the Council of Economic Advisers and placed in the
hands of a specially created Wage-Price-Productivity Agency (WPPA).
This agency should be staffed by economists who have demonstrated an
interest and ability in wage-price-productivity studies, and it
should be attached administratively to the Executive Office.
recommendation is made for the following reasons:
was originally created as an advisory agency.

This

(1) The Council

Continued involvement
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in the administration of the guideposts could severely damage their
objectivity and prestige.

(2) The Council, by its own admission, does

not have the time or resources necessary to conduct the specialized
studies of industry conditions which is necessary for the evaluation
of individual cases.

A specialized agency, staffed by experts in the

wage-price-productivity area, could conduct studies, compile background
information and assume the responsibility for the administration of the
guideposts.

(3) Separation of the duties of policy formulation and

administration is more in line with the governmental concepts of
separation of powers and checks and balances.
The WPPA would function primarily as a statistical and economic
information service on wages, prices, productivity, and profits— both
economy-wide and by major industries.

In addition to its special

studies, the WPPA should be required to publish a year in advance a
list of all forthcoming collective bargaining situations which could,
because of their pattern setting potential, become inflation producers.
Publication of this list would serve to notify the parties that the
guidepost policy would be in effect in those cases, thus warning the
parties in advance.

Studies of wages, prices, and productivity for

the major industries on this notification list should be initiated
when the list is published.

After these first studies are made, they

would merely have to be brought up to date each year for the most part,
as many of the same industries will be on the list periodically.

The

WPPA should also be required to announce an acceptable wage and price
guidepost figure for the total settlement package a year in advance
based on a forecast of productivity trends.

Ideally, these figures

would not be a general pronouncement for the entire economy, but would
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be developed for each major bargaining situation and would be arrived
at after detailed study and analysis by the WPPA and after consultation
with the Council of Economic Advisers and the President's Labor-Management Advisory Committee.

One persistent objection to the guideposts by

both labor and management was that the guideposts were formulated and
administered by a government agency without consultation with the par
ties.

Involving the Labor-Management Advisory Committee or industry

wide committees to improve the collective bargaining process in the
formulation of the guidepost figure should help to eliminate grounds for
this charge.
When the parties serve notice to the National Labor Relations Board
of their intent to negotiate new wage-benefit terms, each party should
be contacted by a WPPA representative who should explain the guideline
figure for their industry for the year, and explain why their collective
bargaining situation

is so critical.

At this time, the parties should

be given the right to make a case for the further uniqueness of their
particular bargaining situation along with the reasons why their nego
tiations should be considered as exemptions to their guidepost figure.
In those cases where this is done, a special analysis of the economic
conditions of the firm should be initiated.

The results of this study

along with the agencies' recommendations should be made available to
the parties but not to the public at this time.
After this informational process, the parties should be free to
negotiate a settlement.

After the settlement has been reached, but

before the details of the agreement are made public, the parties should
be required to furnish the WPPA with a summary of the settlement terms
and a joint estimate of their costs.

This step serves two purposes.
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First, it allows the Agency to exercise some amount of veto power:

they

would automatically approve release of information on agreements where
the wage-benefit package falls within the guidepost boundaries but hold
this information and make new efforts at persuasion in those cases where
the wage-benefit package exceeds the guideposts.

Second, this step re

quires the parties to agree on a joint estimation of the cost of the
wage-benefit package.

One of the difficulties in administering the

guidelines in the past was arriving at a cost of a package made up of
direct wage increases plus deferred wage increases, and liberalized
holiday, vacation, insurance, retirement, and pension plans.
If the cost of the agreement package exceeds the guidepost limits
and if the WPPA's final effort at persuasion fails, then the WPPA
should release the information on the parties' estimate of the cost of
the agreement along with their estimate on the cost of the agreement
and the economic conditions of the industry.

With this information, the

public would be better able to make informed decisions on wage-price
matters.
Finally, a major, concerted effort must be made to strengthen the
process of collective bargaining for two major reasons.
imparts numerous values to society:

First, it

labor peace, industrial democracy,

building support for the capitalistic system, and democratization of
the business system.

Second, collective bargaining appears to be

clearly superior to the alternative methods for the determination of
the rules of the work environment— unilateral management or union action
or government fiat.

Collective bargaining apparently is in danger of

being destroyed from within by the callousness of the parties toward
the public interest, and from without by an impatient public who expects

224
too much from collective bargaining.

Thus, a major educational effort

is in order to inform the parties of the changing public interest in
collective bargaining, to explore ways of making collective bargaining
more compatible with the public interest, and to increase the public
understanding of what collective bargaining can reasonably be expected
to do.
This educational effort should be carried out on several fronts
and in several different ways.

What follows is merely intended to be a

suggestion as to direction and methods.

First, the President's labor

Management Advisory Committee should be continued, but its membership
should be enlarged to include more members of the public.

It should

schedule regular annual meetings, at least one session of which should
be devoted to discussing ways of improving collective bargaining.
Second, labor-management committees for the improvement of collective
bargaining should be formed in the major industries.

The purpose of

such committees would not be to bargain, but to identify industry
bargaining problems before they become crises and to recommend
approaches.

Third, a series of public information conferences should

be developed, aimed at explaining the nature of collective bargaining
and the alternatives to collective bargaining to teachers, members of
the press, and the general public.

Fourth, the Joint Economic Committee

should commission a major study, both generalized and industry-hy-indus
try, o n the current condition of collective bargaining in this country
and on what the public expects from it.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Chronology of Federal Wage-Price Policy, 1945-1962^

1945
On September 6, 1945, President Truman, in a lengthy message on
postwar economic policy, asked the reconvened 79th Congress for certain
powers and price controls to combat the threatened post-war inflation.
Specifically, President Truman asked for an 18 month extension of the
Emergency Price Control Act of. 1942,

due to expire June 30, 1945.

Congressional debate on a bill providing for a one-year extension
centered on criticisms of the Office of Price Administration and efforts
of farm-block members to force an increase in price ceilings on farm
products.

S J Res 30 extended the price control and stabilization

acts as amended to June 30, 1946 (P L 79-108).

1946
In a combined State of the Union and Budget Message submitted
January 21, 1946, President Truman identified inflation as the great
est immediate domestic problem of the United States.

In fact, he felt

that unless controls expiring June 30 were extended, prices could soar
to extremely high levels.

Consequently, Mr. Truman asked for an

immediate one-year extension of the Price Control Act, for authority

^"Adopted from Congressional Quarterly, Federal Economic Policy.
1945-1967; Second Edition (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly
Publication, July 1967), pp. 22-48.
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to place ceilings on the sale prices of new and existing housing, and
for extension of food subsidies and authority to allocate scarce
materials.

The President's program of continuing wage and price con

trols as an inflation combatant encountered massive resistance from
three sources:

organized labor, businessmen, and the conservative

coalition in Congress.

Organized labor urged continuance of price

controls but wanted substantial wage increases.

Businessmen regarded

inflation a lesser threat than stabilization controls, particularly
price controls which were regarded as profit controls.

The conserva

tive coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats that dominated the
79th Congress were opposed to governmental interference with the
"natural, divine, God-given law™ of the market place (Rep. Roe, D.
Md.).

The Office of Price Administration came under heavy fire by the

conservatives before its budget of $1.6 million was approved.
(P L 79-329).
Meanwhile after six weeks of hearings, the House Banking and
Currency Committee reported a bill (HR 6042) providing for a one year
extension of the Price Control Act.

After much debate and several

control weakening amendments, the House passed HR 6042 as amended on
April 18, (356-42).

The Senate Banking and Currency Committee rewrote

the bill, weakening price control even further; other amendments in
the same vein were added from the Senate floor.

After a joint House-

Senate conference, the watered-down bill was sent to President Truman.
Mr. Truman vetoed HR 6042 June 29 because it did not provide effec
tive anti-inflationary tools.
After the Price Control Act expired on June 30, Congress began
rewriting the vetoed bill to provide for an extension of price control.
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The provisions deemed most objectionable by the Administration were
removed but the bill remained an ineffective inflation fighting tool.
Nevertheless, the President reluctantly signed HJ Res 371 July 25, on
the grounds that it was the best that could be achieved.

However,

after the November election of Republican majorities to both houses of
the 80th Congress, Mr. Truman ordered removal of most of the remaining
wage and price controls.

Prices increased rapidly.

1947
On October 23, the President called Congress into special session
(starting November 17) to deal with an interim aid program for Europe
and a domestic anti-inflation program.

Mr. Truman was alarmed because

since mid-1946 wholesale prices had risen 23 per cent.

The President

proposed a 10-point anti-inflationary program in which he again asked
for rationing and price and wage controls for selective use.

These

"drastic measures" were justified only because no other methods could
be safely counted on to successfully stop inflation.

Congress, how

ever, did not agree, for rationing and wage-price controls were not
part of the Anti-Inflation Act.

1948
In his annual message of January 7, President Truman again warned
the nation of the dangers of inflation and the possibility that con
tinued inflation could cause another depression.

He again appealed

for the enactment of his 10-point anti-inflation program and was again
rebuffed by the Republican Congress.
After a February break, food and farm prices began moving upward
again in April, paving the way for a "third round" of wage increases.

229
President Truman called the 80th Congress back into session on
July 26 to act on his anti-inflation, housing, civil rights and wel
fare proposals.

Again, his anti-inflation program was coolly received

by the Republican majority.

GOP hostility was buttressed by the di

vided council of Administration advisers during hearings.

Secretary

of Treasury Snyder and Federal Reserve Chairman McCabe were not enthu
siastic supporters of price-wage controls.

An amendment by Minority

Leader Barkely to authorize price control, allocations and priorities,
and regulation of commodity speculation was rejected by the Senate
33-53.
President Truman blasted Congress' anti-inflationary efforts as
a "feeble response" and asked them to consider the welfare of the
nation.

1949
Mr. Truman in his January 5 address to the 81st Congress stressed
the need to keep "our economy running at full speed" but warned that
inflation continued to pose a threat to prosperity at a number of key
points.
trols.

He again urged Congress to authorize stand-by price-wage con
He also asked for the authority to invest in or to build pro

duction facilities for steel or other items in critically short supply
if such action was found necessary to combat inflation.

The President's

Economic Report of January 7 and his budget message of January 10 also
warned against the remaining dangers of inflation.
Congress paid little attention to the President's anti-infla
tionary proposals embodied in the "Economic Stability Act."

Congress

agreed to extend rent control and some other stabilization policy, but
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refused to authorize price-wage controls, to extend credit controls,
to raise taxes or to grant authority to build productive capacity.
By mid-year, inflationary fears had given way to rising unemploy
ment and declining production as the 1948-49 inventory recession began.

1950
Recession had given way to recovery by the time of President
Truman's congressional message on January 4.

Consequently, policies

for bolstering economic expansion were in order.

The recovery turned

into a veritable boom after the outbreak of war in Korea on June 25
triggered a wave of hoarding as the public anticipated widespread
shortages.

The scramble for goods advanced the wholesale price index

12 per cent from June to December, and by the end of the year infla
tion was once again a problem of major national concern.
Mr. Truman made it clear that if further price increases
threatened stability he would again request price controls and
rationing.

On July 26, Bernard M. Baruch in testimony before the

Senate Banking and Currency Committee urged an immediate freeze and
roll-back of rents, wages, and prices to June 25 levels.

Furthermore

Congressmen were receiving a heavy run of mail protesting the post
June price rises.

Consequently, Congress became much more receptive

to inflationary control measures and debate on several bills began.
The Defense Production Act of 1950 restored authority to impose selec
tive and general controls on prices and wages provided they were
imposed simultaneously.
President Truman promptly established an Economic Stabilization
Agency (ESA) to explore voluntary methods of restraining price-wage
increases.

The first attempt at selective price controls came in
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mid-December, when ESA ordered a roll-back in auto prices to
December 1 levels after manufacturers had refused to conceal recent
increases and followed up with an order freezing auto wages.
The President created the Office of Defense Mobilization and
named Charles E. Wilson to head It, with general authority over pro
duction, procurement, manpower, stabilization, and transport policies
and programs.
1951
The conflicting goals of mobilization and stabilization dominated
economic policy and economic discussions in 1951.

When Economic

Stabilizer Eric Johnson announced a general wage-price freeze on
January 26 and subsequent price "rollback" orders, organized labor
withdrew its representatives from mobilization agencies in February in
protest against the wage freeze.

However, in spite of the lack of

labor's support the various controls and the higher tax rates combined
to limit the inflationary impact of the rapid increase in federal
expenditures.
In April, Mr. Truman asked for a two year extension of existing
stabilization powers and for additional powers.

He wanted authority

to build and operate defense plants, to subsidize high-cost producers
of scarce commodities, to extend mortgage credit controls to encompass
existing as well as new housing, to regulate commodity speculation,
and to control commercial as well as residential rents.

Hearings on

the President's requests, held concurrently by the House and Senate
Banking and Currency Committees followed the pattern of earlier dis
putes over economic controls!

support from Administration officials

and labor, sharp opposition from business interests.
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After much debate in both houses, Congress passed several Defense
Production Act Amendments and President Truman signed the bill on
July 31, even though he felt the measures were insufficient for com
bating instability.

The enacted Amendments extended the priority and

allocation powers of the President for one year; enlarged his authority
to requisition materials, gave him limited power to subsidize highcost production through purchase and resale, authorized expansion of
existing defense plants, and increased the amount that could be bor
rowed from the Treasury for defense production loans.

Price-wage and

consumer credit controls were extended.
1952
On January 9, the President called upon Congress to enact a
strong anti-inflation law and his economic Report of January 16 speci
fied a two-year extension of the Defense Production Act and a repeal
of several of the objectionable 1951 amendments.

However, instead of

strengthening the Defense Production Act, the legislators watered down
his stabilization powers still further.

The 1952 Amendments to the

Defense Production Act extended the President's authority to control
prices and wages to April 30, 1953.

1953
The climate of economic policy making changed with the accession
of a Republican Administration.

One of the basic goals of the new

administration was to put an end to price-wage controls and the acri
mony they had generated.

President Eisenhower, in his February 2 State

of the Union address, announced that he would not ask for renewal of
price-wage control authority expiring April 30, because these controls
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have proved largely unsatisfactory or unworkable.

The new President

let it be known that stability was to be maintained through the use of
"sound fiscal and monetary policy" ...and the natural workings of
economic law."

The Defense Production Act Amendments for 1953 did not

extend the President's wage-price control authority— not even on a
standby basis.

1954
The "rolling readjustment" 1953-54 recession extended 13 months
from July to the following August.

Although the recession was mild,

constant dollar Gross National Product dropped only 4 per cent, the
recession was sufficient to reduce inflationary wage-price pressures.
President Eisenhower's first Economic Report, reaffirmed his decisions
to rely on sound monetary and fiscal policies as the cornerstone to
stability and to avoid any other governmental "stirring or meddling"
in the economy.

1955
By the end of the year, the inflation potential in the economy
had become a matter of renewed concern to the Eisenhower Administra
tion.

Consequently, Congress extended the Defense Production Act to

June 30, 1965, but did not reinstitute wage-price controls.

1956
The President's State of the Union message and his Economic
Report extolled the achievement of "prosperity with general price
stability" but warned against the continuing possibility of inflation
or recession.

The Defense Production Act was extended again, this

time for two years, but no attempt was made to reinstitute wage-price
controls.

President Eisenhower began his second term with a warning against
inflation and an admonition to labor and management to help prevent a
wage-price spiral.

In his State of the Union message of January 10,

he pledged "the government's share in guarding the integrity of the
dollar," but said it could not do the job alone.

"Business in its

pricing policies should avoid unnecessary price increases especially
at a time like the present when demand in so many areas presses hard
on short supplies....

Increases in wages and other labor benefits

negotiated by labor and management must be reasonably related to im
provements in productivity.... Except where necessary to correct ob
vious injustices, wage increases that outrun productivity...are an
inflationary factor."
The same point was stressed in his Economic Report, which noted
that "high costs of raw materials and wage increases that tended to
outrun the year's small gain in productivity were pervasive factors
making for higher prices" of the previous year.
A decline in business investment in plant and equipment brought
an end to the economic expansion that began in 1954.

After mid-year

production dropped, employment fell off, and consumption expenditures
marked time, but prices continued to rise.

1958
The facts that the 1957-58 recession coincided with rising price
levels and defense outlays were raised in the wake of Soviet missile
and space exploits of the previous year combined to convince the
Administration that inflation was the greater threat to long-run pros
perity.

President Eisenhower, however, argued that the "mild, rolling
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readjustment" taking place in the economy would soon end, thus massive
intervention would not be necessary.

Besides, the President was

opposed to "going too far with trying to fool with the economy."

1959
Two legacies of the 1957-58 recession set the stage for a pro
longed conflict over economic policy in 1959:

the largest, peacetime

deficit in history, and the highest rate of sustained unemployment in
the postwar period.

To the Administration, the deficit spelled a

renewal of inflationary pressures, whereas to the Democratic majority
of the 86th Congress, the high unemployment rate reflected a low level
of economic performance traceable to laggard policies.

The policy

debate resulted in two separate studies of the economy by the Cabinet
Committee on Price Stability for Economy Growth and the Joint Economic
Committee.

The Administration's Cabinet Committee, chaired by Vice-

President Nixon, issued four "informational" reports, all supporting
the Administration position on the priority of price stability.

The

first categorically rejected price-wage controls as a cure more serious
than the disease.

From March 20, 1959, to January 1960, the Joint

Economic Committee held ten sets of hearings in connection with its
"Study on Employment, Growth and Price Levels," clearly a countermove
to Administration "education efforts."

The JEC's education efforts

were also more exhaustive than those of the Administration:

the

hearings resulted in 3,486 pages of testimony, 23 study papers which
added an additional 1600 pages, a staff report of 488 pages and a
final committee report of 156 pages— a total of over 5,700 pages,
which cost around $200,000.
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In his Economic Report, the President again called on business
and labor to practice self-restraint in setting wages and prices,
warning that the alternatives would be ruinous inflation or "alien"
controls.

Symbolic of the Administration's concern over inflation

was the President's request to amend the Employment Act to make price
stability an explicit goal of federal economic policy.

This proposed

amendment had widespread business backing, but organized labor opposed
the request on the grounds of conflicting with the goal of full employ
ment.

No Congressional action was taken on the request.
The House Government Operations Committee reported, on June 12, a

bill (HR 6263), introduced by Representative Reuss (D. Wis.), to amend
the Employment Act in several ways.

The major change proposed was the

provision directing the President to hold public hearings on price
increases he deemed a threat to economic stability and on wage increases
leading to such increases.

The Republican minority denounced the pro

vision as "price control and wage control by inquisition."

The bill

did not come to a vote, nor was any action taken on a companion bill
(S 1237) introduced by Senator Clark (D. Pa.).

1960
The partisan dispute over national economic policy intensified as
the two parties sought voter support.

The coalition of Republicans

and Southern Democrats were concerned with the threat of inflation and
the tendency toward "fiscal irresponsibility;" while the remaining
Democrats expressed continued concern over the mounting unemployment
rate which had increased to 4.9 million of 6.8 per cent of the labor
force by December.
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The Joint Economic Committee issued its final report on its
"Study of Employment, Growth, and Price Levels" on January 26.

The

Democratic majority argued that the 1957-58 inflation

had resulted

from instability of output, concentrations of market

power, and the

rising costs of services, none of which could

be halted by general

monetary or fiscal restraint without adverse side effects.
ity called for stronger antitrust enforcement, an

The major

annual labor-man-

agement conference, and standby authority for the President to invoke
a fact-finding procedure in key price and wage decisions which seri
ously threaten economic stability.
The Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth made
its final report on April 17.

This report, like the previous ones,

was essentially a defense of the economic policies of the Eisenhower
Administration— growth had not slowed down, 89 per cent of postwar
inflation had occurred before 1952 and the remaining 11 per cent did
not allow for improvements in quality— and a call for the continuance
of Eisenhower policies in the future.

1961
The change in Administrations was accompanied by a marked shift
in economic policy from an inflation orientation to one of recovery
and growth designed to end the 1960-61 recession and accelerate the
rate of economic growth.

President Kennedy requested the enactment of

five major anti-recession measures:

extension of employment compensa

tion systems, extension of aid to dependent children, an increase in
social security and retirement benefits, an
and aid to depressed areas.

increase in minimum wages,

APPENDIX B
Nature, Causes, and Proposed Remedies for the New Inflation
Summary of Views of Economists appearing
before the Joint Economic Committee
Study on Employment, Growth, and Price Levels

Dr. Sumner H. Slichter
Harvard University
(pp. 2-54;
Diagnosis: The rise of large, powerful trade unions— concentrated
among the largest, most efficient, and pattern setting firms.
Plus the governmental guarantee of full employment aggregate
demand.
Combines to put unions in a strong enough bargaining position to
cause wages to increase faster than productivity.
Policy Recommendations: Government should follow policies designed to
keep compensation per employee (wage rates plus fringe benefits) from
increasing faster than average output-per-man hour. Specifically,
tariffs should be decreased and import quotas abolished to provide
more competition from abroad and unnecessary subsidies should be
eliminated to provide more domestic competition.

Neil H. Jacoby
Professor and Dean
Graduate School of business Administration
University of California, Los Angeles, California
(pp. 55-92)
Diagnosis: Structural rigidities in the economy that retard flexible
wages and prices.
Policy Recommendations: Increase structural flexibility through (1)
more vigorous anti-trust, (2) removal of agricultural price supports,
(3) liberalization of trade policies, (4) elimination of government
stockpiles, (5) reforming the tax structure. Or minimize the inequi
ties of structural rigidities by (1) escalator clauses in all wage
and salary contracts, (2) repayment of all debts im constant purchas
ing power money, and (3) requiring all life insurance companies to
issue variable annuities.
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Leon H. Keygeirlirag
former Chairman
Council of Eooimaoiiic Advisers
President, Conference ora Economic Progress
consulting economist and attorney
(pp. 93-198)
Diagnosis; Excessive economic slack and ramemployment produce ineffic
ient and other facts which generate price inflation.
Policy Recommendations: 1. Increase rate off economic growth and
increase utilization of plant and manpower. 2. Require the Council of
Economic Affairs to set forth trends im wages, prices, profit, invest
ment and consumption consistent with optimum economic growth.

Theodore A. Anderson
University of California, Berkely, California
(pp. 2154- 21(68,!)
Diagnosis; The government failed to provide the proper economic
policies for optimum economic growth ([greater than 47.), consequently
productivity growth was retarded. Frartflnenmore, trade unions have
secured wage increases greater than prodmcttivity increases.
Policy Recommendations; 1. Economic policies designed to provide
optimum economic growth. 2. Provide a favorable economic environment
for the reabsorption of technologically displaced workers. 3. Enlist
the support of labor behind the concept that overall wages should not.
rise by more than productivity.

Arthur M. Okmm
Yale University
(pp. 2169-202)
Diagnosis;

Accepts wage push and bottleneck explanations, in part.

Policy Recommendations;
of slack markets.

1. Reduce bottlenecks.

2. Improve operation
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Robert K. Lanzillotti
State College of Washington
(pp. 2237-2261)
Diagnosis: Firms are capable of administering industry prices through
price leadership. Such firms prefer a price structure that (1) meets
general industry approval without undercutting, (2) provides desired
profit return necessary to cover expansion goals, and (3) can be pre
sented to public as being cost induced.
Policy Recommendations: 1. Government persuasion. 2. Government
encouragement and assistance of entry of new firms. 3. Use anti-trust
to combat market power by amending laws to cover (a) price leadership
and (b) implicitly collusive labor-management relations.

Abba P. L emer
Labor and Industrial Research Center
Michigan State University
(pp. 2262-2265)
Diagnosis:

Administered prices.

Policy Recommendations: Make administered prices behave like competi
tive prices, leaving only excess demand caused inflation that could be
dealt with through monetary and fiscal policy.

William J. Fellner
Yale University
(pp. 2333-2337)
Diagnosis: Powerful unions and corporations engaging in inflationary
wage and price setting— 'exclusive market power.
Policy Recommendations: Policy Alternating: 1. Reduce size of unions
and corporations to insure large number of bargaining units and pre
vent union-management collusion through broadened anti-trust, and
2. suspend collective wage bargaining when long-term unemployment is
above a certain figure.
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Calvin B. Hoover
Ddke (University

((pp. 2379-2384)
Diagnosis:

Cost-push inflationary forces.

Policy Recommendations; 1. Improvement in the organization and opera
tion of our cost-price system. 2. Additional studies on wages,
prices, profits, and productivity.

■.GnMffi (£„ Clark
(Director of Research
Fine Econometric Institute, Inc.
<(pp. 2445-2482)
Diagnosis: Since nonunion wages are rising as fast as union wages,
and profits are rising at approximately the same rate, some other deepseated force is at work. That force is taxation— corporate and per
sonal taxes. Under the present system an employer can purchase indus
trial goodwill by giving a wage increase, about half of which will be
born by the U. S. Treasmry.
Policy Recommendations: 1. Mednce government spending and rethink our
priorities— (have we dome more than our share of defense?) and our
social goods classification— ((especially education).
2. Decrease
taxes and revise the tax system to keep taxes below the safe limit for
taxation (257. or less off national income) because taxes and prices are
directly related.

Carl F. Orrist
(University of Chicago
((pp . 2483-84)
Diagnosis;

Excess aggregate demand.

Policy Recommendations:

Monetary and fiscal policies.

John K, Meyer
Harvard Kmiversity
((pp . 2485-2491)
Diagnosis: Oligopolists" desire to continue or to maintain specified
investment plans, withomt reconrse to external borrowing.
Generates
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two sets of pressures: (1) Excess demand in the investment goods
sector which generates an increase in prices for capital goods,
(2) higher prices for oligopolists' goods to finance investment through
higher profits and retained earnings.
Policy Recommendations: Reduce monopoly power.

Edward C. Budd
Yale University
(pp. 2516-2527)
Diagnosis: Rejects cost-push thesis because (1) not important for
public policy, (2) does not explain transmission of wages from orga
nized to unorganized sectors, and (3) impossible to obtain any empir
ical verification.
Policy Recommendations: Pessimistic about finding any rate of per
manent unemployment which would prevent a rise in wages greater than
the increase in productivity.

George H. Hildebrand
Director, Institute of Industrial Relations
University of California, Los Angeles, California
(pp. 2528-2543)
Diagnosis: Collective bargaining has contributed to rising wages and
prices since World War II, but it has not been the main factor.
Policy Recommendations: 1. Liberal monetary and tax policies designed
to increase investment, growth, and productivity. 2. Encourage
imports. 3. Retain collective bargaining.

Oscar A. Ornatl
Director of Labor Education Center
New School for Social Research, New York,
New York
(pp. 2543-2556)
Diagnosis: Excess demand for labor pulled up wages in the sectors
where trade unions are weakest and trade unions pushed up wages in
the sectors where excess demand was weakest. Collective bargaining
and modern personnel policies have reduced horizontal mobility and
have created artificial bottlenecks which have led to wage increases.

243

Policy Recommendationsi None called for. Rejects idea of using high
levels of unemployment to combat inflation as intolerable, immoral and
erroneous.

— |

.

--

Lloyd Ulman
University of California
Berkeley, California
(2556-2582)
Diagnosis: Collective bargaining has been one of several factors
contributing to the upward mo\'ement in wages and prices in the post
war period. But problems may diminish in the future because of
(1) increased foriegn competition, (2) shrinking of organized sec
tors of the non-farm labor force relative to the total, and (3)
growth in fringe benefits.
Policy Recommendations: The economic cost to the community entailed
by our national labor policy is surely outweighed by the benefits
flowing from the system of industrial democracy which that policy
has helped to establish.

^ark L. Kahn
Wayne State University
(pp. 2583-2588)
Diagnosis: We must be careful about attributing causation to collec
tive bargaining where little or none may actually exist.
Policy Recommendations: Governmental intervention In collective bar
gaining should proceed cautiously.

Charles C. Killingsworth
Michigan State University
(pp. 2628-2632)
Diagnosis: Unions generally do not possess sufficient independent,
unchecked market power to justify harsh measures which would imperil
the great benefits to our economy flowing from our present system of
collective bargaining.
Policy Recommendations: Rejects application of antitrust to unions
on the following grounds:
(1) the market power of most unions is
subject to certain limitations and restraints which are inapplicable
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to the typical business monopolist (e.g., unemployment and the market
power of the employer);
(2) applying anti-trust laws to unions would
not restore perfect competition in the labor market, but would destroy
unions and collective bargaining.

Frank C. Pierson
Swarthmore College
(pp. 2632-2635)
Diagnosisi Union market power is the capacity of labor organizations
to withstand or exceed employment terms that would have been obtained
in the absence of collective action on the part of the workers.
Our
present governmental policy is one of providing unions with market
power. Thus the question is— have unions seriously abused such mar
ket power?
Policy Recommendations: Our present knowledge indicates that general
corrective action is not called for, but there is need for an inten
sive examination in key industries— construction, steel, railroads,
and trucking.

Martin Segal
Dartmouth College
(pp. 2635-2640)
Diagnosis: The possession of some degree of market power is inherent
in the very institution of collective bargaining but virtually any
method of attempting to identify the special impact of collective
bargaining on the trend in recent years is open to question.
Policy Recommendations: After considering and rejecting the ideas of
applying antitrust laws to unions and/or high unemployment, the fol
lowing policies were suggested:
(1) require oligopolistic industries
to justify wage and price changes in public utility fashion, (2)
increase competition in oligopolistic industries, (3) increase inter
regional labor mobility, and (4) reduce barriers to trade.

Richard A. Musgrave
The John Hopkins University
(pp. 2757-2792)
Diagnosis:

Market power and inadequate public policy.
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Policy Recommendations: 1, Establish a fact-finding board with power
to: (a) hold public hearings, (b) supoena necessary data, and (c) make
recommendations.
2. If (1) doesn't work, take more drastic steps.

Fritz Machlup
The John Hopkins University
(pp. 2819-2861)
Diagnosis: The price increases from 1955 to 1959 should largely be
interpreted as a wage-push inflation.
Policy Recommendations: Either make employers more reluctant to
grant wage increases or unions more reluctant to ask for wage
increases through:
(a) removal of full employment guarantee,
(b) reduction or abolishment of protective tariffs and (c) exhorta
tion and public opinion. Regardless of method chosen employment
costs changes should not exceed the average increase in economy-wide
productivity.

Robert A. Gordon
Chairman of the Department of Economics
University of California, Berekeley, California
(pp. 2955-2987)
Diagnosis: At least seven factors combine to create an inflationary
bias in the economy:
(1) growth of organized labor, (2) management's
willingness to pay more for labor peace, (3) greater prevalence of
markup pricing, (4) growing resistance to price cuts, (5) increase in
overhead costs per unit of output, (6) resistance to recessions
removed— downward pressures on prices, and (7) different rates of
productivity increase.
Policy Recommendations: 1. Annual labor-management-government con
ference to discuss goals and coordination of policy.
2. Closer work
ing relationship between Federal Reserve System and organized labor.
3. Make economic report of the President more explicit about the wageprice objectives sought and combination of private and public policies
necessary.
4. Have goal of price stability written into employment
act.
5. Improve labor productivity.
6. Increase competition.
7. Improve coordination of policies.
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Walter W. Heller
University of Minnesota
(pp. 2988-3018)
Diagnosis: Excessively generous wage increases are passed on to the
consuming public in higher administered prices.
Policy Recommendations: Fact-finding body with powers of recommenda
tion to illuminate issues and bring the force of public opinion to
bear on wage bargaining.

APPENDIX C
Productivity Measurement Concepts

Productivity measurements may be classified on the basis of
coverage, treatment of output or treatment of inputs.
One classification treats the segment of the economy covered as the
key distinguishing feature:

economy-wide; private vs. public sectors;

within the private sector, agricu- ural vs. non-agricultrual productiv
ity and manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing; industry-wide productivity;
and even firm, plant and int.er-plant productivity measurements.
A second classification of productivity measurements can result
from the treatment of output.

For economy-wide productivity, gross

national product can be used but it must be converted into real terms
to reflect only changes in value due to changes in physical volume.
Attempts to subdivide further according to output present several dif
ficulties,

One, there is no satisfactory method of measuring the goods

and services provided by government, so the output of general government
is usually treated as roughly equivalent to the compensation of govern
ment employees (output = input, productivity = 1).

Two, many other

activities, such as services, construction, finance, research, house
holds, and non-profit institutions have no directly measurable products,
so indirect and rough techniques of estimation are used yielding con
ceptually obscure measures.

Three, existing data and techniques do not

provide a full accounting of the quality of goods and services pro
duced.

For a more detailed discussion of methodology see the following
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Bureau of Labor Statistics publications:

Methods and Procedures for

Developing indexes of Output Per Man-Hour in the Private Economy;
Trends in Output Per Man-Hour in the Private Economy, 1909-1958, BLS
Bulletin 1249; Indexes of Output Per Man-Hour, Selected Industries,
1939 and 1947-63, BLS Report 301; as well as the separate industry pro
ductivity reports for the concrete products, footwear, gas

and electric

utilities, man-made fibers, primary aluminum, steel, hosiery and air
transportation industries,
A third classification of productivity measurements results from
whether inputs are treated as partial or comprehensive.

Partial pro

ductivity measurements measure changes in the relationship between real
physical production and the amount of one and only one input, expended
in that production.

Real product per man-hour and the capital-output

ratios are examples of this type of productivity measurement.

Although

the measure relates to the output, in terms of the input, chosen (manhours or capital usually), the resulting ratios should not be interpre
ted to represent, the unique contribution of that factor to production.
Rather the measure reflects the operation of many factors (skill,
effort., technology, capital investment, capacity utilization, education
levels, layout and flow of materials, managerial skills, labor-management relations) not expressly included.

Thus, gains in output per

single input cannot be ascribed to any one factor (but reflect the
interaction of all factors) nor will other input indexes necessarily
follow the same trend.

Partial productivity indices are also affected

by shifts of output composition and by the shift of workers among estab
lishments with different levels of productivity.

For a more detailed

discussion of the method of calculating the output per man-hour indices
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used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics see Jerome A. Mark, "Industry
Indexes of Output Per Man-Hour", Monthly Labor Review (November 1962)
pp. 1269-1273, (BLS Reprint 2404).
A more comprehensive productivity measure incorporating both labor
and capital is John Kendrick's Productivity Trends in the United States
(Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1961).

Kendrick first calcu

lates an index of the amount of labor currently used in production in
relation to a base period (•— ) and an index of the real stock of capi-

0
tal currently used in production in relation to the same base period
(— ).

Next, these two indices a e weighted (by the labor's share and

K 0'

capital's share of national income— ja and _b respectively) and combined
to yield an index of total factor input.
L
K ""1
Ia(— )+ b(— )

L

L0

When total factor input

Y
is then divided into the index of national output (— ),

KoJ

*

the result is total factor productivity (C).
(1889-1957) show a sharp break at 1919.

Y0

Kendrick's measures

In the early period, the aver

age annual increase in real GNP was 3.9 per cent, labor and capital
inputs increased at 2.6 per cent, and total factor productivity by 1.3
per cent per year.

The later period (1919-1957) presents a different

picture; real GNP increased 3.2 per cent per year, while labor and capi
tal inputs increased by only 1.1 per cent per year, thus total factor
productivity rose by 2.1 per cent per year.

Why the decline in inputs?

The labor input growth rate may have declined because of the decrease in
hours worked (per week and per year), or because of the declining rate
of population increase (due to the cessation of mass migration and
declining rates of natural increase).

The decline in capital inputs

was more likely due to effects of the Great Depression— (capital stock
in 1945 was virtually the same as in 1929).

Kendrick estimates that
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since 1919, one-third of the increase in GNP was attributable to the
increase in labor and capital and two-thirds to total factor productiv
ity.

Total factor productivity measures (1) quality improvements in

inputs (education, health, and vigor of labor, and improved machinery,
building and equipment); (2) inputs not included in the equation (raw
materials, energy, managerial skill, research); (3) innovation and tech
nological progress; (4) the larger market and volume provided by an
expanding economy which serves to spread social overhead costs, to pro
mote greater specialization and to enable industry to achieve optimum
size; and (5.) shifting industry-r, ix of the economy (e.g., from agricul
ture to manufacturing to services).
The productivity-based wage policy proposed by the CEA is drawn
from productivity data for the national economy developed by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics based on rhe relationship between private economy
output per man-hour and real hourly earnings in the private economy.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics develops two sets of productivity
statistics:

output, per man-hour in the private economy and for selected

industries.

The national or average productivity data, used by the CEA

as the basis for the guideposts, are derived from estimates of real pro
duct and of man-hours,

The real product estimates represent the con

stant dollar value of goods and services produced in the private econ
omy.

They include the unduplicated value of the successive stages of

extraction, processing and distribution,

Data on real product for the

total private economy and the agricultural and non-agricultural sec
tors are compiled by the U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Busi
ness Economics; for manufacturing, the estimates of real product have
been developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Two major sources are used for data on employment and weekly hours:
the Bureau of Census data and data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Census labor force data are defined as output per hour worked: it does
not attempt to exclude all. non-worked hours such as rest periods and
stand-by time.

BLS data are defined as output per hour paid, but they

do not include such time as sick leave compensated for under insurance
programs.

Also, Census data are obtained frotn sample surveys of house

holds, whereas the BLS data are obtained from reports of establishments.
The man-hours are the sum of man-hours worked (or paid) of all persons
engaged in the various sectors of the private economy.

No distinction

is made between groups with different levels of skill and pay.
The BLS warns that in evaluating or using their output per manhour measures certain qualifications should be kept in mind.

(Methods

and Procedures for Developing Indexes of Output Per Man-Hour in the
Private Economy, BLS Bulletin No. 1249).

First, the data only provide

partial coverage for some industries or categories.

Second, existing

data and technique do not fully account for changes in the quality of
goods and services produced.

Third, there are problems of maintaining

consistency between methods of estimating output and labor inputs.
Fourth, the choice of a particular base year may have an effect on
trend.

Fifth, there is considerable variation in trends of individual

component factors and industries, many differing from the sector trend
and the trend for the private economy.

Sixth, year-to-year changes in

output per man-hour are irregular and, therefore, not necessarily indi
cative of long term trends.

Productivity measurements, therefore, can

not be considered to have the accuracy of precision instruments, but as
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general indicators of productivity movements that reflect the inter
action of all factors to gains in productivity.
The BLS also publishes indices of output per man-hour for selected
industries.

These industry productivity indices are computed by divid

ing an output index, primarily in physical units, by an index of aggre
gate man-hours.

Corresponding measures are also computed relating out

put to the number of employees.

Thus, the industry indices measure

changes in the relationship between output and employment and man-hours.
The output, indices are based primarily on the physical output of the
products of an industry combined with fixed period weights (man-hour or
un±t value).

Employment and man-hour indices are developed from basic

data compiled by the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
The distinction between the economy-wide measures of productivity
and the industry-wide measures calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statis
tics goes beyond coverage of the index.

The nation-wide productivity

index results from dividing private Gross National Product in constant
dollars by man-hours employed during the year— hence it is expressed in
money terms.

But some commodities are mot readily measurable in physi

cal terms and must therefore be estimated (e.g., government services).
Also quality changes and new products are not adequately incorporated
into the price indices.

An industry-wide productivity index is obtained

by dividing the physical output of an industry by the number of manhours employed.

This output is normally given in physical units and

normally reflects the use of products from other industries.

Further

more, many industry measurements restrict man-hours to the number of
direct labor hours employed (production workers).

The Council of Economic Advisers chose to use BLS indices of output
per man-hour in the total private eocnmramy.

Wo single productivity

figure was given in the 1962 or 1963 CEA Reports.

Again the 1964 spec

ified no single figure for trend productivity, but in a related table
the 3.2 per cent figure appeared as ithe latest figure in a column
labeled "Trend Productivity."

This figure was described as the annual

average percentage change in ou^pu* per mam-hour during che past five
years and was calculated by u^ing a five-year moving average.
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